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Letter from the Editor

Welcome to the twelfth issue of the American Public University System (APUS)'s *Saber and Scroll Journal*. The combined spring/summer issue's contents include a number of excellent historiographical essays, as well as feature articles that explore the theme of Population Movements and Civilization—the result of the summer 2015 call for papers.

This issue also marks a transition on the journal team, as Joseph (Joe) Cook will step in as Editor-In-Chief, beginning with the fall 2015 issue. Joe has been a senior editor with the journal and has contributed a number of articles, including “A Beloved Headache: Lafayette and His Reputation,” “Henry Clay is Dead: The End of Compromise in Antebellum America,” “The Future of Civil War Soldier Studies: The Failure of Courage,” “Unfinished Work: Oval Office Occupants and Aspirants Come to Gettysburg,” and “From Liddell Hart to Keegan: Examining the Twentieth Century Shift in Military History Embodied by Two British Giants of the Field,” published in this issue. Joe has personally produced works of exceptional scholarship and his background and attention to detail will position the journal for continued success.

Before stepping down as Editor-In-Chief, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the *Saber and Scroll Journal* team and to our wonderful and engaged academic advisors, Emily Herff, Dr. Robert Smith, and Jennifer Thompson. Special thanks are also due the APUS staff members who continue to support the journal, especially Sarah Jenkins, APUS Copyright specialist and Molly Fischer, editor of the APUS ePress, which hosts the *Saber and Scroll Journal* as well as the entire Student Affairs team. Additionally, special thanks are due to Michael Majerczyk, who has stepped in to help tackle Microsoft Publisher, the program used to produce the journal. I am grateful for the friendships made with this incredible group of people and I will continue to help and support our team efforts to create this exceptional journal.

Anne Midgley
Editor-In-Chief



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The *Franj* Invasion of Islamic Lands: *Muslim View of the Crusades*

Noah Hutto

Europe's Crusaders first began rallying to Pope Urban II's call for a Holy War following the Council of Clermont in 1095. He charged Christians to set aside their coreligionist struggles in order to set out and reclaim the holy lands of the Near East, specifically Jerusalem, from the 'infidel' Muslims.¹ The first, ill-prepared, non-combatant-driven expedition, the "People's Crusade," led by Peter the Hermit, was massacred almost to a man in August 1096.² Following that slaughter, Byzantine Emperor Alexius I consolidated the European generals in Constantinople and immediately launched the first "armed pilgrimage."³ This pilgrimage was not only successful, but provided the undertone of romanticism for further exploits. The rise in popularity and nod to "Christian duty" in the Western world still echoes with the exploits of the Crusader knights on their quest from God. Muslim historiography contradicts this line of thought and treats the "Crusades" almost as a footnote within the greater struggles of warring factions in the region—that they were in fact, "tiny and futile attempts to halt the inevitable expansion of Islam."⁴ In the beginning of the conflict, the Muslims did not even consider themselves involved in a religious struggle against Christianity.⁵

Aside from a handful of primary sources from some contemporary historians, such as the personal memoirs of Usāmah Ibn-Munqidh,⁶ or in the collective works of 'Izz ad-Din Ibn Al-Athīr, Abu Ya'la Hamza ibn Asad at-Tamimi (also known as Ibn Al-Qalanīsī), and Nasir ad-Din Ibn al-Furāt,⁷ most surviving historical Islamic sources reference early works that have been lost. Other surviving documents include significant revisions reflecting the views and motives of the author. Although the term *jihad* was a familiar lexicon in the Muslim world, the term *crusader* was not a term used by contemporary participants on either side of the struggle. It was not the Crusades, nor the Islamic reaction to them during the two hundred-year struggle, that shapes the modern-day world debate concerning the eternal struggle between Christianity and Islam.

Western views dominate the historiography of the Crusades, presenting a one sided view of a topic that is far from black and white. M.R.B. Shaw's translation of European noblemen Joinville and Villehardouin does just that. It captures contemporary views of Western Christendom's involvement in the Crusades.⁸ A true

discussion of this topic, often misrepresented in modern society, must include viewpoints that shed light on the opposite side of that same coin. There are some remaining contemporary writings, as mentioned above, and a handful of historians have sought to collect and translate additional scripts from either eyewitnesses or Arab historians using works no longer available. These sources, such as Amin Maalouf's *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, and Francesco Gabrieli's *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, are excellent in painting the necessary picture of conflict from the opposition's point of view.⁹

Two historians whose works are invaluable are Jonathan Riley-Smith and Carole Hillenbrand. Riley-Smith offers sound research for the Crusades and the overall period, without over reliance on either the Christendom or Islamic stance. His works, *The Crusades: A History* and *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, provides excellent frames of reference for the actual events that transpired in the Levant for over one hundred and fifty years.¹⁰ Hillenbrand, on the other hand, provided a remarkable resource for even the casual historian, capturing the more aloof interpretation of non-Christendom resources. In the second edition of *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, she referenced both the attacks of 9/11 and the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The following quote captures the soul of her work. "These events have had a profound impact on the 'crusade' discourse of certain 'jihadist' groups active today . . . such matters which are, of course, far removed from the realities of medieval crusading or Islamic history."¹¹ It is only through an examination of both perspectives that a solid conclusion exists. The Crusades, as the majority of the population understands them, are skewed by either misrepresentation or an underrepresentation of all parties involved. The present turmoil in the twenty-first century—including the fanatical Islamic terrorists groups with their self-proclaimed *jihad* against the West, establishes a foundation for the popularity of the propagandist use of the words "jihad" and "crusades." Both of these words gained momentum in mainstream lexicon of post 9/11 attacks on America. America's immediate reaction in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 magnified them. However, it was not until the nineteenth century resurgence of Arabic and Ottoman-driven history that the religious conflict of the past gained a link to the ongoing modern struggle.¹²

Before the Latin Church unleashed what modern society terms, "The Crusades," Islam had spread across the Near East, across North Africa, and across the Mediterranean Sea to the Iberian Peninsula, engulfing the nomadic Turcoman lands that bordered the southern boundary of the Byzantine Empire. Despite its

wildfire spread, it was far from a uniting force that produced anything like a “United Islamic Empire.”¹³ When Mohammed died in 632 CE, divided on succession, Islam splintered into two main factions.

Two distinct sects resulted from this splinter. The Shi’ites believe the caliphates, the political and religious leaders within a Muslim community, can derive only from a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed. The Sunni belief is contrary to this, believing that caliphates can, and should, rise to power from public demand. At the close of the eleventh century, the Shi’a powerbase was absorbed into the Fatimid Empire in Egypt and extended across Africa and into Palestinian territory. The Sunni powerbase, from a religious leadership point, stemmed from Baghdad with an “elected” caliphate, but its military power rested with the Seljuk Turks. Although based far to the east in present day Iran, the Sunni/Turk influence included portions of present day Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.¹⁴

When the *milites Christi* (knights of Christ), or the crusaders, first set out to liberate the city of Jerusalem in 1095, they did so at the height of the struggle between the two Islamic sects. This struggle “took precedence above all other affairs and the power of both Baghdad and Cairo stagnated.”¹⁵ In *The First Crusade: A New History*, Thomas Asbridge outlined that there was a “pathological hatred that divided the two main arms of the Islamic faith” so much so, that Muslims “had absolutely no intention of opposing the crusaders’ siege” of cities belonging to different sects or kingdoms. He further suggested that because of the constant power struggles between the Muslim sects, the original *Franj* invasions may have been confused with just another Byzantine campaign. Because of this confusion, there was not a distinction initially, but once the defending Muslims realized that their attackers were from Frankish lands, they identified their opponents as “*Franj*.” The Arabs described all European settlers and armies as *Franj*, never distinguishing between their actual nationalities.¹⁶

In addition to the internal fighting between rival tribes and rulers throughout the Near and Middle East, same-sect power struggles divided Muslims further. Mohammed’s death created a faith-based schism. In the same way, the death of local sultans, Turkish nobility (or *atabegs*), and caliphates increased the warring between coreligionists. Many lesser lords and rulers were eager to exploit any weakness in their neighbors hoping for an increase of their own powerbase.

Two examples outline the extent of the “fratricidal struggles” between the Seljuks (a Sunni Muslim tribe that established a Turko-Persian empire in Iran) and the Fatimids (a Shi’a Muslim tribe that established a dynasty that extended from

Atlantic North Africa across Egypt and into Syria and the Arabian Peninsula). Between these two opposing powerhouses fell the openly hostile city-states that dotted Syria and Palestine.¹⁷ First, between the years 1096 and 1099, control of Baghdad passed from usurper to usurper eight times. This translated to a new ruler every hundred days.¹⁸ Second, the underappreciated contemporary historian Ibn al-Athir authored an accurate reflection that the invading Christian armies, properly referred to by Muslim leaders as the *Franj* armies, easily seized and controlled large portions of territory. This success stemmed from the Islamic sultans' inability and unwillingness to work together against a common enemy.¹⁹ The modern Muslim historian Amin Maalouf summed up the deep-seated, individualistic approach of the warring Muslim empires perfectly, "In the eleventh century, *jihad* was not more than a slogan brandished by princes in distress. No emir would rush to another's aid unless he had some personal interest in doing so. Only then would he contemplate the invocation of great principles."²⁰

On the eve of the Europeans' arrival in Asia Minor in 1096, the level of infighting and dissension among Muslims peaked, for "virtually the entire upper echelon of the region's Islamic authorities [passed away] between 1092-1094."²¹ The Seljuk vizier, or high-ranking political advisor, and Sultan died in 1092. In Egypt, the Fatimid caliph and vizier died in 1094. The vacuum of power in the Muslim world hindered their resistance to European aims.²² Salahuddin Ayubi, or Saladin, would eventually found the Ayyubid dynasty that spread from his rise to power in Egypt and eventually included Egypt, Syria, and regions across Mesopotamia. In the midst of consolidating power, Saladin found himself in conflict with both Muslim and Christian adversaries. During the Third Crusade, Saladin commented to King Richard the Lionheart: "the land, it is also ours originally. Your conquest of it was an unexpected accident due to the weakness of Muslims there at the time."²³ Later, to his own confidant and historian, he commented on the fragility of the united Muslim *jihad* efforts against the Christians, "If death should happen to strike me down, these forces are hardly likely to assemble again and the Franks will grow strong. Our best course is keeping on the Jihad until we expel them from the coast or die ourselves."²⁴

So who were these invaders from Europe that arrived in the midst of the region's greatest internal strife? Muslim historians did not use the word "crusaders" when referencing the European forces. The terms "crusades" and "crusaders" were not contemporary terms of historians on either side of the conflict. Muslims grouped all Europeans into only two categories. Upon first arriving, all Europeans were deemed *Franj*, or the Franks (Pope Urban was from France). Later, contemporary

sources differentiated between the *Franj* and the *Rūm* (the Arabic term for the Byzantine Empire).²⁵ This distinction between the two did not occur immediately. The historiography reflects that Muslims were not aware that they were dealing with different foes than the Byzantine forces they had defeated without difficulty at Manzikert in 1071. The first indication of Muslim awareness that they were dealing with a different enemy did not occur until their first major defeat at the hands of Christian armies.

Even so, after the Muslims realized who the crusaders were they did not understand their intent. That is, they were unaware that the *Franj* arrived as *Muhjadeen*, or soldiers of a (in this case, Christian) Holy War. The only source that survived as the exception to this ignorance are the writings of As-Sulami, a Muslim cleric from Damascus. As early as 1105, As-Sulami recognized the European threat as a Christian *jihad* and began promoting Muslim unity as a necessary step for launching their own holy war to repel the European invaders. As-Sulami further prophesized that the arrival of the *Franj* in the Holy Lands was divine intervention. He believed that Muslims had strayed from the teachings of the Qur'an. This combined with the infighting made the European invasion an act of punishment on the Muslim world. He preached that spiritual purification for both the individual and for Islam as a whole rested on a united Turk-Kurd-Arab *jihad*. His insight received little attention, until some fifty years later with the ascension of Nur al-Din. Nur al-Din demanded a unified counter-*jihad* to expel the *Franj*.²⁶ Prior to Nur al-Din, *jihad* appears intermittently among Arabic historiography. When it does appear, it refers more often as propaganda or as an attempt to smooth over wrinkles stemming from same-sect armies warring with each other.

From the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, until the completion of the First Crusade and the European capture of Jerusalem, Muslims did identify the *Franj* separately from the *Rūm*. However, this separation only went as far as the Muslim consensus which indicated the *Rūm* were mercenary European armies but formed under the banner of the Byzantine Empire, and paid to re-conquer territories lost in 1084.²⁷ In this capacity, contemporaries, such as Yaghi-Siyan, the Muslim ruler of Antioch in 1097,²⁸ even legitimized the arrival of the Christian armies as honorable. It was honorable because they were waging a war to reestablish their original boundaries in Asia Minor.²⁹

By the middle of 1098, after the fall of Edessa and Antioch to a combined European crusader force, the Muslims did distinguish between the *Rūm* and the *Franj*. Furthermore, they highlighted the greater military prowess and fanaticism of

the *Franj*.³⁰ Despite actual friendships and even cordial visits among Christian settlements, contemporary historians are quick to riddle their histories with propaganda-based anecdotes. They pay tribute to *Franj* military skill but often lace the compliment with descriptions and stories that highlighted the “barbaric” and “backward” mannerisms of the *Franj*.³¹ Well known contemporary poet and adventurer, Usāmah Ibn-Munqidh wrote autobiographical accounts both during and after the early Crusades. He captured the life, struggles, and conflicts of the Muslim warriors and the Christian invaders. In his memoirs, he described the *Franj* in the following way, “when one comes to recount cases regarding the Franks . . . he sees them as animals possessing the virtues of courage and fighting, but nothing else.”³²

Not all observations and opinions were negative. One interesting story from Ibn-Munqidh records a surprising event. The Knights Templar (usually categorized with extreme disdain) extended an apologetic concern when they interrupted Usāmah during his Islamic prayers:

The Templars, who were my friends, would evacuate the little adjoining mosque so that I may pray in it. One day I entered this mosque . . . and stood up in the act of praying, upon which one of the Franks rushed on me . . . and turned my face eastward saying, ‘This is the way thou shouldst pray’. A group of Templars hastened to him, seized him and repelled him from me. I resumed my prayer [whereupon the Frank rushed in at him again]. . . . The Templars . . . expelled him. They apologized to me, saying, ‘This is a stranger who has only recently arrived from the land of the Franks and he has never before seen anyone praying except eastward.’³³

This fickle relationship between Christian and Muslim armies sheds light on an aspect overshadowed by the simple “us vs. them” mentality that accompanies discussions of the Crusades.

When the *Franj* first arrived, the internal power struggles so engulfed the Muslim world of the Near East that Muslims viewed the European armies as just additional players on the field of battle. Almost from the beginning, separate Muslim sultans and *Franj* leaders sought to suppress or defend against internal rivals, often signing treaties and alliances with rival religious armies. In later years, when a rift occurred between the Europeans, there were even Muslim/*Franj* alliances against rival Muslim/*Franj* alliances, and Muslim/*Franj* alliances fighting Muslim/*Rūm* alliances.³⁴

Again, it was not until Nur al-Din finished consolidating his own powerbase by uniting the Sunni areas of Baghdad, Damascus, Mosul, and Syria that a united Muslim front appeared.³⁵ In 1149, after vanquishing a combined Christian and Muslim force with his victory at Inab, Nur al-Din bathed in the Mediterranean, a gesture that symbolized his dominance over Syria. This consolidation of power served as the first phase of Nur al-Din's quest for eliminating the *Franj*, but as a *jihad*, against Muslims, it was a contradiction to the term. Ironically, his second phase also did not focus on Christian armies, and was another declaration of "Holy War" against Muslims. Through his upstart, Shirkuh (and later his son, Saladin), Nur al-Din then conquered the Shi'a Fatimids in Egypt, creating an extended unified Sunni caliphate that included Egypt. With the Shi'a subjugated, he turned his attention to the *Franj*, and the first *jihad* to eliminate the Christian invaders.³⁶

Since the Muslims did not originally understand that the Crusaders arrived with every intention of bringing a Holy War to the region, it is important to understand the Muslim concept and contemporary view of *jihad*. The sectarian struggle was so great at this point, that little interest existed in pursuing action that would expand the borders of Islam.³⁷ Only an imam, or the Islamic religious and worship leader, can grant permission for an offensive *jihad*. This forced a multi-tiered leadership structure akin to Stalin's Red Army, wherein he had both military and commissar leaders in tandem roles. According to the Qur'an, the call for an offensive *jihad* of such magnitude equated to "the Last Days," or the Islamic Day of Reckoning. That is, the "Last *Jihad*" is the final struggle between Muslims and non-Muslims.³⁸

Therefore, the actual concept of pursuing a Holy War against the Christians was foreign to the Shi'a and an afterthought for the Sunni. It was after Nur al-Din prevented the European Second Crusade from gaining momentum beyond strongholds in Syria, and Muslims united under one leader from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean to the Nile, that a true *jihad* occurred.³⁹ Just over eighty years after As-Sulami's warning, and three decades after Nur al-Din set out to remove the Christians, his successor, Saladin, set out for Jerusalem. Muslim armies marched into Jerusalem as victors over the *Franj* in 1187. Muslim defenders finally became involved, in every sense of the word, in *jihad*, and battle for the Levant commenced through a lens of the survival of Islam equated with the destruction of Christianity in the Middle East.⁴⁰

As the focus shifted from infighting to *jihad*, so too did Arabic historiography. Rather than the casual mentioning of a conflict with the *Franj*,

specific details emerge concerning prisoner exchange, beheadings, emissary encounters, and other interactions occurring between the two warring religious groups. Religious overtones influenced the historiography. Victories occurred because "God willed it," or "'the infidel' lack of faith in the One True God."⁴¹ In the same way, the Muslims attributed defeat to "God's Will," rather than to the *Franj's* superior military actions.⁴²

In addition, superfluous adjectives riddle the sources. "Glorious," or "exalted" precede the names of Muslim warriors, and "May God Damn Them" or "may Allah render them helpless"⁴³ follows mention of the *Franj* "infidels." The saturation of the historiography with religious overtones stems from the caliber of the historian. They were religious scholars, not historians, or military strategists. As such, they viewed all historical events "through the prism of faith."⁴⁴

The political circles within travel camps influenced contemporary historians. Much of the historiography that survived omits specifics in regards to strategies and tactics of the force-on-force battles or the sieges and counter-sieges that occurred throughout the Crusades. There were some exceptions, such as historical accounts from military veterans turned historians, but the typical account glances over any worthy description of tactics, strategies, and weapons.⁴⁵ Still, the greater concentration of writing falls on the Muslim warrior-leaders that led the *jihad* against the *Franj*. The writings reflect a tight focus on their piety, their dedication to the *jihad*, and the Islamic teachings of the Qur'an. Usamah summed up the Muslim approach to historiography. "Victory in warfare is from Allah and is not due to organization and planning, nor to the number of troops and supporters."⁴⁶

As stated above, many historians traveled in Muslim leaders' camps and often served as official secretaries or confidants. Thus, their accounts and descriptions are biased and highly propagandist. The genre of Arabic literature during this period was termed *adab*, and the primary purpose of this writing style was capturing a story that was both pleasing and entertaining to read. The writing also intended to teach some life or religious lesson to the reader. It was "not bound by conventions to tell the 'truth,' but sought rather to narrate a good story, even if in so doing the truth might be stretched a little, or more than a little."⁴⁷

Nowhere is this more evident than in the surviving accounts of Saladin. Saladin rose to power as Nur al-Din's lieutenant in Egypt. Once he was successful in overthrowing the Fatimid Caliphate, the two came dangerously close to warring themselves. The sudden death of Nur al-Din prevented the inevitable clash because Saladin claimed the rights as Nur al-Din's successor. His quick maneuvering allowed

for immediate subjugation of any opposition to his designs, and ensured the consolidation of the Egyptian kingdom within the vast empire left by Nur al-Din.⁴⁸

Saladin's first order of business in this consolidation phase was waging war against coreligionists, even among the same sect. The different opinions of Saladin in his own time are relevant today. Those that praise Saladin remark on his pious approach and dedication to the *jihad*.⁴⁹ According to Saladin's own historian, Baha al-Din Ibn Shaddad, Saladin "was very diligent in and zealous for the Jihad." He further praised his hero by recording that Saladin once remarked,

I have it in mind that, when God Almighty has enabled me to conquer the rest of the coast, I shall divide up the lands, make my testament, take my leave and set sail on this sea to their islands to pursue them there until there no longer remain on the face of the earth any who deny God – or die [in the attempt].⁵⁰

His desire for serving the best interest of Islam often skewed Saladin's treaties and alliances. Ibn Shaddad comments at length on a peace treaty signed by Saladin after a fierce battle outside Acre:

He continued to resist them [*Franj*], steadfastly, though they were in great numbers, until the weakness of the Muslims became evident to him. He then made peace at their request, for their weakness and losses were greater, although they were expecting reinforcements and we expected none. There was an advantage to us making peace, and that became clear when circumstances and fate revealed what they had kept concealed.⁵¹

In retrospect, Saladin was successful. He captured and secured Jerusalem from the Christians. Some Muslim historians still record the many treaties, non-aggression pacts, and alliances that occurred between the *Franj* and the Muslims with a negative connotation. The most prominent of these treaties was with Richard the Lionheart in 1192.⁵² Even though Saladin secured Jerusalem, the treaty left the coast from Tyre to Jaffa in the hands of the Christians. For this, Saladin suffered a backlash of accusations from contemporary accounts for not "taking the fight" to the infidels and failing to rigorously pursue *jihad*.⁵³ On the other hand, other Muslim historians recorded this same event in a positive light. They described it as the "nature" in which the relationship between *Franj* and Muslim changed as the local

Franj inhabitants were fully absorbed into the overall situation and struggles of the Near East. From the outset, the “nature” of war and power struggles throughout the Levant and the Near East suffered from any clarity of who was at war with whom. Muslims, Sunni, Shi’ite, Fatimids, and Christians, *Franj*, *Rūm*, all hoped for a foothold in the region as an extension of power. It was not a Crusade, nor was it a *jihad* as defined by Islamic leaders. It was a grasp for power.

It is evident from Muslim historiography that the Crusades' initial success caused a unifying effort through Zengi, Nur al-Din, and finally Saladin. Further, it was the realization that the Europeans were waging their own Holy War that served as the impetus behind their own *jihad*. However, evidence also exists that the *Franj* were not specifically anti-Islamic, and the two religions co-existed before, during, and after the Crusades.⁵⁴ Three contemporary sources remark that the *Franj* were tolerant of Islamic practices within the lands they controlled. First, Imad ad-Din commented that the *Franj* “changed not a single law or cult practice of the [Muslim inhabitants].”⁵⁵ Second, Yaqut remarked, “the Franks changed nothing when they took the country.”⁵⁶ Third, Ign Jubayr echoed Yaqut’s observation, when he wrote, “in the hands of the Christians [the shrine at Ain el Baqar and its] venerable nature is maintained and God has preserved it as a place of prayer for the Muslims.”⁵⁷

Muslims themselves did not have a term for the “Crusades.” Until the nineteenth century, they referred only to “the invasion by the *Franj*.”⁵⁸ In the 1890s, the Ottoman Empire suffered humiliating defeats in the Balkans. This brought the end to the last great Muslim Empire. Afterwards, non-Muslim religions surrounded the Muslim Middle East. This caused a rekindled interest in the champions of Islam—namely Nur al-Din and Saladin. Furthermore, the Ottoman Sultan called for the unification of Muslims under one authority.⁵⁹ It was not until this resurgence, nested within a romantic notion of the great *jihad* against Christianity, that the term *Hurab al-Salibiyya*, or “Wars of the Crusades,” came into use.⁶⁰

The European “Holy War” and presence in the Near East lasted less than 200 years.⁶¹ This period is minute considering the great and vast history of the cradle of civilization. Ultimately, the Crusades were a failure. Only the initial shock and initial Muslim dissension allowed the First Crusade any real measure of success in the Muslim Near East. Anachronistic manipulation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries transformed the Crusades into a modern day “rally cry” of Islamic extremists. Thus, terrorists enacted their own warped version of *jihad*. Jonathan Riley-Smith noted that until this modern misrepresentation, “Muslims . . . looked back [on the crusaders] with indifference and complacency. They believed, after all,

that they had beaten the crusaders comprehensively . . . [and] had driven them from the lands they settled in the Levant.”⁶²

In the 1930s, Muslims claimed, “[The] West is still waging crusading wars against Islam under the guise of political and economic imperialism.”⁶³ In the 1970s, Islamic Nationalists, under the leading ideologist Sayyid Qutb, defined "crusading" as “any offensive, including a drive for economic or political hegemony, against Islam anywhere by those who called themselves Christian . . . and to any aggressive action by their surrogates, like Zionists or Marxists.”⁶⁴ The argument today that the “*Franj* Invasion” that began in the late eleventh century is the impetus of today’s claims of a religious war between Christianity and Islam is unfounded. Eastern historiography on the “Crusades,” suggests the Muslims of yesterday gave the *Franj* invasion little attention. Muslims did not inherit bitter, hate-filled accounts of the Crusades from their contemporaries⁶⁵—rather their main interest lay in recording the everyday Muslim views and portraying comic book-esque plights of their heroes and champions of Islam.⁶⁶

Afterword

The concept of this essay arose from the peculiarities of the author’s specific situation when his research was at its infancy. Extensive reading and scribbling of notes occurred in the backseats of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles while on breaks from traveling, almost daily, from the mission at hand. The author served as a Captain on a United States Army Military Transition Team (MiTT) in the position of Combat Advisor for Iraqi Army Officers. He assisted in the training and rebuilding of the Iraqi Army in 2009. Thus, working hand-in-hand with the Iraqis, daily interaction occurred with both the Iraqi Army counterparts and/or the five interpreters assigned to the team—all of them Muslim. Both the Shi’a and Sunni sects were represented. Having received weeks of cultural awareness and even elementary Arabic language training, the author saw a great opportunity and environment for discovering the Islamic/Arab view of the European Crusades.

Not long after research began, one of the interpreters commented on one of the sources. “Do not trust everything you read, especially in Arabic history—most of it is twisted or is lies, time after time in order for politics and dictators to influence the minds of the Arabic people.” It was an interesting point of view.

A few days later, another interpreter, who was also attending Baghdad University for a degree in History, remarked that in his University, and in Iraq in general, historical lessons only concentrate on Classical History, such as the Greeks and Romans. This made sense to him, because “Arabs know that most history after that is just made-up, to give the messages of the people in power.” Because he held this viewpoint with such passion, there was no point in explaining that not only were Greek and Roman historians guilty of manipulation, but also, unless approached from a purely scholarly lens, all history contains biases or propaganda. Within three weeks of the initial research, all five interpreters and three accompanying Iraqi officers echoed the same sentiment. The “*Franj* invasion” was hardly a footnote in Arab or Muslim history. All agreed that Saladin is overrated as a hero, having warred against fellow Muslims more than Christians, and that any history regarding Saladin is circumspect at best. One even remarked, through a “thousand-yard stare,” that during Saddam’s reign over Iraq, there was endless comparison of Saddam to Saladin—both from Tikrit and both power-hungry at the expense of their own people and Muslims in general.⁶⁷ With that in mind, the author researched the topic and the above article is a product of that work.

Notes

1. Thomas F. Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 7-8.

2. Ibid., 16-18.

3. Norman Housley, *Contesting the Crusades* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 15.

4. Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades*, x.

5. Thomas Asbridge, *The First Crusade: A New History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 114.

6. Usāmah ibn-Munqidh, *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman & Warrior in the Period of the Crusades: Memoirs of Usāmah Ibn-Munqidh* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

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11. Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), xiv.
12. Ibid.
13. Asbridge, *The First Crusade: A New History*, 113.
14. Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 37.
15. Asbridge, *The First Crusade: A New History*, 113.
16. Ibid., 186.
17. Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, 19.
18. Maalouf, *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, 55.
19. Ibid.
20. Maalouf, *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, 21.
21. Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 38.
22. Ibid.
23. D.S. Richards, trans., *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, or al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya wa'l-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya* by Baha' al-Din Ibn Shaddad (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2002), 186.
24. Ibid., 195.
25. Maalouf, *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, 20-21.
26. Thomas Madden, ed., *The Crusades* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 221.
27. Maalouf, *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, 21.
28. Ibid.
29. Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades*, 46.
30. Madden, ed., *The Crusades*, 224.
31. Riley-Smith, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, 233.
32. ibn-Munqidh, *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman*, 161.
33. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 71.
34. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*; Christopher Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 344.
35. Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades*, 344.

36. Ibid., 345.

37. Asbridge, *The First Crusade: A New History*, 116.

38. Qur'an. Surat At-Tawbah, 9:5,29. There are numerous references throughout the Qur'an in regards to *jihad* between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the "Last Days." In 9:5 a particular course of action is outlined and in 9:29, specific reference to the "Last Days" occurs.

39. Riley-Smith, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, 228.

40. Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades*, 51, 63-64.

41. Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, 32.

42. Ibid.

43. Riley-Smith, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, 233.

44. Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, 32.

45. Ibid., 432.

46. Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, 433.

47. Ibid., 261-262.

48. Maalouf, *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, 174.

49. Richards, trans., *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, 27.

50. Ibid., 29.

51. Ibid., 27.

52. Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, 184; Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 146.

53. Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, 184.

54. Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 158-159.

55. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 70.

56. Ibid.

57. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 70.

58. Riley-Smith, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, 259.

59. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 305.

60. Riley-Smith, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, 259.

61. Margaret R.B. Shaw, trans., *Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades* (London: Penguin Books, 1963), 7.

62. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 305

63. Ibid., 306.

64. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 307.

65. Ibid., 306.

66. Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, xvii.

67. A fact that was actually referred to in the Epilogue of Carole Hillenbrand's *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, page 595. See Bibliography.

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From Liddell Hart to Keegan: Examining the Twentieth Century Shift in Military History Embodied by Two British Giants of the Field

Joseph J. Cook

American Civil War general Richard Taylor wrote plaintively, “Although since the days of Nimrod war has been the constant occupation of men, the fingers of one hand suffice to number the great commanders.”¹ While a bit of an exaggeration, a similar statement could be made about the scarcity of great military historians. Two British historians of the past century could be credited with the label of greatness during their lifetimes, while writing vastly different forms of history. In many ways, Basil Henry Liddell Hart and John Keegan—both knighted for their contributions—symbolized, respectively, the traditional and new approaches to writing military history. Therefore, they form an effective duo to illustrate the shift in historiography the field underwent during the twentieth century.

Scientific professionalism defined the field of history in the mid-twentieth century United Kingdom—a time when Liddell Hart was at his professional height and Keegan was undergoing his education. The modernist school of history prominent in the United Kingdom believed that objective analysis would lead to historical truth. Traditional historiography remained intact, defined by “intellectual excitement, eloquence, and an empiricism which saw the world as open, filled with unique phenomena, and accessible to conscientious research.”² Political history and grand narrative remained popular, with attention paid to the prominent individual actors who shaped history. Liddell Hart embraced this custom. However, the *Annales* school was on the rise in France at the time, and its “eagerness to reject traditional historiography” influenced some Brits.³ However, “Even at the high tide of social history, English historiography never neglected the traditional topics, dealt in customary ways.”⁴ In many ways, these British social history adherents embodied the “*humanisme historique*” which the *Annales* group of France may have sought: an approach that “acknowledged the impact of large-scale forces on human life while respecting the role of the individual.”⁵ John Keegan took inspiration from this new emerging group.

Basil Henry Liddell Hart was a member of a new breed of military historians who came to prominence at the end of the nineteenth century and start of

the twentieth century. The group—in which Hans Delbruck and J.F.C. Fuller were prominent members—was able to apply personal military experience to its work. “A European university education of the 19th century consisted largely of a classical education in which the original texts were read. Many university graduates of the aristocratic classes became high-ranking military officers, who did pore over the accounts of ancient warfare for modern lessons.”⁶ Reflecting on his studies of the ancient texts, Liddell Hart contributed a new biography of Scipio Africanus, the Roman general that defeated Hannibal; focusing on his talent for mobile warfare, Liddell Hart deemed Scipio to be “Greater than Napoleon”—a straightforward subtitle to his book.

Subtlety was never a strong attribute of Liddell Hart’s. To some rivals in the field—and at least one biographer, John Mearsheimer—Liddell Hart’s prominence in the field was largely the creation of his own self-promotion. However, much of the criticism was aimed at Liddell Hart as a supposed military theorist and innovator, not as a military historian. Liddell Hart devoted his military histories to promoting the universal success of mobile warfare—from the Mongols to the tanks of World War I. Some credited him as the innovator of blitzkrieg. “Of course there is a good deal about which Mearsheimer is correct. Liddell Hart did overstate his contribution to armored warfare at the expense of others, most notably Fuller.”⁷ Mearsheimer’s critiques, however, were tainted by the fact that his book had the tone of a character assassination. Other critics could retain “the greatest respect and affection for the man himself,” and for his historical scholarship, but Mearsheimer could not “separate the man from his ideas.”⁸ At any rate, Liddell Hart’s influence within the government as a theorist and policy-maker is not the present issue at hand; rather, it is his contribution to historiography.

Liddell Hart fully embraced traditional, professional approaches to writing military history. He had no qualms about the great man theory of history. A quick scan of his prominent books reveals lengthy biographies of Scipio, William T. Sherman, Edmund Allenby, and the German high command of World War II (he even edited the papers of Field Marshal Rommel). Each delved into the realm of military theory, and may have taken Liddell Hart out of his element, promoting his obsession with mobile warfare. Yet his focus on strategy at the upper echelons of military leadership was perfectly in line with the traditional approach to writing military history.

He was not without flaws as a historian. In his work concerning contemporary generals of the great World Wars, Liddell Hart was frequently guilty

of breaking his own cardinal rule for history: objectivity. For example, in his discussion of Allenby, the British general of World War I, he usefully quoted a tribute by T.E. Lawrence (who served under Allenby and admired him), but then Liddell Hart inserted his own perspective by adding an aside: "That tribute, if examined, is found to leave out any estimate of mental ability. And I have reason to know that the reservation was intentional."⁹ In the same book in which Liddell Hart included that and other unnecessary subjective asides based on his own disenchantment with the British high command (awfully impertinent for a mere staff captain), he concluded with an appeal for "the objective study of history as a guide in dealing with our present-day military problems."¹⁰ Liddell Hart never seemed to recognize the contradiction. Nevertheless, contemporaries viewed it as "undoubtedly a good book" and the author as "a military historian whose work has been of incalculable benefit to the army."¹¹

Beyond his efforts at portraying/promoting himself as a military theorist and despite his unfortunate knack for personal subjectivity in his evaluation of contemporaries, Liddell Hart made valuable contributions to military history and historiography. His military training allowed him to insert personal knowledge into his study of logistics and other critical fields. "The emergence of modern war on an unprecedented scale" and the replacement of the "art of war" by "military science" created a new atmosphere for historical inquiry in the first half of the twentieth century—an atmosphere that Liddell Hart effectively fused with ancient military campaigns he studied.¹² Scientific approach to history was prominent in Liddell Hart's scholarship. Although he broke his own rules far too often in writing contemporary history, the bulk of his work on military history dealt with subjects with whom he had no personal acquaintance and thus no reason for grudges. With his fondness for grand narratives and biographies, it can be stated that he was fortunate to have lived when he did. Yet coming at the end of one's era does not diminish one's own contributions. In a highly-complimentary assessment, British military historian Ronald Lewin considered this concept:

In the Himalayan range of the great thinkers about warfare he was one of the last and undoubtedly one of the pre-eminent peaks. The time-span he covered spread from the Mongols to Montgomery—and . . . virtually all his writing and ratiocination concerned . . . the military activity of human beings in the old, the traditional and the conventional sense. He was lucky—if it may be called lucky—to

have lived through a period in which two world wars provided him with practical exemplifications (and often contradictions) of ideas about which he had only latterly, because of nuclear development, to make a radical re-appraisal.¹³

The history field that Liddell Hart left behind at the time of his death was not the same as that in which he thrived, but neither was the world.

It could be said that Liddell Hart was the last of the great military historians of his era. He spent a life applying new professional approaches to ancient subject matter and attempting to apply its lessons to his modern world. Yet the world in his final years was vastly different even from that of the World Wars when he served as an advisor (“the Captain who taught Generals,” as Lewin called him). This world was one with which Liddell Hart was not essentially concerned, with its “inter-continental missiles, over-killing, satellites, moon-flights.” Lewin mourned Liddell Hart’s departure, with reference to his grand narrative of mobile warfare in history: “A direct line running from the Mongols’ horses to Montgomery’s tanks has probably—though not decisively—been broken: and broken, in particular, from the point of view of the military critic. With Liddell Hart’s death, it might be said, God shattered a mould.”¹⁴ Before passing away, however, in his reflections on a lifetime of work and on military history as a field, Liddell Hart offered a grim perspective: “I would add that the only hope of humanity, now, is that my particular field of study, warfare, will become purely a subject of antiquarian interest. For with the advent of atomic weapons we have come either to the last page of war, at any rate on the major international scale we have known in the past, or to the last page of history.”¹⁵

Of course, this fatal prognostication of the military history field did not come true. In another of his contradictions, Liddell Hart offered the reason for this in the same essay in which the prediction appeared. Attacking those who criticized the field of military history, he stated plainly, “Can anyone believe that the history of the world would have been the same if the Persians had conquered Greece; if Hannibal had conquered Rome; if Caesar had hesitated to cross the Rubicon; if Napoleon had been killed at Toulon?” Turning his attention to his own home nation, he added, “Can anyone believe that England’s history would have been unaffected if William of Normandy had been repulsed at Hastings? Or—to come to recent times—if Hitler had reached Dover instead of stopping at Dunkirk?”¹⁶ War undeniably affected the course of history since the earliest days of man, and could not be ignored.

Yet while it could not be ignored in history, the field of military history

could evolve in a new direction, and the second historian in this examination helped propel it on that new track. John Keegan emerged on the scene in 1976 with an instant classic: *The Face of Battle*. While serving as a professor at the elite British military academy at Sandhurst, Keegan buried himself in research concerning soldier experiences in British history. Examining the battles of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme, Keegan wove a narrative of universally timeless characteristics of soldiers in combat. “Drunkenness, mayhem and earsplitting noise were rampant, he found. This was military history in a new key.”¹⁷ The book was an instant classic and is still in print more than three decades later. The seminal book created intense new interest in the field of soldier studies, focusing on the common men of the army rather than the generals and grand strategy which held Liddell Hart’s attention.

Keegan pulled no punches in his introductory chapters to *The Face of Battle*, pointing out the insufficiencies of traditional historiography in military history. Aside from mere criticism of the general ignorance or indifference demonstrated toward the common ranks in traditional history narratives, he was particularly pointed in his assault on the art of history writing itself. He harshly stated that private soldier’s accounts were used improperly: “At worst, they are mined for ‘interest’, to produce anthologies of ‘eye-witness accounts’ in series with titles like *Everyman at War* (*The Historian as Copy-typist* would be altogether more frank); at best, they serve as the raw material for what is not much more than anecdotal history.”¹⁸ He also deplored those who took the scientific approach to history too far and “achieved the remarkable feat of writing an exhaustive account of one of the world’s greatest tragedies without the display of any emotion at all.” Keegan admitted that “Historians, traditionally and rightly, are expected to ride their feelings on a tighter rein than the man of letters can allow himself,” but the entirely emotionless result was inexcusable in his opinion.¹⁹

Despite his hopes for the new, social, bottom-up direction of military history he was proposing, he knew that the wider community of professional military historians might be ambivalent about it at first. “The insight which intimacy with soldiers at this level can bring to the military historian enormously enhances his surety of touch in feeling his way through the inanimate landscape of documents and objects with which he must work.” Clearly optimistic about soldier studies, he was nonetheless wary concerning other historians: “It will, I think, rob him of patience for much of what passes as military history; it will diminish his interest in much of the ‘higher’ study of war—of strategic theory, of generalship, of grand strategic debate, of the machine-warfare waged by air forces and navies. And that, perhaps, is

a pity.”²⁰ Liddell Hart and his contemporaries would surely disagree with the “perhaps” part; this was spitting in the face of the military history tradition of the previous century. Yet Keegan then proposed that even critics would be won over when they recognized several things about this new direction (“to question, as I have found it does me—the traditional approach”), particularly the great depth which it could *add* to their traditional work, rather than detract from it.²¹ While the general field of history was evolving, military history could not afford to remain stagnant.

It should be noted that Keegan did not invent the new historiographical shift. Rather, the wild success of his book helped to popularize, shape, and advance the new mold. He traced the birth of the new historiography himself in a 1978 article for the *International Security* journal titled “The Historian and Battle.” In this article, aside from describing his own early experiences in research and methodology, he explained:

[M]ilitary history underwent a remarkable change. I noted at the outset that battle is a popular subject, both with readers as with authors. But it has not in recent times recommended itself to professional historians. Because battle is the central act of warfare, it and associated subjects—the lives of great commanders and their thoughts—have monopolized historiographical enterprise in the military field. But about twenty years ago, that sort of military historiography began to give way to a new approach, comparable in many ways to that of the new historiography of politics and society. The reasons why that happened are, I think, obvious. It was the historiographical heritage of the Second World War.²²

The Second World War, the final conflict which Liddell Hart could actively examine and write about, changed the field of military history forever. Keegan embraced and stepped to the fore-front of this new social-conscious historiography.

Keegan continued building a reputation as a leader in the new vein of soldier studies, including creating a comprehensive history of warfare. Agreeing with Liddell Hart’s assessment of the inevitability and primacy of war, Keegan “presented swaths of military history, reaching back to prehistoric times to put war in cultural context. Controversially, he rejected Clausewitz’s dictum that war is politics by other means, insisting that war is even more integral to civilization.”²³ Some reviewers

believed he took this too far. One was perplexed by Keegan's "constant, and at times trifling, battle with Clausewitz." Nevertheless, this same reviewer praised Keegan for attempting to fuse military and social history, admiring his "synthesis of some of the best recent interdisciplinary work on warfare to provide a coherent framework to understand non-political, non-technological studies of the subject."²⁴ Another reviewer had a more positive reaction to his approach to Clausewitz. "Just as philosophers are stuck with Kant, teachers of military history are stuck with Clausewitz, whose fat and barely translatable German book is what they need to make their subject academically respectable. But that does not make Clausewitz right, far from it."²⁵ Accepting the premise that Clausewitz made military history academically respectable—which can certainly be disputed—Keegan was making a major historiographical leap by directly challenging the Prussian's work. Reception was mixed, but clearly he was attempting to move military history forward and into a wider context.

Aside from shifting focus to the common soldiers, Keegan incorporated many other fields into his study of military history. *The Face of War* and *A History of Warfare* incorporated social, psychological, cultural, and economic lines of inquiry. He then turned his attention to another factor that was only beginning to gain prominence in military history. In the post-World War II period in which Keegan rose to prominence, "The most innovative historiographical movement of the era, the Annales school, developed an agenda which stressed deep structural actors such as geography, climate, and population instead of military and political events."²⁶ Keegan had tackled population in his two aforementioned books. In *Fields of Battle*, he shifted his focus to geography and climate as a determining factor in broad military history. Focusing exclusively on North America, he paid particular attention to men such as Samuel de Champlain and George Washington, who had professional experience as a mapmaker and a surveyor, respectively.²⁷ He later returned to the theme of North American geography in his history of the American Civil War. Expanding his range further in other books, Keegan focused on the value of military intelligence—including examinations of the cultural images of spies—in *Intelligence in War*, and on the appeal of leadership in *The Mask of Command*, which relied heavily on psychology.

Despite his pre-eminence in the field, however, Keegan was not immune from missteps. Like Liddell Hart, Keegan's blunders tended to occur when he overreached. The controversy of his efforts to dispute Clausewitz's famous dictum has already been seen. *A History of Warfare*—as his most ambitious and wide-ranging

effort—seemed to elicit the most controversy altogether. One glaring error by Keegan in the book was a puzzling dismissive attitude toward gender history: “Keegan explicitly refuses to address women in this study, content instead to argue that they ‘have always and everywhere stood apart.’ Such a blanket exclusion undermines his own powerful logic.”²⁸ Critics also attacked the book for its dismissive attitude toward irregular forms of warfare. Identifying state-run armies and murderous mobs as the two collective actors in warfare, he determined that “only the state-run kind deserved serious study.”²⁹ The twenty-first century War on Terror has proven the error of Keegan’s thinking in this area. Finally, his history of the American Civil War, published in 2009, focused largely on geography throughout the narrative, but reached an unsatisfactory conclusion in turning to social/economic questions. In this book, Keegan seemed a bit careless with facts throughout, and his conclusion that the horrors of the Civil War in the United States essentially frightened the Americans from ever staging a socialist revolution seemed terribly undeveloped by evidence.

What can be said in conclusion about the two British stalwarts of military history in the twentieth century, Liddell Hart and Keegan? The two men sat on opposite sides of a historiographical divide—one helping to usher out the traditional in grand fashion, the other propelling and rejuvenating the field after the horror and destruction of two World Wars diminished interest in military affairs. Both created controversy through their work, typically the result of oversteps—always a risk for historians in development of a thesis. In many ways, both men failed to appreciate the turns the world would take near the ends of their lifetimes. Liddell Hart was not a man suited to writing about inter-continental ballistics or nuclear weapons—and over-emphasized the fatality of nuclear weapons on the field of military history, almost as if to claim that military history could not continue without him. Keegan failed to appreciate the tremendous impact non-traditional armed forces could have on the battlefield of the twenty-first century.

As General Taylor stated in his 1870 memoirs, war has been the constant occupation of men since the days of Nimrod. The seven score years since Taylor wrote that have done nothing to halt that endless cycle of human destruction. To borrow another phrase from Taylor, “May we not well ask whether religion, education, science and art combined have lessened the brutality of man since the days of [Albrecht von] Wallenstein and [Johann Tserclaes, Count of] Tilly?”³⁰ Liddell Hart and Keegan went far beyond Wallenstein and Tilly in their examination of the past—reaching all the way to ancient times. Examining the subject on

different levels and from different intellectual angles, they satisfied Liddell Hart's prescription for finding historical truth: "Truth is a spiral staircase. What looks true on one level may not be true on the next higher level. A complete vision must extend vertically as well as horizontally—not only seeing the parts in relation to one another but embracing the different planes."³¹ While Liddell Hart focused primarily on the upper levels of the military hierarchy and political structure, Keegan filled in the foundation as best he could with focus on soldier studies and varied social sciences.

Neither man believed war was possible to be done away with, though Liddell Hart believed it needed to be and Keegan referred to himself as "95 per cent pacifist."³² As Keegan put it, "I don't think you can run this wicked world without armed force."³³ If one accepts Liddell Hart's basic premise that one studies history in order to learn how not to repeat it, this sense of the inevitability of warfare is troubling. Keegan never portrayed himself as a military theorist or strategist in the sense that Liddell Hart did, and was more interested in explaining the past than prognosticating the future. With the depth of his analysis, he helped take the military history field from the high level grand narratives of Liddell Hart to the multi-faceted histories that are expected of professional historians in the modern era.

Like Shakespearean tragic figures, both Brits were undone at moments by their own excessiveness. This should serve as a cautionary tale to military historians in the post-Keegan world. Keegan was generally successful in avoiding Liddell Hart's vice, by leaving personal feelings out of his work. Modern military historians must recognize the dangers of over-reaching in thesis as Keegan was occasionally wont to do. This can be corrected in one of two ways. The reach of new military histories can be drawn back to conservative levels, safely protecting the historian from such charges. Or the military historian could delve even more deeply into the subject than Keegan did, incorporating the fields that he ignored such as gender history. Certainly the latter approach is preferable. Keegan and his contemporaries advanced historiography along a new path from the tradition of Liddell Hart. It is the next generation's responsibility to expand and pave this new path in order to further develop military history as an academic field. War is not disappearing from humanity's future as both men warily hoped; yet deeper understanding of the wars of the past will hopefully help to limit it in the future.

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2. Ernst Breisach, *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 388.
3. Ibid., 391.
4. Ibid., 388.
5. Ibid., 391.
6. Richard A. Gabriel, "Can We Trust the Ancient Texts?" *Military History* 25, no. 1 (March/April 2008), 4.
7. Richard M. Swain, "Liddell Hart and the Weight of History by John J. Mearsheimer," *Albion: a Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 23, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 803.
8. Ibid., 804.
9. B.T. Reynolds, "Through the Fog of War, by B.H. Liddell Hart," *International Affairs* 18, no. 1 (January-February 1939): 112.
10. Ibid.
11. Gabriel, 5.
12. Gabriel, 5.
13. Ronald Lewin, "Sir Basil Liddell Hart: The Captain Who Taught Generals," *International Affairs* 47, no. 1 (January 1971): 79.
14. Ibid.
15. Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Why Don't We Learn from History?* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1971), 12.
16. Ibid., 17.
17. Stephen Miller, "John Keegan 1934-2012; a Scholar of Soldiers in Battle," *Wall Street Journal*, August 3, 2012.
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19. Ibid., 29.
20. Ibid., 33.
21. Ibid., 33.
22. John Keegan, "The Historian and Battle," *International Security* 3, no. 3 (Winter 1978-1979), 140.
23. Miller.

24. Michael Neiberg, "Reviews – A History of Warfare by John Keegan," *Journal of Social History* 29, no. 2 (Winter 1995), 466.

25. "The Killing Fields – A History of Warfare by John Keegan," *The Economist* 329, no. 7831 (October 2, 1993), 97.

26. Richard Buel, Jr., "A History of Warfare by John Keegan," *History and Theory* 34, no. 1 (February 1995), 90.

27. Miller.

28. Neiberg, 466.

29. "The Killing Fields," 97.

30. Taylor, 41. Wallenstein and Tilly were two leading generals of the Thirty Years War.

31. Liddell Hart, *Why Don't We Learn From History?*, 92.

32. Stephen Miller, "John Keegan 1934-2012; a Scholar of Soldiers in Battle," *Wall Street Journal*, August 3, 2012.

33. Ibid.

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Fractured Friendship at the Battle of Munda 45 BC: Julius Caesar and Titus Labienus

Michael R Majerczyk

Julius Caesar and Titus Labienus were friends forced to fight one another because they could not deny the influence of *dignitas* and *amicitia*, two social values the Roman Republic forced them to recognize. As young men, they campaigned together in Asia. They returned to Rome and fought the *optimates* in the Senate and later, barbarians in Gaul. Nevertheless, in 45 BC at the Battle of Munda, they fought one another as enemies, and there Labienus fell. Caesar triggered a civil war when he crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC to defend his *dignitas*. Bound by *amicitia*, Labienus joined the opposition, Pompey, and the *optimates*. The study that follows begins with a discussion on related historiography and sources, followed by an outline of the conflict between the *optimates* and the *populares*. It then examines the significant cooperation between both men and determines this cooperation was rooted in genuine friendship not mutual benefit. *Dignitas* and *amicitia* divided the two friends and an analysis of these two values is given. Last, a survey of the Battle of Munda describes a tragic end to a once flourishing friendship.

Historiography and Sources

Plutarch (50-120 AD) was one of the first biographers to pass judgment on Caesar. Plutarch suggested that Caesar, from the beginning of his career, planned to achieve absolute power.¹ This approach left little room for an agonizing Caesar grieving over the death of Pompey.² If absolute power was his initial aim then celebration rather than tears was appropriate over the death of his rival. Plutarch wrote his biographies in pairs or parallel lives, and attached Caesar's life to Alexander the Great. He analyzed his subject's positive and negative attributes through a historical narrative.³ Even so, Plutarch recognized the distinction between the biographer and the historian. The biographer focuses on the character of the person while the historian focuses on the event and situates the person in it.⁴

The biographer Suetonius wrote during the same period as Plutarch. Contrary to Plutarch, Suetonius employed a realist approach to the evidence and was not concerned with the moral dilemmas Julius Caesar encountered.⁵ In his masterwork *The Twelve Caesars*, Suetonius identified Caesar as a coldblooded

opportunist who weighed the value of others based on their contributions to his quest for greater power.⁶ Suetonius's research benefited from the client-patron relationship he enjoyed with Pliny the Younger. Pliny wielded significant political influence and provided Suetonius access to government records. This provided a measure of reliability concerning Suetonius's interpretations.⁷

Cicero provided a solid source for the later part of the first century BC. Cicero was a contemporary of Caesar and no realist. He strove to restore the Republic in a manner he believed idealized its constitution and traditions. Events prevented Cicero from realizing his efforts. For example, the civil wars involving Marius and Sulla in 88-86 BC, Cataline's conspiracy to overthrow the Republic in 63 BC, and the civil war between Caesar and the *optimates* in 49-45 BC ensured Cicero's calls for restraint and public debate received little consideration. During the civil war, Cicero refused his unconditional support to either Pompey or Caesar. Believing him to be the lesser evil of the two, he favored Pompey but wisely stayed out of the military side of the dispute. In this way, he avoided retribution from either man.

Cicero defended the aged *optimatus* Rabirius against Caesar and Labienus in the courts. His *For Rabirius on the Charge of Treason* gives a detailed account of the trial.⁸ In *On Duties*, Cicero relayed his thoughts on character and moral values. Cicero believed that one who strives for absolute power is by nature immoral.⁹ Written soon after Caesar's death, *On Duties* attempted to ignite the Senate's sense of duty and cause it to govern in a way consistent with the highest principles of the Republic. His effort to sway the Senate failed.

Caesar gave his own version of political and military events in his *Commentaries*. Divided into two works, *The Gallic War* and *The Civil War*, Caesar's *Commentaries* are central primary sources for scholars researching his life and represent a unique firsthand account of ancient battles.¹⁰ The *Commentaries* were dispatches sent to Rome and read in public. When campaigning in Gaul, Caesar was absent from Rome for nine years and maintained interaction with his greatest group of supporters, the masses, through the *Commentaries*. In an effort to please his listeners and readers, Caesar wrote in the third person and limited his use of the first person. In this way, Caesar created an illusion that he was a spectator of the events he described and not a participant. In addition, his use of the third person deflected the arrogance inherent in an autobiography.¹¹ Also of note, Hirtius wrote the last book of *The Gallic War*. Hirtius campaigned with Caesar and the two were friends. Aware of Caesar's literary skills, he made clear the apprehension he felt undertaking

the task of writing the final book.¹² For the researcher, his book provides many references to Labienus just before his defection to Pompey. Likewise, the author of the last three books of *The Civil War* remains anonymous. Speculation points to Hirtius, Sallust, Asinius Pollio, or one of Caesar's junior officers as possible authors.¹³

Theodor Mommsen began the modern interpretation of Caesar.¹⁴ Published in successive volumes between the years 1854 through 1856, Mommsen's *The History of Rome* offers energetic prose. Mommsen described Caesar as a realist with a unique sense of daring. Fused with Caesar, these ingredients fashioned the "perfect man."¹⁵ He was the perfect leader and organizer, the perfect ally, and soldier.¹⁶ He was a statesman, a king that never wore a crown, and a Roman that epitomized Romanesque.¹⁷ Mommsen believed winning political office drove a Roman aristocrat's career. This placed Caesar in a world dominated by ambition and absent of the personal interaction and friendships that existed.¹⁸

Mathias Gelzer's *Caesar, Politician and Statesman* published in 1921, highlighted Caesar's lust for power. It separated him from his peers but made him a great statesman. He valued others on a basis of personal benefit. Incapable of genuine friendship, he formed cold-hearted relationships for the sole purpose of political advancement. Cato believed his opposition to republican values made him a tyrant and therefore a brute in conflict with human dignity. Gelzer did not challenge this.¹⁹

On the contrary, this study suggested those long marches through Gaul represented something other than mutual benefit and a tyrannical lust for power. Caesar won the loyalty of his soldiers and officers. Indeed, mutual benefit may begin a relationship but mutual benefit breeds friendship. Friendship fertilizes loyalty that it may bear trust and respect. When Labienus joined Pompey, Caesar's tone suggested he felt betrayed by a friend.²⁰ A power-maddened opportunist, incapable of friendship, would feel no such thing. Gelzer detached Caesar from his humanity. This study rehumanized Caesar.

In Philip Freeman's *Julius Caesar* published in 2008, Freeman contended Caesar recognized the experiences of the lower class *plebeians*. Due to their aristocratic ancestry, the upper class *patricians* filled government positions and maintained the republic. The Julian clan were *patricians* and amongst the oldest clans. They could trace their lineage to Rome's founding. Despite this, at the time of Caesar's birth in 100 BC his clan wielded little influence. This, combined with the proscriptions of Sulla in 81-82 BC lessened the likelihood of a revival. As a result,

Caesar grew up in Rome's rough Subura neighborhood. Though close to the Forum, its working class inhabitants included craftsmen, prostitutes, and back alley hustlers. Hence, the young Caesar heard visitors speaking in their native tongue mixed in with the bustle of workshops and the sound of passing horses. This environment gave Caesar a unique upbringing foreign to his *patrician* counterparts. Caesar grew up rubbing shoulders amongst the *plebeians*. They knew one another. His thirty-year residency there indicated strong connection to the neighborhood and its inhabitants. Even though Caesar was born with social rank, he had a clear understanding of the underprivileged.²¹ Therefore, his populist views were more than political opportunism. They were genuine. Freeman described an empathetic Caesar. This study added to Freeman's line of thought by exposing Caesar's humanity through his friendship with Labienus.

The *Optimates* and the *Populares*

During Caesar's time, the government consisted of two camps, the conservative *optimates* or “the good men,” and the progressive *populares*, acknowledged for their support of the *plebeians*.²² The *optimates* recognized Lucius Cornelius Sulla's (138-78 BC) constitutional changes and the *populares* championed Sulla's rival Gaius Marius (157-86 BC). With this alignment, *optimates* and *populares* translate to Sullans and Marians. The fracture in the government dated to the time of the progressive legislation of the brothers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus in the late second century.²³ Both men served as *tribune*. The *tribunes* represented the *plebeians* in the Senate and championed their issues. To maintain their dominance the *optimates* killed both brothers, and afterwards the two served as divisive figures between the two camps.²⁴ The bad blood between Marius and Sulla furthered the division when it escalated into a civil war. Once Sulla secured his victory, he executed many Marians in the Senate and replaced them with handpicked supporters. He then reconfigured the constitution to ensure *optimata* control of the government. In the meantime, the marginalized Marians waited in fear for their new champion to emerge.²⁵ Julius Caesar was that champion. To counter the *optimates*' control of the Senate, Caesar needed firm and creative allies. Titus Labienus was one of them.

Caesar and Labienus in Politics

The sources first mention Labienus campaigning against the Cilician pirates in 78 BC.²⁶ That Caesar took part in that campaign suggests the two future collaborators knew each other at that time and were roughly the same age.²⁷ It also leads to speculation that they served together in Asia Minor under Marcus Minucius Thermus in 80 BC.²⁸ That Labienus reappears in the sources as *tribune* and an ally of

Caesar's in 63 BC implies the two maintained ties through the period 78 BC through 63 BC.²⁹

During the consulship of Pompey and Crassus in 70 BC, Caesar worked with both to restore the traditional powers of the *tribunes*.³⁰ Longstanding allies of the *populares*, the Sullan constitution stripped the *tribunes* of their veto power and their right to introduce legislation into the Senate. The move rendered them powerless to counter the *optimates* by legal means.³¹ Caesar helped to restore those powers. His efforts strengthened the Marians, gained the support of the populace, and energized an office Labienus would later hold.

When Labienus served as *tribune* in 63 BC, he came to a strengthened office and colluded with Caesar to direct his powers against the *optimates*. He was a key supporter in Caesar's quest to win the *pontifex maximus*, the highest position in the College of Pontiffs. Labienus motioned in the Senate to reinstitute the traditional method of awarding that prestigious office, the popular vote of the *comitia*. Without this legislation, Caesar had little chance at the office because Sulla filled the College of Pontiffs with his supporters and gave them standing to elect their own members.³² In an all or nothing gamble, Caesar won the prestigious office. The victory put him at the center of Roman politics.³³ Caesar and Labienus wrested the *pontifex maximus* from the *optimates*, a significant blow indeed. Later in 63 BC, the two continued their fight against the *optimates* by prosecuting one of their members, Gaius Rabirius, for treason.

Gaius Rabirius was an aged senator who had taken part in the death of the *tribune* Saturninus and his supporters in 100 BC.³⁴ At issue was the division of the land wrested from the Cimbri in the same year. The consul Marius drove the Cimbri from the area of Gaul they were living and claimed their land in the name of Rome.³⁵ The pending legislation prevented the *optimates* from seizing the land but benefited the Italian allies by allotting them a significant share. Not trusting the Senate, Saturninus added that if the law passed, the senators would take an oath swearing to abide by it, a significant slight to the *optimates*.³⁶ A vote in the *comitia* decided the matter. The controversial legislation set off a riot during the proceedings but this did not prevent the bill from passing. Later, tension increased when senator Matellus refused the oath and suffered banishment. The country-dwelling Italian allies rejoiced but Matellus's ardent supporters in the city expressed their discontent.³⁷ For the time being Saturninus had out maneuvered the *optimates*.

Even so, as Memmius stood for the consulship in the *comitia*, Saturninus overstepped when he had him murdered.³⁸ In response, the Senate passed the *senatus*

consultum ultimum or the Ultimate Decree. The Senate retained oversight, but the measure gave the highest government official, the *consul* Marius, authority to secure the republic by whatever means necessary.³⁹ However, the immediate situation was already out of control. The following day Memmius's supporters gathered intending to kill Saturninus. Saturninus and his supporters fled to the Capitoline Hill and barricaded themselves in. Later, after they surrendered, Marius locked them in the Senate house to decide their fate. Still agitated, Memmius's people ripped the tiles off the roof and through the openings, stoned them to death.⁴⁰ In another version of the story, an angry mob killed Saturninus and his followers as they came down from the Capitoline Hill into the forum.⁴¹ At the time, the death of Saturninus and his supporters prompted no legal actions. This meant Saturninus's murder was in line with the *optimates'* designs.⁴²

At issue for Caesar and Labienus was the Senate's use of the Ultimate Decree. It was their definitive weapon. With it, the *optimates* were able to negate their opposition and consolidate power.⁴³ To bypass the *optimates*-controlled courts, Caesar and Labienus charged Rabirius with *perduellio*.⁴⁴ Translated, this means "offense against the Roman people."⁴⁵ The charge dated to the time of kings, five hundred years prior. With so much time gone by, there existed no procedure to hear the case. The Roman people were always mindful of tradition and did not prevent the case from moving forward. Without precedent to restrain them, Caesar and Labienus employed classic gamesmanship. To ensure a conviction, Labienus served as the prosecutor while Caesar served as one of the two judges and the one responsible for passing sentence.⁴⁶ Quintus Hortensius, a powerful orator, provided the defense but it was not enough.⁴⁷ The penalty for Rabirius's conviction was crucifixion on the *Campus Martius*.⁴⁸ During the first century BC, this penalty did not apply to Roman citizens, but in this matter, the archaic law trumped common practice.⁴⁹ The blow to Rabirius was two-fold. Roman tradition specified a Roman citizen could choose banishment rather than death, but again, the archaic law did not make provisions for this. The law did provide an opportunity for Rabirius to appeal to the *Comitia Centuriata* or the Centuriate Assembly.⁵⁰

The gamesmanship continued. Cicero represented Rabirius and spoke to the Centuriate Assembly. Aware of Cicero's skill, Labienus countered by limiting the great orator's speech to one half hour in place of the customary hour.⁵¹ Cicero attacked Labienus for employing such an archaic law suggesting that using a law that dated to the time of kings was an attack on the republic.⁵² As his speech progressed, it became clear he would not be able to sway the assembly to Rabirius's advantage.

Second in rank to the *consul*, the *praetor* Metellus Celer responded and prevented a condemning vote by lowering the Janiculum flag. Caesar and Labienus referenced an ancient law to prosecute Rabirius and in the same way, an ancient custom saved him.⁵³

The story of the flag is as follows. Held outside the city walls, the Centuriate Assembly was vulnerable to attack. Prior to Roman dominance, Rome's enemies were not far from the city. To address the danger, half the assembly would vote while the rest stood guard on the Janiculum Hill. When the first half of the assembly voted, they in turn relieved those guarding the hill. If an enemy approached, the defenders lowered the Janiculum flag warning those on the plain of a looming threat. Likewise, when Metellus lowered the Janiculum flag the voting stopped and the assembly adjourned. The move saved Rabirius's life.⁵⁴ Labienus pursued the case no further. This suggests that Caesar and Labienus had no interest in seeing the old man put to death and Caesar ordered the flag lowered.⁵⁵ Rabirius escaped crucifixion but the message to the *optimates* was clear. They would challenge the Senate's use of the Ultimate Decree.⁵⁶ The two next exercised their resolve in Gaul.

Caesar and Labienus in Gaul

Caesar completed his term as *consul* in 59 BC. Following the consulship, it was customary for the former *consul* to govern a province with the rank of *proconsul*. Caesar secured the provinces of Illyricum, Transalpine Gaul, and Cisalpine Gaul as his provinces and appointed Labienus *legatus pro praetore*.⁵⁷ This made Labienus second in command and he served in that capacity for nine years. *The Gallic War* provides an account of Labienus's movements in Gaul. It is evident the two men continued their cooperation and friendship in Gaul, just as they had in the Roman forum. From the beginning, Caesar charged Labienus with great responsibility and amongst Caesar's subordinates, Labienus stands alone in the first book of the *Gallic War*.⁵⁸ In 58 BC, the Helvetii migration consisting of over 300,000 people threatened to cross the Rhone River into Roman territory. Proven warriors, the Helvetii defeated a Roman army fifty years earlier. Not satisfied with the victory they further humiliated the Romans by forcing them to pass under a yoke of spears.⁵⁹ A mistake against the Helvetii invited disaster. Nevertheless, with only one legion, Labienus maintained the eighteen miles of fortification along the Rhone while Caesar left for northern Italy to raise two more legions.⁶⁰ Both men completed their task. If they were to succeed, trust and confidence in the other's ability was paramount.

Trust breeds friendship and the relationship between the two strengthened as their experience in Gaul increased. In 57 BC, Caesar warred with the Belgic Coalition. Again, Labienus is recognized and credited for capturing the enemy's camp.⁶¹ In 56 BC, Caesar and Labienus campaigned against the Morini.⁶² The famous invasions of modern day Britain and Germany occurred in 54 BC and 55 BC.⁶³ In 53 BC, Caesar and Labienus routed the Treveri. Caesar found Labienus favorable enough to quote him in the *Commentaries* as he urged his men on. The quote is one of the few times anyone other than Caesar does the speaking.⁶⁴ "Here is your chance. You have got the enemy where you wanted them—in a bad position where they are not free to maneuver. Fight as bravely under me as you often have for the commander-in-chief [*imperator*]; imagine that he is here watching the battle in person."⁶⁵ When the public speaker delivered the report to the commons, it is easy to imagine shouts of praise for both Caesar and Labienus.

In 52 BC, the Gauls united under their great general Vercingetorix in a winner-take-all attempt to end the conflict. As the struggle with Vercingetorix increased, Caesar separated his army into two parts. Labienus, charged with four legions, campaigned against the Senones and Parisii while Caesar moved along the Allier River towards Gergovia. In addition to the four legions, Caesar assigned a detachment of cavalry to Labienus's command.⁶⁶ Thus, Labienus was responsible for nearly half of Caesar's army. Labienus would need that experience at Alesia.

On the last day of the Siege of Alesia, one area in the siege lines, the north camp, proved problematic. Due to the topography, Caesar was unable to incorporate it fully into his ring of defenses. The problem, further complicated by its location at the bottom of a hill, gave the pending Gallic charge momentum.⁶⁷ The Gauls allocated their best warriors for the attack on the north camp. As a result, the outcome there decided the outcome of the entire war. As the battle progressed, the north camp began to give ground. Caesar assigned Labienus six cohorts. The detachment, tasked to reinforce the north camp and prevent the Gauls from breaking through, would require additional support. Knowing this, Caesar instructed Labienus to inform him when the situation turned critical.⁶⁸ In the meantime, Caesar would stabilize a situation at one of the fortifications. Labienus sent a dispatch to report a desperate situation. Caesar took four cohorts and divided the cavalry. Half exited the defenses to attack the Gallic rear while Caesar reinforced the internal breach. Caesar threw himself directly into the fight with Labienus and his soldiers.

As he hurried to the scene, his red cape flowed in the wind and announced his presence all along the siege lines. The reenergized legionaries pressed on. His

appearance had the opposite effect on the Gauls. This, coupled with an attack on their rear by the Roman cavalry, weakened the Gauls' will. Gallic determination gave way to panic and confusion. In that moment, Caesar, Labienus, and the Roman army won Gaul.⁶⁹ To ensure victory, this would not be the last time Caesar would throw himself directly into battle with Labienus. However, at the Battle of Munda they were on opposite of the line.

Defection to Pompey

When Caesar crossed the Rubicon, he was in open rebellion against the Roman republic. Shortly after that crossing Labienus defected to Pompey and the *optimates*. Both held firm to the social values of the Roman republic. Caesar stated that his *dignitas* was more important to him than his life.⁷⁰ In large part, he perpetuated a civil war to defend it. *Dignitas* was important to all Roman aristocrats. In 63 BC, Cataline conspired to overthrow the republic because he felt the Senate dismissed his *dignitas*.⁷¹ That is, lesser men passed him in standing. He would not allow this, nor would any aristocrat, without repercussions. Tacitus suggested *dignitas* "grows and advances."⁷² Caesar's *dignitas* had grown to a point he felt equal in rank to Pompey and believed Pompey could not bear this.⁷³ The result of this impasse was a civil war. *Dignitas* encompassed one's self-worth, lineage, achievements, and social standing.⁷⁴

Dio suggested Labienus felt equal to Caesar in status and knowing Caesar would not elevate him further, he would realize greater standing on the side of Pompey.⁷⁵ This was not probable because should an agreement between Pompey and Caesar been realized, Caesar was in a position to win the consulship in 48 BC. Furthermore, Hirtius makes clear that Labienus was already maneuvering for the consulship himself and would have sat alongside Caesar as co-consul, equal in rank.⁷⁶ Evens so, Labienus may have believed Caesar would lose the civil war and wished to be on the winning side. Considering his knowledge of Caesar's fortitude, Labienus would know better than to underestimate Caesar's chances in any conflict. In addition, if this were the case, more of Caesar's *legates* would have left him. As it was, only two did, Labienus and Cicero's brother.⁷⁷ Just as *dignitas* bound Caesar in the direction he took, the social value *amicitia* shackled Labienus.

Amicitia was an agreement that secured political interests and alliances between those wishing advancement. *Amicitia* trumped personal feelings and friendships.⁷⁸ Labienus had direct ties to Pompey and interaction with his supporters past and present. For instance, Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus formed the political union recognized as the First Triumvirate. Q. Metellus Celer, the man described

above who lowered the Janiculum flag and saved Rabirius's life, was an associate of Pompey.⁷⁹ Furthermore, Labienus was from Picenum. The Pompeii clan wielded great influence in this area of Italy. Enough influence that it enabled them to raise a private army if need be. It would be difficult for Labienus or any other upstart to realize success without a client-patron relationship with Pompey.⁸⁰ *Amicitia* bound Labienus to Pompey in the same way it bound others to Caesar. After Caesar's assassination, Gaius Matius who held firm with Caesar during the civil war wrote to Cicero, "It was not Caesar I followed in the civil conflict, but a friend."⁸¹ Matius was referring to an arrangement of mutual benefit or *amicitia*. Likewise, in a letter to Cicero, C. Asinius Pollio told Cicero he was against the civil war but had no choice but to follow Caesar. Having enemies on both sides, he could not stay neutral, thus it was better to remain amongst the safety of his friend, Caesar, lest he fall into the plots of his enemies.⁸² Labienus's ties to Pompey were no secret to Caesar. However, it was clear he did not expect Labienus to honor them.

Hirtius reports that near the time of Labienus's defection there were rumors circling that the Pompeians were in contact with him. Caesar did not believe the rumors.⁸³ That he assigned the management of Cisalpine Gaul to Labienus, a position that would promote his candidature for consul, was evidence of this. Caesar was helping his heartfelt friend reach a goal the two had discussed in depth. That they were already thinking past their long stay in Gaul and planning to play politics together in the Senate makes it clear neither was expecting a civil war. *The optimates*, determined to destroy Caesar, had other plans.⁸⁴

When Caesar crossed the Rubicon to defend his *dignitas*, there was no turning back. In the same way, when *amicitia* forced Labienus to join Pompey, there was no retreating from his decision.⁸⁵ Once on the side of Pompey and the *optimates* Labienus divulged all he knew.⁸⁶ He was in a delicate position. Should the Pompeians lose the war, he could not expect Caesar to pardon him. Likewise, if the Pompeians questioned his allegiance to them, they would kill him.⁸⁷ To prove his loyalty, he rejected all ideas of peace with Caesar and participated in every campaign of the civil war.⁸⁸

Background to Munda

Caesar defeated the Pompeians in Spain at the Battle of Ilerda in 49 BC.⁸⁹ In 48 BC, the Pompeians broke Caesar's blockade at Dyrrachium. The next engagement, the Battle of Pharsalus in 48 BC, was the deciding battle between the *optimates* backed by Pompey and Caesar. After the battle, Pompey fled to Alexandria believing it to be a safe location to regroup. He was wrong. The Egyptian

government conspired to kill him. Two Roman centurions, Septimius and Salvius accompanied by government officials including Achilles, King Ptolemy's XIII tutor, and Pothinus the treasurer, stabbed him to death as they brought him to shore in a skiff.⁹⁰ The execution was an effort to win favor from Caesar. The effort failed. When Caesar arrived in Egypt, the King's envoy presented him with Pompey's head. He turned away at the sight of it. When presented with Pompey's signet ring, he began to cry. Considering their history, Caesar's reaction proved genuine and Pompey would have received a pardon if he wished it. Caesar ordered both Achilles and Pothinus, the architects of the deed, executed.⁹¹ The episode separates Caesar from the cynic Mathias Gelzer described him to be but supports a Caesar that feels compassion and is capable of having genuine friendships. Nevertheless, victory at Pharsalus and the death of Pompey did not end the conflict. The Pompeians, under the leadership of Metellus Scipio regrouped in Africa and lost to Caesar at the Battle of Thapus in 46 BC. From there the Pompeians again regrouped in Spain to face Caesar at Munda.

The Battle of Munda

Weapons for both the Pompeian's and Caesar's army were similar. The Roman legionary used two key weapons, the *gladius* and the *pila*. The *gladius*, designed for close quarter fighting, measured thirty inches in length.⁹² It carried a long point for thrusting and a double edge for slashing.⁹³ These attributes allowed the *gladius* to deliver continuous blows that a longer sword, in limited space, could not.⁹⁴ The *pila* or javelin's two-part construction provided effective penetration. Topped with a pyramidal point, the narrow iron neck was two or three feet long and the main shaft four feet.⁹⁵ Both the *pila* and *gladius* were effective weapons and both armies had to contend with them.

An unfavorable engagement on March 5, 45 BC at Soricaria deterred the Pompeians from engaging Caesar without a recognizable advantage.⁹⁶ The Pompeians chose an elevated position near Munda to offer a decisive battle.⁹⁷ Below the heights and between the two camps was a plain that extended for five miles. Caesar believed the enemy would advance to the center of this plain to offer battle at a time of their choosing.⁹⁸ On March 17, the enemy offered battle. Caesar raised the battle flag at his tent and his army began to march towards the enemy.⁹⁹ The march, slowed by the soggy nature of the plain in several areas, provided an opportunity for the enemy, yet they maintained their position on the heights.¹⁰⁰ Undaunted by the tactical advantage of his opponents, Caesar ordered his army to march uphill and engage the enemy.

As in previous engagements during the civil war, both Caesar and Labienus had to consider the knowledge they had of one another's thought process. Labienus had counseled the Pompeians on appropriate strategy against Caesar throughout the civil war and, the Pompeian's determination to maintain their position on the heights is indicative of this. During the Gallic War, Caesar had charged uphill at the Battle of Gergovia and suffered his first setback.¹⁰¹ This leads to the conclusion Labienus hoped to put Caesar in a similar situation.

Caesar was outnumbered but his soldiers were more experienced and his cavalry superior.¹⁰² At the onset of the battle, both Labienus and Caesar knew where the other was and as the battle progressed, it seemed Caesar would lose. However, as Labienus had witnessed in the past, Caesar threw himself directly into the fighting to encourage his men, shouting, "Are you not ashamed to take me and hand me over to these boys?"¹⁰³ Due to the bright red cloak he always wore in battle to signal his identity, the enemy spotted him and directed a barrage of missile fire at him.¹⁰⁴ At no time prior had Caesar come so close to losing his life.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, the risk to Caesar's life was great but so were the stakes. The prize was Rome. Caesar's famous Tenth Legion broke through first.¹⁰⁶ To halt the breach, Gnaeus ordered Labienus from the right wing to the left. The move allowed Caesar's cavalry to swing around the enemy's weakened right flank and attack from the rear.¹⁰⁷ The move was decisive and Labienus lost his life as the Pompeian army collapsed. To show his respect, Caesar gave Labienus a proper burial.¹⁰⁸

Conclusion

Caesar and Labienus were friends forced to fight one another by forces they had little control over. Caesar fought to defend his *dignitas* and *amicitia* bound Labienus's allegiance to Pompey. They had achieved much together. They served with distinction in Asia, defeated the political designs of the *optimates* in Rome, and conquered all of Gaul. Nevertheless, their friendship could not prevent them from opposing each other during the civil war. The point of no return for both men was the Rubicon. From there, only one of them could live. They each knew the other's thought process, and in a way, they were fighting a reflection of themselves. To survive, that reflection could not bear light of their former friendship. That they spent the last years of their lives trying to deprive the other of existence indicates neither man questioned their choices.

Making choices allows a measure of freedom to the human condition. *Dignitas* and *amicitia* denied both Caesar and Labienus an alternative to fighting one another. Those who come to Caesar's story must also make a choice. If they choose

to believe in Caesar, the villainous dictator, there is evidence to support that. If they choose to believe in an empathetic Caesar, the people's dictator, champion of the underprivileged, there is evidence to support that as well. One element that does not need support is that Caesar was a man. None living shared Caesar's time, but all share with him the experience of human existence. To have friends and to lose friends is part of that human existence the same as it is to experience tragedy and triumph. Through their friendship, Caesar and Labienus shared these experiences. They did not die together in battle as comrades. Rather, both men fought their last battle together as enemies. Labienus died at the Battle of Munda, March 17, 45 BC and Caesar on March 15, 44 BC.

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22. Plutarch, *Caesar* 1.

23. Cynthia J. Bannon, *The Brothers of Romulus* (New Jersey: Princeton, 1997), 128-35.

24. Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 19; *Gaius Gracchus* 17.

25. Plutarch, *Sulla* 31-33; Lucius Canfora, *Julius Caesar* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 20.

26. Cicero, *For Rabirius on a Charge of Treason* 21.

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28. Suetonius, *Divus Julius* 2.

29. Abbot, 4.

30. Suetonius, *Divus Julius* 5.

31. Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.100.

32. Philip Freeman, *Julius Caesar* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 68.

33. Plutarch, *Life of Caesar* 7.

34. Appian, 1.32.

35. Appian, 1.28.

36. Plutarch, *Life of Marius* 29.

37. Appian, 1.31.

38. Appian, 1.32.

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40. Cicero, *Rad Perd* 7.

41. Plutarch, *Life of Marius* 30.
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66. Caesar, *Gallic War* 7.34.
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90. Plutarch, *Pompey* 78; Appian, *Civil Wars* 2.84.
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102. Gelzer, 295.
103. Plutarch, *Life of Caesar* 56.
104. Appian, 2.104: Caesar, *Gallic War* 7.88.
105. Paterculus, 2.55.
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The Historiography of the Late Roman Republic

Guy Williams

They then desisted, but Marius and Sulpicius went to confront him near the forum on the Esquiline with as many men as they had time to arm, and there took place a struggle between political enemies which was the first war conducted in Rome not under the guise of civil dissention, but nakedly as a war, complete with trumpets and military standards; such was the catastrophe to which their recklessness in political quarreling had led them.

—Appian, *The Civil Wars*

By the mid-second century BC, the Roman Republic appeared to be on the ascendency. The Third Punic War had ended with the defeat of Carthage in 146 BC and cemented the position of Rome as the preeminent military power in the Mediterranean region.¹ Despite the apparent success of the military, the period from 133 BC until 27 BC marked a critical time in Roman history as the Republic began a perilous slide towards internecine warfare that eventually ended with the transformation of the Roman Republic into the Roman Empire.

The problem facing modern historians centers on the causal factors behind the changes of the Roman Republic. Economic and political factors such as the struggle between the *patricii* (aristocrat class) and the *plebes* (common people), civil war, and the denigration of Roman law all influenced the transformative process.² While each of these causal factors contributed to the evolution of the Roman Republic, they did not encompass the entire scope of the process of change or explain the machinations behind key events and people who contributed to Rome's emergence as an empire. Amongst the myriad factors that contributed to the demise of the Republic, one rose above the others as the prime enabler to the transformative process. The Roman legions presented the one common denominator that the causal factors shared and became the fulcrum point between key events and historical figures. Modern historiography about the late Roman Republic pays scant attention to the crucial relationship between the military and the civil authorities and their resulting effect upon the transformation process of the Republic.

Modern historians have addressed fundamental factors behind the evolution

of the Republic, but they have not fully integrated the process of legislation, politics, societal norms, and civil war that drove events *en toto*. Instead, historians have weighted individual causal factors or events rather than examining the transformation process. The civil wars that rocked the failing Roman Republic did not result from a simple desire for change or a collective attempt by the military to usurp the Roman government, but were a response from an organization that no longer held the same strong civil ties to a state that existed as a shadow of itself.³ The legions provided a vehicle for individuals to gain power and to dismantle the checks and balances that originally existed, such as *consul* (highest elected public official in the Republic), term limits, and the appointment of two consuls to prevent tyranny or a strong central government under the control of one leader. By examining the transformation process and the role of the Roman military during the process, evidence demonstrates the importance of soldier-citizen relations and the preeminence of power politics in the Roman Republic.

During the transformation, the Roman legions evolved from a citizen militia into a full-time professional army that gave its loyalty not to a state or government, but to leaders who rewarded the legions' loyalty. The Roman military became a political tool and the power behind key figures who sought to grasp the reins of state leadership and exercise absolute authority over Rome. As historian David Shotter notes in *The Fall of the Roman Republic, Second Edition* (2005), "Thus, individuals and factions came to see that they could exploit the republic's forms for their own needs, and at the expense of their peers."⁴ The tenuous relationship between the Roman Senate and the military grew increasingly strained, as the Senate sought to marginalize military leaders with legislation, and the military negated the power of the Senate by force of arms. The professionalization of the Roman army alienated the legions from the state and enabled the application of power by one individual to determine the domestic and foreign affairs of Rome.

After the end of the Third Punic War, the Roman Republic emerged as a hegemonic power in the Mediterranean region. The Republic did not possess a government or logistical infrastructure to handle the associated challenges of managing an expanding population, increased geographical areas of responsibility, and internal struggles between social classes and individuals striving for greater power.⁵ The change from a republic to an empire occurred gradually, and contemporary scholars of the era noted many of the changes but lacked the historical hindsight of later historians to appreciate the scope and importance of the change.

Primary Sources

One of the earliest Roman historians, Gaius Sallustius Crispus, “Sallust” (86-35 BC), recognized the inherent fear and trepidation of the era brought on by years of civil war. Sallust not only recorded events, but also sought to impart guidance to his contemporary readers. In his speech to Caesar, Sallust wrote, “Moreover, the victors demand booty, the vanquished are fellow citizens. Amidst these difficulties you have to make your way, and strengthen the state for the future, not in arms only and against the enemy, but also in the kindly arts of peace, a task far, far, thornier.”⁶ Sallust recognized the inherent difficulties with divisive politics and civil wars that pitted Roman against Roman. Sallust wrote an informative commentary similar to the style of the Greek historian Thucydides (c.460-c.400 BC), who sought to impart wisdom to his peers. Additionally, Sallust’s terse style emphasized brevity and conveyed a judgmental tone. He worried about the decaying status of Rome’s elite and sought to warn the *patricii* of their growing decadence.

While the Roman elite appeared to drift farther from the consensus of the plebes, the civil wars that rocked Rome in the first century BC touched all aspects of Roman life. The legions that fought fellow legionnaires and citizens alike began to give their loyalty to their commanders rather than to the state. During this period, journals and books from key leaders offered historians a glimpse into the popular sentiment and political topics of the day. For example, Gaius Julius Caesar, “Caesar” (100-44 BC), cemented his popularity and image as a cultish figure through his writings. Caesar wrote *The Gallic Wars*, not from any obligation to record history, but to keep his name fresh in the mind of Roman citizens and to project a favorable image. He wrote, “Yet Caesar decided that he must endure it all, so long as he still had some hope of deciding the issue according to law, rather than by fighting it out.”⁷ This statement sounded reasonable to the casual reader, but in reality Caesar made little attempt to heed the dictates of the Roman Senate. While Caesar used his book for political purposes, other Roman leaders like Marcus Tullius Cicero, “Cicero” (106-43 BC), wrote letters, books, and journals that extolled the virtues of the earlier Roman Republic, and in particular, the examples of Greek philosophers.

Cicero offered readers the unique perspective of a key participant in the events that helped change Rome. In *Cicero: Selected Works* (1960), translated by Michael Grant, a compilation of speeches and personal letters conveyed to historians the pragmatic politics at play within the Roman Senate. Like Caesar, Cicero occupied an important position in Roman affairs as a senator and gifted orator. While Caesar sought to centralize authority, Cicero urged for the return of power to the

many rather than the one. Although Cicero initially favored Caesar as a matter of political expedience, he began to resent the growing power of Caesar and the threat he posed to the traditional Roman Republic. Cicero advanced that only a madman sought to be king and stated, “for he [Caesar] justifies the destruction of law and liberty and thinks their hideous and detestable destruction glorious.”⁸ Cicero’s writings warned against the absolute power of tyranny and the erosion of senatorial powers. However, Cicero did not write about the changes within the legions. Cicero recognized key individuals, but did not describe how those individuals used the legions as a political tool to degrade senatorial powers. Cicero did not live to see the eventual fall of the Roman Republic, because Marcus Antonius (83-20 BC) ordered his murder in 43 BC.⁹ Cicero’s dire warnings about the fall of the Roman Republic soon came to fruition after his death.

Later Roman historians such as Titus Livius, “Livy” (59 BC-17 AD), sought to write a comprehensive history of Rome. Livy recognized the change that had occurred after the rise of Augustus and attempted to write an accurate narrative. He relied less on flowery rhetoric and more on the recognition that the “rise of a state to greatness was based on its people possessing a number of proper character traits (*virtutes*) and not, as for [the Greek historian] Polybius, on a proper constitutional arrangement.”¹⁰ Although much of Livy’s work did not survive, later historians such as Lucius Annaeus Florus, “Florus” (74-130 AD), borrowed from Livy to supplement their own histories of Rome.

Two interesting historians emerged during the early Roman Empire who used historical biography as a lens to examine the military and political exploits of Roman leaders. Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus, “Plutarch” (46-120 AD), wrote in the early second century AD. Plutarch’s *Parallel Lives* compared twenty-three pairs of Greek leaders to corresponding Roman leaders in a series of biographies of Greek and Roman history. Plutarch used historical events as a backdrop and focused more on the character of his subject rather than the historical events surrounding his subject. Plutarch wrote, “May I therefore succeed in purifying Fable, making her submit to reason and take on the semblance of History. But where she [events of history] obstinately disdains to make herself credible, and refuses to admit any element of probability, I shall pray for kindly readers, and as such receive with indulgence the tales of antiquity.”¹¹ Plutarch used a popular narrative to entertain his readers about historical figures rather than objective analysis.

Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, “Suetonius” (70-130 AD), wrote his book *The Twelve Caesars* during the same period as Plutarch, but he employed a different

approach to his biographies. Whereas Plutarch focused almost exclusively on the character of his subjects, Suetonius linked historical events to his key figures and then described the personal aspects of each person. Suetonius enjoyed access to official records and limited audiences with Emperors Trajan and Hadrian, and those privileges allowed him to write with greater credibility. However, Suetonius did not hesitate to chronicle the rumors and examples of debauchery of the emperors as evidenced by his description of Augustus's penchant for virgins.¹² Regardless of the accuracy of the rumors that surrounded the subjects of Suetonius, his writings offered a snapshot into the collective psyche of Roman society and how they perceived their emperors.

The Roman historian Appian (c.95-c.165 AD) broke from the traditional historical biography narrative and wrote a comprehensive history called *Roman History*. Although much of Appian's work no longer exists, his five volumes that dealt with the period 135 BC-35 BC did survive. The five volumes detailed the key events of the Roman Republic's transformation in the last century BC. Appian focused almost exclusively on war and struggle with his narrative. In *Appian: The Civil Wars* (1996), historian John Carter remarked that Appian focused on war and conflict because he saw them as "symptoms of decline from a peaceful and law-abiding polity into the ultimate chaos of civil war."¹³ While Appian did not associate the professionalization of the legions with the civil wars, his detailed description of events built an excellent foundation for other historians.

Lucius Cassius Dio, "Dio" (150-235 AD), followed Appian, and of the ancient historians, wrote the most comprehensive history of Rome. His work *Roman History* began with the founding of Rome and ended in the third century AD.¹⁴ Dio's books described a period of over one millennium and sought to emulate the objectivity of Thucydides, but did not convey the same cool logic and objective realism that his predecessor imparted. However, Dio's work did provide a serious scholarly attempt to record a massive history, and he used many primary sources that no longer exist.

Modern Historical Sources

While the primary sources on Roman history provide invaluable information and offer a flavor of the period, they do not contain the hindsight and objectivity of modern historians. The ancient historians did not see the transformation of Rome from a republic to an empire, but rather viewed the changes as symptoms of decadence or even progress. They did not possess the objective viewpoint to compare the two eras because the historians lived either during or soon after the change. The

position of the modern historian allows an objective view of the events and the technology to incorporate primary sources with modern disciplines to develop an inclusive examination of the era. Writing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Theodor Mommsen (1817-1907) offered just such an inclusive method.

Mommsen approached Roman history with a certain proclivity towards socio-economic factors. His massive three-volume *History of Rome* published from 1854-1856 presented one of the most complete summaries of the Roman Republic since Edward Gibbon's earlier work *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. Mommsen's writings almost mirrored the early twentieth-century French Annales School with his writing style, because he not only analyzed key events, but also described social norms, economies, and weighted the social class struggles of Rome over other causal factors.

Ronald Syme (1903-1989) viewed the fall of the Roman Republic as a matter of revolution rather than a power struggle enabled by the Roman legions. Syme's *The Roman Revolution* (1939) focused on Augustus but offered a concise analysis of the events leading up to the ascendancy of Augustus. Syme did not believe the eventual peace or *Pax Romana* resulted from constitutional and senatorial reform, but rather as "the peace of despotism."¹⁵

Historian Erich Gruen stands opposite of Syme in his analysis of the fall of the Roman Republic. Gruen's *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (1974) did not portray the rise of Augustus as a matter of expediency. Gruen stresses that his work "was not to search for the weakness that brought about the Republic's fall but to examine the practices and conventions that kept it going so long. Transformation of the state into a monarchical regime can be laid to the charge of a devastating civil war, rather than to the putative disintegration of institutions and morale in the previous decades."¹⁶ He maintains a centrist approach that recognizes many of the associated factors, but does not attribute the change from a republic to an empire to any historical figure. Gruen theorizes, "Civil war caused the failure of the Republic—not vice versa."¹⁷ Gruen identifies key factors such as the suspension of the *Capite Censi* (those counted by head), the *Lex Sevilia Glaucia* (Servilius Glaucia Law), and the professionalization of the Roman legions as causal factors that contributed to the demise of the Roman Republic. Additionally, Gruen theorizes that the transformation that occurred after Gaius Octavius (Augustus) defeated the forces of Cleopatra and Marcus Antonius did not happen because of inevitable progression, but resulted from the cumulative legislations and changes to the Roman military.

While Gruen did not attempt reductionism to explain the disintegration of the Republic, he correctly identifies many of the contributing factors behind the fall of the Republic in a concise manner.

Other current modern historians such as Michael Grant and Adrian Goldsworthy write extensively about the events before, during, and after the transformation but do not associate the Roman legions as the principle enabler behind the disintegration of the Republic. While Grant focuses on major events and key individuals, other historians look to the evidence left behind by the *populus* (general population) to flesh out the societal norms and daily activities of the ancient Romans. Historians Paul Veyne and Georges Duby from the Annales School examine the culture of the common citizen of Rome in their book *A History of Private Life: From Pagan Rome to Byzantium* (1987).¹⁸ Their unique compilation of daily rituals and habits illustrates the common psyche of the Roman people and helps researchers lose some of their anachronistic bias and better relate to the events of the time.

Historians continue to debate the various causal factors behind the transformation of the Roman Republic. The key events, figures, and legislation during the critical years of 133-27 BC marked a period of great challenges to the civilization of Rome. Political scientist Samuel P. Huntington captured the timeless truism of the importance of the civil/military relationship in his book, *The Soldier and State: The Theory of and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957). He stated, "The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a social imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society."¹⁹ Huntington's statement highlighted the criticality of Rome's military during the fall of the Republic as it metamorphosed from a citizen army focused on existential threats to the Roman state to a professional army commanded by individuals who wielded the army as a political tool to secure power and personal gain. Individually none of these items caused the fall of the Republic, but collectively they led to civil wars that forever changed the method of governance in Rome and the role of the military in Roman politics. The professionalization of the Roman army alienated the legions from the state and enabled the application of power by individuals to determine the domestic and foreign affairs of Rome. A review of the modern literature suggests that additional research is warranted because, although many theories exist about the fall of the Roman Republic, little existing literature demonstrates the criticality of the soldier and civilian relationship

in the Roman Republic and how the legion emerged as the key enabler behind the transformation of the Republic.

Notes

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Origins of the Lost Cause: Pollard to the Present

Rebecca Simmons Graf

The literature available on the American Civil War is extensive and growing each year. The war is considered to be one of the bloodiest conflicts in human history and the earliest manifestation of modern warfare. The variety of interpretations of the war has aided in creating this tremendous volume of literature. Northerners and Southerners were—and continue to be—prolific in promoting their own versions of the conflict. Following the defeat of the Confederacy, a movement began in which Southerners wrote their version of the conflict and the events leading up to it. Southern historian Edward A. Pollard named this movement the “Lost Cause.” The historiography of the Lost Cause is constantly being added to and it is still a major topic; both proponents and opponents publish often on their interpretations of the Lost Cause.

One of the unique features of the Lost Cause is that it is a history written by the losers instead of the winners. Southern men, such as Edward Pollard, Jubal Early, and Jefferson Davis, were determined that their version of history would be carried into the future. Therefore, they wrote early and wrote often, disseminating their version throughout the nation, so that Southern heroes such as Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson would remain in the forefront of the history of the Civil War. These authors left a legacy of conflicting information for future generations that has led some to continue debating the implications of the war even in the twenty-first century.

The Lost Cause is the phrase that is typically associated with the writings used to explain the defeat of the Confederacy in the American Civil War; all adherents to this school of historiography have built upon Pollard’s *Lost Cause*, from whence the name of the movement came. Lost Cause literary efforts are considered apologias: pieces written as explanation or justification of motives, convictions, or acts. The motivation of these writers centered on their attempts to ensure that their views reached posterity. This version of history has been continuously debated for nearly 150 years. Civil War historian Gary W. Gallagher stated,

The architects of the Lost Cause acted from various motives. They collectively sought to justify their own actions and allow themselves

and other former Confederates to find something positive in all-encompassing failure. They also wanted to provide their children and future generations of white Southerners with a ‘correct’ narrative of the war.¹

Challengers of the ideology of the Lost Cause alternately define it as a myth or, as Alan T. Nolan, the prolific Civil War author, stated, “an American legend.”² However, there is, as has often been noted, some truth to legends and myths. Some of the assertions of Lost Cause writers contain a grain of truth—enough to keep the legend alive for generations.

Nolan detailed the components of the Lost Cause in *The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History* (2000). A primary claim of the Lost Cause contends slavery was not the primary sectional issue, and that the Southern states would have given up slavery on their own eventually. Meanwhile, abolitionists provoked the South by citing the mistreatment of slaves, although Southerners depicted slaves as happy in their situation (this was most notable in John C. Calhoun’s arguments in the late 1840s that slavery was a positive social good). Additionally, the Confederate military loss was due to the “massive Northern manpower and material,” not any martial ability on the part of Union officers or men. Finally, Northern military leaders were viewed as butchers, specifically William Tecumseh Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant, or blundering, such as George B. McClellan; meanwhile, the Confederate generals, in particular Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, were considered saintly or Christ-like—as were the common Confederate soldiers.³ In the end, Nolan stated his belief that the purpose of the legend was to “foster a heroic image of secession and the war so that the Confederates would have salvaged at least their honor from the all-encompassing defeat. Thus the purpose of the legend was to hide the Southerners’ tragic and self-destructive mistake.” (Southerners, after all, are the only [white] Americans who have ever had to suffer the humiliation of being conquered.) In fact, Nolan’s goal was to refute “the Lost Cause legend and reestablish the war as history” by comparing the tenets of the Lost Cause with the accepted history of the war.⁴ These tenets are affirmed or debated throughout the various writings of the Lost Cause, from Pollard, Early, and Davis, to Douglas Southall Freeman, Foster, and the brothers James R. and Walter D. Kennedy.

The writings of Edward A. Pollard (1832-1872), as editor for the *Richmond Examiner* established the Lost Cause, along with General Jubal A. Early’s (1816-

1894) writings for the Southern Historical Society, and former Confederate President Jefferson Davis' *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government* (1881). These authors espoused the tenets of the Lost Cause; Pollard and Davis both argued secession was a right and included some of the other tenets in their writings while Early focused on the numbers involved in the conflict and therefore the unequal competition. These men instituted the Lost Cause and attempted to gain credence for their writings throughout the nation. They were successful overall; many in both the North and South believed their proposed version of the events as the accurate history. Their attempts were fruitful because they wrote early—Pollard published just one year after the end of the war, and Early's *A Memoir of the Last Year of the War for Independence, in the Confederate States of America* came the next year—and their ideas have been passed on to succeeding generations of Southerners.

Pollard was the first to use the term Lost Cause; it appeared as the title of his three volumes, *The Lost Cause: A New Southern History of the War of the Confederate States* (1866). He was born in Virginia and during the war was an editor of the Richmond *Examiner*. His writings tended to be in favor of the Confederacy, but very critical of the Confederate administration, in particular President Jefferson Davis. Editor of the *Civil War Times*, Dana Shoaf noted that,

the volume's title [*The Lost Cause*] has transcended that book to serve as a label for a romantic, Magnolia-scented view of the war that focuses on state's rights over slavery as a cause of the conflict and that portrays Southerners as Americans who simply wanted to be left alone, but who fought heroically and savagely when provoked.⁵

Shoaf alluded to an idea of a laid-back Southern people who merely wanted to leave the Union peacefully and only fought once they perceived being attacked by the Union forces. This idea is presented in Pollard's writings as well as other Lost Cause authors; the Union began hostilities through their attempts to reinforce Fort Sumter. From this idea comes another name for the conflict: the War of Northern Aggression. Pollard covered both the political questions and the military aspects of the war, despite the assertion by Gallagher that "[Robert E. Lee] was the preeminent Lost Cause hero (by focusing on him rather than on Jefferson Davis, ex-Confederates could highlight the military rather than the far messier political and social dimensions of the war)."⁶ While Pollard was the first to use the term, Early would

cement the ideology in Southern history and culture.

Jubal A. Early, following his time as a general in the Confederate army, commemorated the resistance of the Confederacy. In addition to publishing a memoir of the war, during the 1870s Early wrote for the Southern Historical Society, often championing Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s efforts as the military leaders of the Confederate armies. Early also looked at the differences in military power of the two belligerents and even provided, in March 1877, comments on Philippe d’Orleans, the Count of Paris’ *Histoire de la guerre civile en Amérique*, seven volumes published between 1874 and 1890, in which the Count wrote of his time in the Union Army under General George McClellan.⁷ The Count, as an Aide de Camp, expressed his view that the South was the cause of the war, actually calling its secession a *coup d’état* against the legitimate Federal government. Gallagher detailed Early’s major points throughout his writings as: “(1) Robert E. Lee was the best and most admirable general of the war; (2) Confederate armies faced overwhelming odds and mounted a gallant resistance; (3) Ulysses S. Grant paled in comparison to Lee as a soldier; (4) Stonewall Jackson deserved a place immediately behind Lee in the Confederate pantheon of heroes; and (5) Virginia was the most important arena of combat.”⁸ Actually, Gallagher gave Early some credence; he stated that “The longevity of many of these ideas can be attributed in considerable measure to their being grounded in fact.” However, “The distortion came when Early and other proponents of the Lost Cause denied that Lee had faults or lost any battles, focused on Northern numbers and material superiority while ignoring Confederate advantages, denied Grant any virtues or greatness, and noticed the Confederacy outside the eastern theater only when convenient to explain Southern failures in Virginia.”⁹ In order to demonstrate that Union generals were not the noblemen that Confederate generals were, Grant was used as the ultimate example. His military abilities were questioned and his own words, “to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way” were often used against him.¹⁰ This assertion by Grant was used to vilify him, as well as a few other Union generals who were believed to have taken harsh liberties with the civilians of the South. The maligning of Union generals was used to demonstrate the contrast between the leadership of the two sides and as yet another reason for the Confederate generals’ higher status for this chivalrous behavior.

On a more political note, the first volume of Jefferson Davis’ *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government* (1881) argued that the Southern states retained

their sovereignty despite the formation of the Constitution. In the second volume, Davis looked at the war itself. Over and over, Davis explained the states, North and South, did not lose their sovereignty to the Federal government and retained the right to leave the Union at any time. He includes instances of Northern states threatening the same action repeatedly prior to the formation of the Confederacy. He also argued that slavery was not the issue for the Southern people, as they would have eventually stopped slavery on their own. Davis notes additionally that slavery was as prevalent in the North initially, but had become untenable economically. Here, once again, a leader of the Confederate cause, attempts to look at both the political and military implications of the war, despite assertions that the Lost Cause writers attempted to avoid the political aspects.

The Lost Cause was expounded by these early writers and passed on to future generations through the actions of various groups; however, the primary carriers were white Southern women and veterans. Immediately following the war, many Southerners, especially women, focused on perpetuating the Lost Cause. Various means were used to remember the war and those who died for the cause. These included a Confederate Memorial Day, speeches by veterans, and more publications by both men and women; all of these were common following the war's end and throughout the remainder of the century. According to Purdue's Caroline E. Janney, who specializes in the Civil War, the war caused more women to enter the public sphere than ever before, and many of these women became increasingly politicized.¹¹ Historian Lesley J. Gordon claimed the wife of Confederate General George Pickett and author LaSalle Corbell Pickett's "published writings and lectures repeatedly stressed the South's right to secession, the righteousness of the 'cause,' the valor of Confederate soldiers, the devotion of Southern women, and the loyalty of the childlike slaves."¹² The women and men that survived the conflict attempted to honor the fallen through their writings and memorials, a practice which continues in many areas of the South to this day.

Some items became symbols of the Lost Cause through the efforts of both veterans and Southern white women. These icons included the flag of the Confederacy, the gray uniform, and the song *Dixie*. These icons were, and are, brought out again and again to invoke the memory of the Civil War. As historian Robert E. Bonner pointed out, as much as Americans now view the desecration of the United States flag as an act of violence "to the memory of soldiers who died defending their 'colors' from their countries enemies," the Civil War and the Confederate flag made the association "even more pronounced because the

[Confederate] country's most popular emblem, the Southern Cross, was a banner specifically designed for use in combat."¹³ The Southern Cross was routinely brought out, along with the Confederate gray uniform, at ceremonies and memorials of Confederate dead, inciting passion and great emotion from attendees. As historian Keith S. Bohannon noted, "Flags held a prominent place at reunions, appearing at the head of processions and draped behind speakers' stands. The tattered appearance of these banners, like the empty pants legs of many veterans, provided graphic reminders of the terrible violence and cost of the war."¹⁴ These visual reminders of the war became important to the remembrance of the war and yet another part of the Lost Cause history.

The Lost Cause has continued to be a topic of interest and debate into modern times. Many writers have argued for or against the Lost Cause since Pollard, Early, and Davis published their works. Many more reference the ideas of the Lost Cause without focusing on the idea itself. Drew Gilpin Faust, president of Harvard University and the Lincoln Professor of History in Harvard's Faculty of Arts and Sciences, discusses briefly the "cult" of the Lost Cause in *This Republic of Suffering* (2008), stating that it and "the celebration of Confederate memory that emerged in the ensuing decades were in no small part an effort to affirm that the hundreds of thousands of young Southern lives had not, in fact, been given in vain."¹⁵ In *Cities of the Dead*, William Blair (2004), director of the Civil War era center at Penn State, alluded to the importance of the Lost Cause in the twentieth century by noting, "[T]he literature of the Lost Cause portrayed Memorial Days as cultural elements with little or no political content, as examples of civil religion, or as a means of helping celebrants overcome the loss of the war."¹⁶ For some, the Lost Cause became more than history, or historiography; it became a religion.

The idea of the Lost Cause as a religion is described by historian Lloyd A. Hunter. He references a speech given at a United Confederate Veterans reunion by Lawrence M. Griffin, in which Griffin states that the "worship of the Immortal Confederacy, had its foundation in the myth of the Lost Cause." The Southern people "elevated it [the Lost Cause] above the realm of common, patriotic impulse, making it perform a clearly religious function."¹⁷ Hunter discussed the use of the emblems of the Lost Cause—the Stars and Bars or the Southern Cross, *Dixie*, and the Confederate gray jacket—as religious, and this connotation was extended to the image of the generals as well. He looked to the idea of sacralization, the elevation of "commonplace elements of a culture to some sort of sacred, inviolable standing" in which "the whole culture or land takes on religious import" and the "society itself

becomes sacred.”¹⁸ The land of magnolias and chivalry, in Hunter’s summation, became its own religion, to be cited by Southerners along with their sovereign state’s right to secede.

More recent uses of the Lost Cause include James R. and Walter Donald Kennedy’s *The South Was Right!* (2008). The Kennedys detail Davis’ argument for secession, explaining that secession was the right of all states. They also perpetuate the idea of happy slaves, more so than maybe any other Lost Cause writers, through the use of “Slave Narratives” which supposedly demonstrated “that a vast majority (more than seventy percent) of ex-slaves had only good experiences to report about life as a slave and about the Old South.”¹⁹ However, *The South Was Right!* does make a drastic assertion that was not prevalent in other writings, which may have become visible to them only in hindsight; the Kennedys assert that following the Civil War, the North went on a campaign of “Cultural Genocide” as part of an “effort to re-educate the Southern populace.”²⁰ Reconstruction and its evils has become a part of the Lost Cause in more recent years; however, it is still not the primary focus. The focus remains mostly on the tenets of the Lost Cause: brave, virtuous Confederate generals versus evil Union generals; Northern superiority in resources, but not leadership; Generals Longstreet and Pickett vilified for betrayal and incompetence; defense of states’ rights, not slavery, as reason for secession; secession justified in response to Northern aggression; slavery as a benign institution in which the slaves were happy; and, although very rarely mentioned in modern times, the idea that without slavery, slaves would have risen up and taken control of the South.

Assessing the early historiography of the Civil War, Ernst Breisach notes that the initial writers participated in the typical “war-guilt debate” in their efforts to determine fault for the bloody conflict.²¹ He also notes that despite the time and distance factors, “the discussion of the Civil War remained firmly linked to moral issues and judgments.”²² In terms of historiography in general, many writers who have examined the Lost Cause have fallen into two camps: the Progressives and the revisionists. Progressive authors tended to focus on the persistent “national” history evident through the preservation or restoration of the Union, following the economic-sectional approach of Charles Beard.²³ The revisionists, appearing only briefly, focused on the political aspects; they noted that the war could have been averted with a return to “calm reason and statesmanship.”²⁴ Later writers appear in the various approaches that developed during the twentieth century. Cliometricians, or New Economic historians, looked at the profitability of slavery, a quantitative method that

left questions of morality and qualitative methods out of the equation. Additional steps have been taken within the new Social History. Increasingly the actions of women, the slaves, and other minority groups have received new notice. Overall, the Lost Cause has been viewed in most methods of historiography that have evolved since the end of the war.

The Lost Cause ideology has been argued over for nearly 150 years, with no end in sight. The ideas that began with Pollard, Early, and Davis have, over time, invaded popular culture, for example, in popular books and movies, such as *Gone with the Wind*, *Gods and Generals*, and *Birth of a Nation*. Movies, and the books they were based on, such as these have perpetuated the ideas started by early Lost Cause writers, ideas that indicate the South was fighting for a just cause. They honor those generals and soldiers who fought for the Confederate cause and vilify those Northerners who defeated them as well as the carpetbaggers and scalawags who ran the Southern states' governments during Reconstruction. Additionally, these works perpetuate the myth that slaves were child-like and happy in their subservient situation. With the addition of these ideas to popular fiction and movies, the Lost Cause truly moved from a historical debate to prevailing culture. In more recent publications, proponents of the Lost Cause are portrayed as racists or accused of skewing the facts, and opponents are portrayed as merely trying to cover up the truth. Indeed, each side has many passionate authors working diligently to push their version of Civil War history. With such an expansive historiography, the Lost Cause may continue to be debated for years to come, as sectional differences do not seem to have abated for some in both regions of the country. In this sense, the Lost Cause engenders a continuing historical debate on the Civil War and Reconstruction era.

Notes

1. Gary W. Gallagher, ed., *The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), 1.

2. Alan T. Nolan, "The Anatomy of the Myth," in Gallagher, ed., *The Myth of the Lost Cause*, 12.

3. Ibid., 17-18.

4. Ibid., 14.

5. Dana B. Shoaf, "Originator of the Lost Cause." *America's Civil War* 19, no. 6 (January 2007): 35.

6. Gallagher, ed., *The Myth of the Lost Cause*, 2.

7. Gregory R. Crane, ed. Perseus Digital Library, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/>, *Southern Historical Society Papers* 3, 1877, 140-154.
8. Gary W. Gallagher, "Jubal A. Early, the Lost Cause, and Civil War History: A Persistent Legacy," in Gallagher, ed., *The Myth of the Lost Cause*, 40.
9. Ibid.
10. Brooks D. Simpson, "Continuous Hammering and Mere Attrition: Lost Cause Critics and the Military Reputation of Ulysses S. Grant," in Gallagher, ed., *The Myth of the Lost Cause*, 156.
11. Caroline E. Janney, *Burying the Dead but Not the Past: Ladies' Memorial Associations and the Lost Cause* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 15.
12. Leslie J. Gordon, "'Let the People See the Old Life as it War': LaSalle Corbell Pickett and the Myth of the Lost Cause," in Gallagher, ed., *The Myth of the Lost Cause*, 170.
13. Robert E. Bonner, "Flag Culture and the Consolidation of Confederate Nationalism," *The Journal of Southern History* 68 no. 2 (May 2002): 295.
14. Keith S. Bohannon, "'These Few Gray-Haired, Battle-Scarred Veterans': Confederate Army Reunions in Georgia, 1885-95," in Gallagher, ed., *The Myth of the Lost Cause*, 94.
15. Drew Gilpin Faust, *This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 193.
16. William A. Blair, *Cities of the Dead: Contesting the Memory of the Civil War in the South, 1865-1914*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 2-3.
17. Lloyd A. Hunter, "The Immortal Confederacy: Another Look at Lost Cause Religion," in Gallagher, ed., *The Myth of the Lost Cause*, 186.
18. Ibid., 188.
19. James R. Kennedy and Walter D. Kennedy, *The South Was Right!* 2nd ed. (Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing, 1994), 96.
20. Ibid., 274.
21. Ernst Breisach, *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern*, 3rd ed, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 260.
22. Ibid., 261.
23. Ibid., 337.
24. Ibid., 338.

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Einhard: The Lasting Influence of *The Life of Charlemagne* and Other Works

Aida Dias

The Carolingian period was of significant importance to the development of medieval history writing. Charlemagne (c.742-814) surrounded himself with scholars in an effort to promote learning and the arts, which had been in decline for centuries. Within this Carolingian Renaissance, there was one scholar who established his place in history by writing a concise but remarkable, and mostly accurate, biography of the greatest king and emperor of the early Middle Ages. This scholar was Einhard (c.770-840), who created impressively original works that had both an immediate and lasting influence on the writing of biographies and hagiographies. A closer look at these works reveals a great deal about the man who wrote them and the social and political climate that shaped them. From his classical education and the influence of Charlemagne's court, Einhard developed a unique style of writing and created works which, in addition to giving him personal power, had social and political significance for the Carolingians.

Einhard was born around 770 to parents who were landowners, after Charlemagne was already co-ruler of the Frankish kingdom. He was sent to be educated at the monastery of Fulda in Eastern Francia at a young age. His short stature probably made it unlikely that he would succeed in a military career. At Fulda he learned Latin and was educated in the classics and the Bible.¹ When Charlemagne sought capable scholars to promote literacy in his kingdom and to improve its workings and administration, Einhard was recommended. Thus he began his career in the royal court, which brought him alongside great scholars like Alcuin of York, a great teacher who had also been recruited. Einhard's exact functions are unknown, but he appears to have been involved in the construction of several buildings, perhaps as an architect, in addition to being Charlemagne's secretary and, apparently, a distinguished poet, according to his contemporaries.² His education, both at Fulda and with the scholars at the royal court, especially Alcuin, profoundly influenced his writings, most of which were completed in the later part of his life after the subject of his main work, Charlemagne, had died in 814.

The *Vita Karoli Magni*, or *The Life of Charlemagne*, was written sometime between 817 and 836. Historians have argued over likely dates and their implications

for what sentiments Einhard might have been trying to convey. An earlier date is generally favored, as it had the “immediate purpose of consolidating Louis the Pious’s position as the rightful and appropriate heir to his father’s dominion,”³ a factor looked at in more detail below. In his preface to *The Life*, Einhard expressed a sense of duty to record the memory of his “lord and foster father,” knowing that no one would be better suited to write Charlemagne’s life and deeds than himself, having been present at the time.⁴ He humbled himself, stating his inadequacies as a Latinist and referring to himself as *homo barbarus*,⁵ perhaps to excuse not only his writing style but also the content of his work. He lamented that a life as magnificent as that of Charlemagne, a man who had been so kind and generous to him, and so worthy of praise, should be recorded with “Ciceronian eloquence” rather than his feeble attempt.⁶ It is clear from Einhard’s words that *The Life* is a work of praise and must therefore be assumed to have been somewhat biased. He was writing the life and deeds of a king to whom he felt indebted, and whose dynasty he served as a member of the court. But historians still generally agree that it is mostly accurate.

Rather than draw on the traditional hagiographies and medieval writings of the time, Einhard modeled his biography on, and at times borrowed heavily from, Suetonius’s *Lives of the Caesars*, especially the *Life of Augustus*. However, as medieval historian Richard Sullivan stated in his study of Carolingian education, “[i]t was not plagiarism but schooling that led Einhard to portray Charlemagne in terms Suetonius had used to describe Roman emperors.”⁷ In his essay on Einhard’s portrayal of Charlemagne, the last chair of paleography at King’s College London, David Ganz, praised Einhard’s originality for seeking that “Ciceronian eloquence” which had been rejected by Christians in their hagiographies, noting that by 839, his biography had already inspired a hagiography (Wandalbert of Prüm’s *Life of St. Goar*), “the very genre it had reacted against.”⁸ Einhard was undoubtedly familiar with the medieval panegyric style of writing, with kings described in martial terms, but he decided the classical style with more human characterization was more appropriate, drawing some criticism from those who found it too pagan.⁹ Einhard wanted to save for posterity the memory of Charlemagne’s great deeds as a great king, but also as a great man, whom he deeply respected.

The biography itself is a very short work, the first half of which details Charlemagne’s deeds (as a *gesta*), and the second half describes his life. Because of its length, it seems to receive more criticism for what it omits than for what it includes. But Einhard’s writing style proved to be popular with his contemporaries. *The Life* was one of the bestsellers of the ninth century, often paired with annals and

other biographies, and later used in the education of future emperors Charles the Bald and Charles the Fat, Charlemagne's grandson and great-grandson, respectively.¹⁰ Many biographies written shortly after were directly and heavily influenced by it, notably Bishop Asser's *Life of Alfred the Great* in 893.¹¹ Einhard's work seems to have also influenced the biographies of Louis the Pious written by the Astronomer, the anonymous writer from Louis's court, and, especially, that written by Thegan of Trier.¹² One interesting work worth mentioning is *Charlemagne* written by the Monk of St. Gall, generally believed to be Notker the Stammerer (840-912), sometime after 883. While regarded as having little value as a work of history, this collection of anecdotes about Charlemagne as a very pious man seems to have more value as political commentary on Charles the Fat's time.¹³ But professor Simon MacLean, who specializes in late Carolingian history, argues that "[f]ar from being the naively recorded collection of bizarre anecdotes that it seems to be, Notker's work was actually a carefully constructed exposition of Einhard's *Life of Charlemagne*, designed to invert that work's secular values and place God back at the centre of the reader's understanding of history."¹⁴ Regardless of whether it was a direct response to Einhard's work or not, it shows that "Charlemagne's biography was turning into legend."¹⁵

One interesting aspect about *The Life* is that it appears to have circulated for a few decades without its author's name attached to it.¹⁶ (Some evidence suggests that perhaps Einhard's preface, where he states his inadequacies, was addressed to Louis's librarian Gerward, rather than to the general public.¹⁷) Nonetheless, the prologue to *The Life* written by the theologian and poet Walahfrid Strabo in 840 offers great praise to Einhard "not only for his knowledge, but also for the complete integrity of his character. It is also known, since he was present at most of these events, that he made his account even stronger by attestation to the simple truth."¹⁸ Walahfrid was, then, establishing Einhard as an honest historian, whose works could be consulted with confidence. To facilitate this, he divided the text into individual chapters. It is not known why Einhard left his name out of his work when it seems everyone knew he was the author—he might have been really that modest, or perhaps he wanted others to introduce him as a great and honorable man.

The Life was written during Louis the Pious's reign (814-840), likely at a time of turmoil in the kingdom. Like his father, Louis seems to have held Einhard in great esteem, granting him several properties shortly after Charlemagne's death, as it was the "custom of imperial Highness to honor those faithfully serving it with many gifts and to elevate them with great honors."¹⁹ Einhard seems to have served all his

superiors faithfully and honorably, and remained at court until 830 when, during a time of conflict between Louis and his sons, he retired to serve as lay abbot at his many properties. Medieval historian Rosamond McKitterick argued that *The Life* served to reinforce Louis's legitimacy as king and emperor, pointing specifically to the section in which,

Charlemagne repudiates the daughter of Desiderius and marries Hildegard. Louis the Pious, of course, was the only surviving son of Hildegard. It thus serves to reinforce both the legitimacy of Carolingian succession, and the theme of the genealogy which completes the collection, where the Carolingian line from father to son, from its origins in the Trojan and Gallo-Roman past to Louis the Pious, is elaborated.²⁰

Einhard was possibly trying to please the king with the mention of his mother. A noticeable omission from *The Life*, which may reinforce this idea, has been pointed out by Paul Dutton, author of *Charlemagne's Courtier: The Complete Einhard*. There is no mention of the "Division of the Kingdom" of 806 (which had been personally delivered to Rome by Einhard), possibly because it "ran counter to Louis's view (prior to 830) of an indivisible empire . . . to which he had been the sole heir,"²¹ since his brothers had died earlier. This suggests that Einhard was certainly aware of the political implications of everything he wrote and, as the faithful servant that he was, did not wish to displease his king. "To recognize the propaganda value of such texts as Einhard . . . is to accept that these works were not simply written for an aloof posterity, but as works of immediate purport, with a vital message for the living and those with power."²² The immediate significance and effect of *The Life* must, then, be considered.

In addition to asserting Louis's right to the title, *The Life* served to affirm the title itself. Einhard began the first chapter of the biography with a piteous depiction of the last Merovingian king, Childeric III, holding the empty title of king and later being deposed supposedly by the pope himself, while the mayors of the palace held the real power over all the affairs of the kingdom.²³ (It has been argued that the records concerning the pope's involvement in Childeric's deposition may have been inaccurate, but this would have been from before Einhard's time.²⁴) This served to give legitimacy to the Carolingian line, which began with Charlemagne's grandfather, Charles (the Hammer) Martel, that great military leader who had been

mayor of the palace. When Charlemagne surrounded himself with scholars, he may or may not have already had in mind that it would be beneficial to have someone describing his “royal prowess on the field of battle; strengthening the bonds of kinship and personal dependence; effective management of royal resources; exemplary personal conduct; administrative assertiveness; and mustering the powers of the Church to carry God's special favor.”²⁵ All of this Einhard did with exceptional skill, but not until after Charlemagne's death in 814.

Einhard described Charlemagne's military conquests in the first part of the biography. Each of the nations or peoples that the Franks fought was addressed in a separate paragraph (separate chapters after Walafrid's addition) in a somewhat Suetonian fashion. While the Royal Frankish Annals described how Charlemagne fought myriad different peoples in one year, *The Life* painted a picture of a highly organized ruler who seemed to plan a series of conquests to expand the kingdom, suggesting a “grand strategy rather than a policy of plunder.”²⁶ Einhard repeatedly stressed the royal virtue of steadfastness. “The King, who excelled all the princes of his time in wisdom and greatness of soul, did not suffer difficulty to deter him or danger to daunt him from anything that had to be taken up or carried through, for he had trained himself to bear and endure whatever came, without yielding in adversity, or trusting to the deceitful favors of fortune in prosperity.”²⁷ The concept of fortune, used here and elsewhere in *The Life*, is worth noting as a classical and pagan influence in his writing.²⁸ In addition to valor in conquest, Einhard emphasized Charlemagne's goodwill toward other kings and nations, and his mercy toward conquered peoples. In describing the long war with the “faithless” Saxons, he pointed out how Charlemagne took 10,000 of them along with their wives and children, resettling them in different parts of Gaul and Germany,²⁹ but failed to mention the massacre of 4,500 Saxons at Verden. Given the level of detail in the former description, the latter should have been included, and its omission can be assumed to have been intentional.

Einhard got more personal when describing Charlemagne as a family man. He described the affection and devotion he bore his mother, sister, and daughters, the latter whom he never allowed to marry because he could not bear to part with them. Charlemagne seems to have been aware of the sexual scandals involving his daughters but preferred to ignore them. All of this was mentioned only in passing, as if Einhard did not feel it was his place to expose the family troubles. He claimed that even early in his life, Charlemagne “while sharing the kingdom with his brother . . . bore his unfriendliness and jealousy most patiently, and, to the wonder of all, could

not be provoked to be angry with him.”³⁰ No evidence in the historic records suggests that Charlemagne was at all involved in Carloman’s death, but it is somewhat difficult to imagine that only one of the brothers was jealous and unfriendly. Likely, Einhard’s assessment was a little biased. Some historians have claimed that this portrayal as a devoted family man (his many concubines seem to have been socially acceptable at the time) was a defense against Charlemagne’s critics toward the end of his life, when his injustices, his lust, and his propensity toward war seem to have been under attack. In the mid-820s, a vision or dream of Charlemagne being punished for his lecherous life was widely circulated—advocates of later writing dates for *The Life* think it was a response to that story.³¹ If Einhard felt a duty to preserve the memory of his beloved king, he certainly felt a need to defend him against those who would speak ill of him, but being as close as he supposedly was to Charlemagne, he could not have failed to notice his faults.

Einhard used personal characteristics and habits to portray Charlemagne as a man of the people. He depicted him as “stately and dignified,” but enjoying simple pleasures like hunting, riding, and swimming. Charlemagne enjoyed the warm springs of Aachen immensely, and liked to invite his sons, nobles, friends and, occasionally, his courtiers and bodyguards, so that at times over one hundred people might be bathing together. Einhard also devoted a chapter to describe how the king preferred to dress in regular, common clothes and only dressed up in royal or imperial garb when the occasion demanded it.³² This section was written in a style used earlier by Paul the Deacon in describing the Lombards’ dress, and used again by Thegan in describing Louis the Pious. This style described dress in an ethnical context in a way not used by earlier medieval writers such as Jordanes, Gregory of Tours, or Bede.³³ York historian Guy Halsall described how Thegan, modeling much of his biography on Einhard’s, depicted Louis’s way of dressing as similar, but Thegan’s emphasis was on the rich vestments rather than the common Frankish dress Einhard described. And as Charlemagne had been moderate in food and drink and enjoyed listening to music and readings from scholars over meals, Louis, in turn, detested the “barbarous” songs of old kings his father preserved. While Einhard stressed the “horizontal bonds” between Charlemagne and his people, Thegan copied his model to stress the opposite about Louis.³⁴ But Charlemagne’s sociability was perhaps divinely inspired.

Einhard described how Charlemagne devotedly cherished the Christian religion, and made friends with foreign rulers so that he could help Christians living under their rule. He also welcomed foreigners who came to his country, offering

them protection. If Einhard is to be believed, Charlemagne had no intention of ever becoming emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, although he had a very close relationship with the popes Hadrian and later Leo III.³⁵ But, while Thegan and the Astronomer had described Charlemagne as exceedingly pious, correcting the gospels as he was dying, “Einhard resisted such explicit Christian language, because his sense of greatness could not be simply Christian.”³⁶ His version of Charlemagne’s death was more like the secular death of a hero.³⁷ Einhard reported that before his death there were many signs, such as eclipses, meteors, earthquakes, and lightning strikes that Charlemagne supposedly recognized as omens but pretended were not relevant to him.³⁸ So Charlemagne was deeply religious but not excessively so, and his greatness was more a personal characteristic.

The man who “hurled scriptural quotations at corrupt officials or worldly clerics”³⁹ was perhaps more concerned with reform instead. While Charlemagne seems to have done a great deal to fix problems with existing laws and corruption, it was here that Einhard issued one of his few complaints, stating that the king did little more than add a few missing items, and even so, left those in an incomplete state.⁴⁰ But the “Renaissance man born seven centuries early”⁴¹ did a great deal to beautify and improve his kingdom. He built his impressive palace and chapel at Aachen, erected schools for peasants and nobles alike, restored churches that needed repairs, built bridges, and assembled fleets to keep watch over both the northern and southern coasts to protect the kingdom from Vikings, Moors, and others. Einhard attributed the relative safety of Italy, Gaul, and Germany to Charlemagne’s great measures.⁴² In these matters, the praise for the emperor might be mostly justified.

Before he left the court in 830, Einhard was already distancing himself from the troubles between the emperor and his sons by spending time at his many properties given to him by Louis. *The Translation and Miracles of the Blessed Martyrs, Marcellinus and Peter* was written around 830 but described events from a few years earlier. It went on to influence the creation of a new subgenre of hagiography, that of the translation of saints’ relics, which gained great prominence in the Middle Ages.⁴³ This work is a delightfully bizarre tale of the relics which Einhard acquired by theft from Rome for his chapel, their retrieval, the displeasure expressed by the saints concerning their location through dreams and bleeding reliquaries, their translations accompanied by devout crowds, and the miracles associated with them.⁴⁴ Evident in the tale is the rivalry between Einhard and Hilduin, an abbot who had acquired the relics of St. Sebastian earlier and, therefore, enjoyed the status of being a relic holder. That Einhard used his personal connection

with the saints to gain prestige and request favors is evident from the literature. He used his position as savior of these saints—justifying their theft—to request of the emperor that he be excused from court matters and be able to remain at his properties. He also requested the building of churches and other necessities, asking in his letters to the emperor to keep in mind what heavenly rewards and worldly praise awaited him if he properly venerated the saints.⁴⁵ But it is perhaps unfair to call him an “adept opportunist” who engaged in the relic affairs strictly for power and prestige.⁴⁶ Convincing evidence supports the genuineness of his religious beliefs.

Einhard began many of his letters and works, including *The Translation*, with “Einhard, a sinner.” While this could have been a standard of the time, it seems to fit with the humble picture he painted of himself. He also often referred to his smallness compared to somebody else’s greatness when addressing them. But the most genuine of Einhard’s surviving documents is a letter concerning the death of his wife, Emma, written to the Benedictine monk, Lupus of Ferrières. He expressed within it his enormous grief as well as his profound disappointment in the fact that the saints, for whom he had cared and ensured proper reverence, had completely ignored his prayers.⁴⁷ The letter, “On the Adoration of the Cross,” turned into a theological treatise in which he analyzed the differences between prayer and adoration or veneration, and stated concerns with how to pray to the saints and venerate the cross.⁴⁸ While not of significant theological value, it serves to illustrate the authenticity of his beliefs.

Influenced by his classical education and the scholarly environment of Charlemagne’s court, Einhard wrote an influential biography which served to affirm the great royal values he attributed to Charlemagne—valor in battle, mercifulness, devotion to family, amiability, and aspiration to improve the kingdom. The political climate during Louis the Pious’s reign played a role in shaping the work, as did Einhard’s affection for his mentor, but the style and structure of the work were almost immediately copied by other writers. Less well known but significant in its own right is his work on the translation of relics that inspired a new type of hagiography. It reflects the religious climate of the age as well as the author’s genuine beliefs. The humble Einhard would have been surprised by the influence his works have had on the writing of history since his time. Or perhaps starting trends was his goal all along.

Notes

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15. Breisach, *Historiography*, 99.
16. Dutton, *Charlemagne's Courtier*, xxii.
17. Ganz, "Einhard's Charlemagne: The Characterisation of Greatness," 41.
18. Walahfrid, "Prologue," in Dutton, 7-8.
19. Louis the Pious, "The Charters," in Dutton, 43-45.

20. McKitterick, *History and Memory in the Carolingian World*, 123.
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22. Rosamond, McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the Written Word* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 241, accessed October 16, 2011, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.01227>.
23. Einhard, *Life of Charlemagne*, 15-17.
24. McKitterick, *History and Memory in the Carolingian World*, 24, 136.
25. Sullivan, *The Gentle Voices of Teachers*, 64.
26. Ganz, "Einhard's Charlemagne: the Characterisation of Greatness," 47.
27. Einhard, *Life of Charlemagne*, 30.
28. Ganz, "Einhard's Charlemagne: the Characterisation of Greatness," 44-45.
29. Einhard, *Life of Charlemagne*, 28.
30. Ibid., 47-48.
31. Dutton, *Charlemagne's Courtier*, xix.
32. Einhard, *Life of Charlemagne*, 56-59.
33. Walter Pohl, "Telling the Difference: Signs of Ethnic Identity," in *From Roman Provinces to Medieval Kingdoms*, ed. Thomas F. X. Noble (London: Taylor & Francis Routledge, 2006), 113-114, accessed October 16, 2011, <http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=156431&site=ehost-live>.
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Polybius on the Roman Republic: Foretelling a Fall

Mary Jo Davies

During his sixteen-year detention in Rome, Polybius's initial admiration for the Romans faded as he came to see them in an increasingly unfavorable light. Political reasons prevented him from overtly expressing his views, but he provided clues for his reversed opinion throughout the *Histories*. As Rome's power grew so did its overconfidence and arrogance. This eventually provided the catalyst for the demise of the Republic. Although he died roughly one hundred years prior to the fall of the Republic, the signs of change were evident to him. In his account of the final destruction of Carthage in 146 BC, Polybius described how the Romans razed Carthage to the ground by "stratagem and deceit."¹ In time, he had come to believe that every form of government was transitory, including that of Rome, but to grasp how he was able to analyze the organic nature of Rome's mixed constitution, it is crucial to understand how he believed all forms of leadership worked based on his assessment of human behavior.

Historiography and Sources

Polybius's goal in writing history was to provide a moral lesson. In an effort to educate his readers, he offered examples of virtue and vice, and demonstrated how each can mean the difference between success and failure for the survival of a state. Hence, Roman general Aemilius Paullus, who defeated King Perseus of Macedonia at the Battle of Pydna in 168 BC, earned a favorable mention when he abstained from arrogating anything from his victory, despite the fact that he had won absolute control over Macedonia.² In contrast, the Carthaginian general, Hannibal, led by his anger and violent hatred of the Romans, violated the terms of the treaty that his father, Hamilcar Barca, had forged with Rome after the First Punic War.³

In time, Polybius was effectively able to portend the fall of the Republic simply because the degeneration of the once honorable behavioral customs of Roman society was enough to determine the course their government would take.⁴ Yet, regardless of their conduct in warfare, and how it contributed to the fall of the Republic, it is important to note that Polybius did not incorporate socioeconomic issues and the possible role these played in the Republic's demise. By not considering the sociologic and economic impact on the course of history, Polybius limited his writing to military and political affairs as the agent of change. Indeed,

historian F. W. Walbank, considered an authority on Polybius, stated, “[a]s a contribution to sociology it is practically worthless.”⁵ Since Polybius was Greek by birth he was no doubt acquainted with the works of preeminent Greek writers such as Aristotle and Xenophon, both of whom had contributed observations on early economic thought in their writings. Aristotle, whose works include reflections on military and political matters, had also applied an analysis of distributive justice and how it affected society in Book V of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.⁶ The only evidence in the *Histories* regarding Rome’s economy was Polybius’s conflicting thoughts on appropriating the wealth of conquered territories for the financial benefit of Rome. Seizing gold and silver from their enemies was reasonable, while all-out plundering, such as what happened at Syracuse in 212 BC, garnered his criticism.⁷ Yet this is more indicative of Rome’s behavior in warfare than it is an analysis on economic thought and how it could affect a society.

Walbank also suggested that Polybius did not provide novel insight concerning the cyclical nature of governments, which he termed the *anacyclosis* theory. His analysis of monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies and how each, on their own, degenerate into their respective evils of tyranny, oligarchy and ochlocracy (mob-rule), highlights the weaknesses of single-rule forms of government. When a monarchy becomes tyrannical, the aristocracy takes over the affairs of the state. But rule by aristocracy eventually degenerates into an oligarchy when they come to believe that they have supreme rights over the populace. When the people turn against this system of government, democracy is born. This, in turn, degenerates into ochlocracy at which point the cycle begins anew.⁸ Yet, Walbank stated that Aristotle had previously pointed out that “in practice any type of constitution can turn into almost any other,” including mixed constitutions.⁹ However, while Polybius’s insight may not have been novel, it rested on his initial confidence that Rome’s growth was different from that of all other governments. It had developed through many victories and defeats and thrived on its unique internal structure and military skills.¹⁰ Although Polybius knew that the Republic’s mixed constitution was just as vulnerable to decay, he initially believed it to be better than all other forms of government.¹¹ Based on this premise alone, he had much to contribute to the discourse.

Polybius believed that the *Histories* would aid readers in determining whether to emulate or reject Roman rule.¹² He exhorted their trust not only because he witnessed, but also participated in some of the events.¹³ Historian Luke Pitcher, author of *Writing Ancient History*, believed that an ancient historian’s affinity for

producing a highly detailed narrative does not necessarily mean proof of first-hand sources such as interviews. Pitcher stated that it could be an author's attempt to create a more engaging account for readers. However, Polybius himself believed that accuracy was critical.¹⁴ If Polybius believed eyewitness accounts were the most reliable, it makes sense that he took great care to provide as truthful an interpretation of the events he witnessed as possible. Despite the difficulties related to the plausibility of ancient writing, Polybius's accounts remain widely regarded as the most comprehensive and most eloquent account of the Roman Republic and eventually served as a source for those historians who followed him, such as Livy (59 BC - 17 AD).¹⁵

Background

Born into a wealthy, influential family in Megalopolis, Arcadia around the year 200 BC, Polybius was much more than a Greco-Roman historian of the Hellenistic period. He began an active career in politics at a very early age as a member of the Achaean League, a confederation, which included most Greek city-states on the Peloponnesian peninsula with the exception of Sparta.¹⁶ Following the death of Alexander the Great, his empire split into a number of successor states, with the principal sections ruled by the Ptolemaic, Seleucid, and Antigonid dynasties. These Hellenistic strongholds provided protection against foreign raids, but disputes among them made it difficult for the traditional Greek city-states to remain united in defense of their borders.¹⁷ With their frontier protection waning, the Greeks faced the extraordinary, rising power of Rome. In 172 BC, war broke out between Rome and Macedonia, forcing the members of the Achaean League to choose where their sympathies lay.¹⁸ In an attempt to secure autonomy for Achaea, Polybius chose to support Rome by acknowledging its supremacy. This recognition put him in a position to offer his services to Rome. However, constant hesitation over how much they should oblige their overlords caused friction within the league. At issue was whether to submit when Rome infringed on Achaean laws.¹⁹ League member Aristaenus believed they should, while Philopoemen and Lycortas (Polybius's father and a prominent politician in the League) firmly held that they should obey only if Rome strictly abided by the terms of the alliance.²⁰ Polybius sided with the latter group, which eventually led to his incarceration in Rome in 167 BC along with a thousand other dissenters.

Despite the forced condition of his permanence, he forged a lifelong friendship with the Roman General, Scipio Aemilianus. During his time in captivity, Polybius began recording the *Histories*. He wrote in the Greek language to appeal to

a Greek audience. Although the political position he was in caused him to put Rome in a favorable light, he did, nevertheless, come to see the Roman constitution as the best form of government, stating that it was “sufficiently firm for all emergencies.”²¹ Yet he also knew that all forms of political administration, including that of Rome, were susceptible to decline.²²

How Leadership Worked In Terms Of Moral Behavior

Polybius believed human character was essentially weak and easily swayed by external influences. Sloth, greed, uncontrollable lust, anger, rashness, drunkenness, arrogance, and cowardice were among the harmful traits that Polybius found to be rampant in humans. However, amongst all of these vices he regarded a thirst for greed and power as the most destructive. Each one led to vices of every kind. In contrast to these negative aspects of human behavior, Polybius believed that humans responded positively to acts of kindness and generosity. However, because of the impulsive nature of the human character, he believed *Tyche*—fortune, fate, and chance—rather than wisdom played a larger part in achieving greatness. As previously mentioned, Polybius maintained that proper behavior toward achievements was crucial to the lasting success of a state. He reasoned how “the most signal successes have, from ill management, brought the most crushing disasters in their train; while not unfrequently the most terrible calamities, sustained with spirit, have been turned to actual advantage.”²³

In Book 6 of the *Histories*, Polybius exposed his version of the ephemeral nature of single rule forms of governments. Although he considered monarchies and aristocracies to be weak, it is clear that Polybius found democracy to be of the worst kind. He expended more effort in detailing the degeneration of democracy into ochlocracy than any of the other forms of government. When generation after generation of people become accustomed to the freedom democracy grants, the government is transformed into one ruled by violence.²⁴

Rome’s mixed constitution contrasted sharply with the destructive nature of the single-rule forms of government mentioned above. Its unique structure was built on a balanced system of safeguards established to counteract any propensity to excess that might undermine internal stability and cause a collapse. Knowing that each component had the power to support or harm the other would help each to develop a relationship of respect. However, while Polybius’s methodology indicated that Rome’s constitution was the best and most balanced, he knew that the usual course of nature leads to the decline of all things, including Rome’s form of government.²⁵ Roman philosopher and politician, Marcus Tullius Cicero, similarly

elaborated on mixed constitutions in *The Republic*. In his interpretation, monarchies and aristocracies would survive on their own, provided they placed themselves on an equal footing with the general population by adhering to the same rules and by not giving in to lust, passion, or power. In turn, he believed, the population would more readily oblige their rulers. Democracies, on the other hand, could never promote equality of rights. In Cicero's analysis, people tend to be too corrupt to understand the difference between honor and infamy. By according the same recognition to the most ignominious in society, democracies pervert the very characteristic that engenders equality—morality. But since all three elements—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—on their own, have a tendency to deviate into their “kindred vice,” Cicero, like Polybius, believed that mixed constitutions were the most successful.²⁶ It is interesting to note that *The Republic*, written in 54 BC, represents Rome not long prior to its transition to Empire, when the need to reevaluate the deteriorating condition of its constitution and restore unity to the state, was at its peak of urgency.²⁷

Behavior and Just Causes in Warfare

Polybius had already recognized this urgency a century earlier. Perhaps by chronicling negative aspects of foreign governments Polybius endeavored to spare Rome from the same fate. A brief, historical background of both Sparta and Carthage is helpful to better analyze the nature of the Republic's decline.

While Polybius took great care to pay homage to his Greek roots, he remained focused on the mission of his work, which was to provide a moral lesson, even if it meant sometimes presenting both positive and negative aspects of the history of his own people. In this vein, the Spartan King Lycurgus received godlike reference because of his sagacity.²⁸ His mixed constitution, like that of Rome's, combined the best features of each government in an attempt to prevent any one form from gaining too much power and deviating into its “kindred vice.”²⁹ Focusing on internal politics and the distribution of land and food, Lycurgus secured peace within Sparta's borders.³⁰ However, while he was successful where civil harmony was concerned, he did not provide the Spartans with constitutional guidance in matters regarding the treatment of conquered societies and this would have serious consequences for their own society for years to come.³¹ Polybius reinforced this argument by reminding his readers of the way the Spartans had conquered the Messenians for the purpose of enslaving them.³² Indeed, for the sake of attaining the finances they needed to secure supremacy over Greece, the Spartans had enlisted the help of those whom they had once conquered to liberate Greece—the Persians. In

what Polybius regarded as a sign of constitutional weakness, a series of treaties, which were enacted to end the Peloponnesian war, brought certain areas of Greece once again under Persian control.³³

Hence, the success of a constitution lay not only in its internal affairs, but also in how it managed imperialistic ventures. A just cause for war was necessary. However, wars cannot be successful without a specific goal established at the outset.³⁴ Hannibal's aggressive behavior during the Second Punic War invited disaster. It interfered with his ability to act judiciously at the most critical moment—the start of war.³⁵ As a child, his father, Hamilcar Barca, a general in the First Punic War (264-241 BC), had made him swear never to be friendly with the Romans.³⁶ After twenty-three years of fighting, Rome claimed victory and forced harsh peace terms on the Carthaginians. This included a hefty fine and a Carthaginian withdrawal from Sicily.³⁷ In addition, the Romans displayed questionable behavior when they seized Sardinia, a stinging blow to Carthaginian pride.³⁸

Twenty years after the First Punic War, Hannibal vowed to reclaim Carthaginian dignity and honor. After the death of his father, he broke the treaty, which had also forbidden them from crossing the Ebro River. Thus, in the year 218 BC, in a state of what Polybius considered unreasonable and malicious fury, Hannibal crossed the river to seize Saguntum from the Romans.³⁹ As the war escalated, he succeeded in defeating the Romans at Trasimene in 217 BC and Cannae in 216 BC. Nevertheless, no matter how masterful Polybius believed Hannibal to be in military organization, Hannibal did not appear to have any concrete plans with respect to seizing Rome proper.⁴⁰ In the meantime, the disaster at Cannae had given the Roman Senate the impetus to deliberate over a plan of action.⁴¹ In an effort to prevent further loss of infantry through direct combat, they adopted Roman General Fabius Maximus's indirect response to frustrate Hannibal's intentions.⁴² Positioning armies at strategic locations such as Cumae, Suessula, and Nola, the Romans encircled Hannibal to block him from pillaging more countryside.⁴³ More significantly, Hannibal had eyed Nola's agricultural wealth as a means to provide sustenance for his army, but by sending general Marcus Claudius Marcellus there to defend Nola from Hannibal, the Romans denied the Carthaginian general and his army their much needed food supply.⁴⁴ These tactics proved to Polybius that Hannibal's triumphs at Trasimene and Cannae were not enough to claim victory. Furthermore, as Polybius stated, if a country and its army can maintain a positive spirit in light of its disasters the tides will eventually turn in their favor, and for Rome, they had. However, since pretexts were crucial to justifying warfare it

is important not only to examine Hannibal's motives and behavior in battle, but Rome's as well.⁴⁵

Rome's Behavior in Warfare

Polybius's *Histories* revealed how the Romans' skillful enterprises allowed them to become "masters of land and sea."⁴⁶ Cicero mentioned that, unlike Lycurgus, whose sole wisdom created the foundation for the Spartan's mixed constitution within the timeframe of his own administration, Rome's mixed constitution was fashioned over the course of centuries from the genius of many individuals.⁴⁷ It was established, "by continually adopting reforms from knowledge gained in disaster," such as they had after their defeat at Cannae.⁴⁸

In his article, "Polybius on the Causes of the Third Punic War," historian Donald Walter Baronowski reveals Polybius's principle that wars should *appear* just.⁴⁹ As Polybius mentions, "the general impression that they [the Romans] were justified in entering upon the war with Demetrius enhances the value of their victories, and diminishes the risks incurred by their defeats."⁵⁰ In this context, the question then becomes whether the Romans were ever justified in their imperialistic ventures. If warfare required merely *appearing* justified, then one can easily make the leap and suppose that the Roman pretext for war was for power and supremacy, otherwise regarded as self-aggrandizement. This seems to compromise Polybius's view that the Roman mixed constitution was the best form of government by linking it with the "kindred vice" of his *anacyclosis* theory. While Polybius always knew that mixed constitutions were vulnerable to deterioration, he did believe Rome's was more stable, but seen from this perspective, the Roman government had been showing signs of monarchical arrogance all along. Since Carthage was one of the wealthiest cities at the time, economic gain from conquest was likely one of Rome's motives for war.

Contrary to this line of thought, it is significant that after the Carthaginian surrender of 149 BC, the Romans had agreed not to annex their country, suggesting that the Roman pretext for war was not for profit.⁵¹ Indeed, the era of annexations did not begin until the destruction of Carthage, around 148 BC.⁵² Prior to that, Rome had every opportunity to annex Carthage, as well as Illyria and Macedonia at the time of these victories, but the Romans did not do so in each case until long after the initial war. In the cases of Hispania and the Carthaginian territories of Egypt, the Romans did not complete a systematic annexation until 19 and 30 BC despite the fact that these territories fell to the Romans in 206 and 201 BC.⁵³

By the same token, it is difficult to assume that Rome fought solely for

defensive reasons. This becomes clear if we consider the events leading up to the First Punic War. While Carthaginian power in western Sicily had begun to grow, Carthage took no explicit action against Rome even though the Romans had involved themselves with the Mamertines against King Hiero II of Syracuse, an independent city in eastern Sicily and Carthaginian ally. Carthage could easily have considered Rome's proximity menacing, yet it did not budge until Rome had made the decision to go to war. If Rome's motive to go to war with Carthage rested on the presumed danger of a threat to its borders, the Romans would have allied themselves with King Hiero II rather than the Mamertines.⁵⁴ However, Rome's decision to form an alliance with the Mamertines against Syracuse suggests a ploy toward a much bigger purpose—eliminating Carthage to establish control over Sicily. Nevertheless, a Carthaginian threat might have seemed real enough to Rome; after all, Carthage had naval superiority. The possibility of naval raids on Rome's territory was plausible, which is why the Romans eventually pushed Carthage out of Sardinia. Yet absent Carthaginian action against Rome, it is more reasonable to assume that by taking down this formidable opponent, Rome would be in a position to appropriate its wealth, and as a consequence, enjoy sovereignty over the Mediterranean beyond the borders of the Italian peninsula.⁵⁵ Based on this premise, the assumption of monarchical arrogance is clear indeed.

Polybius's Changing Assessment of Rome—Foretelling the Fall

Polybius recognized Rome's propensity for prudence in military and political affairs. Unlike Hannibal, whose anger and passionate hatred fueled his military enterprises, Rome's equanimity in warfare reinforced the notion that not only was their mixed constitution better than that of the single-rule forms of government, it was also superior to other mixed constitutions, such as that of Lycurgus. Rome's internal system of checks and balances allowed its constitution to remain steadfast under the most extreme conditions, certifying imperialistic success under a solid policy of hegemony.⁵⁶ They remained cool and levelheaded, a composure that assisted them in their achievements and turned their failures into triumphs.

Polybius's criticism lay in the fact that while Rome was more successful than any other state at conquering foreign empires, over time they abandoned their ethical governing skills.⁵⁷ He condemned the Romans for forsaking the principles upon which their constitution rested. After all, these principles sustained them as they strove to achieve their position of supremacy. Their unnecessarily harsh and destructive methods encouraged excess in future generations. Traditionally,

ruthlessness was tolerable up until the point the conquered territory submitted. Afterwards, the conquered received fair treatment. Polybius's assessment of Scipio's exploits on the Iberian Peninsula, and his descent upon Carthage in 209 BC gave a clear example of this. When Scipio faced resistance, he ordered most of his troops to kill anyone they encountered without mercy.⁵⁸ After much bloodshed, Mago Barca, brother of Hannibal, surrendered the city. This allowed the Romans to collect and distribute booty, after which Scipio promised the prisoners freedom as long as they remained loyal to Rome.⁵⁹ This suggests that Polybius's ability to foretell the future of the Roman Republic had less to do with trying to identify who was the more aggressive party than it had to do with how aggression and ruthlessness are a necessary part of war, or more significantly, how wisely (or unwisely) each player carried out their task.

Nevertheless, although analyzing pretexts and justifications are important to understanding ancient warfare, it is equally important to bear in mind that mutual fear, misunderstandings, and accidents (details of which might be lost to history or simply veiled by authorial prejudice in ancient historical accounts) demand consideration. As a result, judgment may not always be possible. In the case of Rome, there is no clear-cut formula that can definitively identify them as the provoker in every case.⁶⁰ It is also important to know that all empires are built with economic benefit in mind. That both the Carthaginians and the Romans desired to occupy Sicily suggests each power coveted that territory for its economic prosperity and strategic location.⁶¹ Yet, pretexts and economic issues aside, one thing became evident to Polybius—Rome's old structure was not consistent with the current path of merciless destruction and individual narcissism. Although the transition from Republic to Empire was still a century away, Polybius endeavored, through his writings, to save Rome from what he ultimately foresaw as its irreversible destiny—that despite the enduring success of their constitution, their system of checks and balances would eventually founder and drive them to a system of one-man rule.

Notes

1. Polybius, *Histories* 37.1, The Perseus Catalog, accessed July 10, 2015, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu>.

2. *Ibid.*, 32.8.

3. *Ibid.*, 3.15.

4. *Ibid.*

5. W. Walbank, "Polybius on the Roman Constitution," *The Classical Quarterly* 37, no. 3/4 (1943): 89.
6. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.4.1-13, The Perseus Catalog, accessed July 10, 2015, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu>.
7. Polybius, *Histories* 9.10.
8. Craige B. Champion, "Polybius on Political Constitutions, Interstate Relations, and Imperial Expansion," Academia.edu, accessed April 1, 2014: 8. <http://www.academia.edu>; Polybius *Histories* 6.9.
9. Walbank, "Polybius on the Roman Constitution," 89, footnote no. 2; Aristotle, *Politics* 5:1316a, The Perseus Catalog, accessed July 10, 2015, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu>.
10. Polybius, *Histories* 6.10.
11. Ibid., 6.18.
12. Ibid., 3.4.
13. Ibid.
14. Ernst Breisach, *Historiography Ancient, Medieval, and Modern*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 49.
15. H. L. Ebeling, "Livy and Polybius: Their Style and Methods of Historical Composition," *The Classical Weekly* 1, no. 4 (1907): 26.
16. R. J. H. Schutt, "Polybius: A Sketch," *Greece & Rome* 8, no. 22 (1938): 50.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 51.
19. Walbank, *Polybius* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 7.
20. Champion, "Polybius on Political Constitutions, Interstate Relations, and Imperial Expansion" 8.
21. Polybius, *Histories* 6.18.
22. Ibid., 6.57.
23. Ibid., 3.4.
24. Polybius, *Histories* 6.9.
25. Ibid., 6.57.
26. Marcus Tullius Cicero, *The Nature of the Gods, Divination, Fate, The Republic, Laws, Etc.* trans. C. D. Yonge (London: Bohn's Classical Library, 1853), 1.34.
27. Elizabeth Asmis, "A New Kind of Model: Cicero's Roman Constitution in 'De republica,'" *The American Journal of Philology* 126, no. 3 (2005): 385.

28. Polybius, *Histories* 6.48.
29. Ibid., 6.10.
30. Ibid., 6.48.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 6.49; Jan P. Stronk, "Sparta and Persia 412-386: An Outline," *Talanta* (1990-1991): 117.
34. John Peddie, *Hannibal's War* (Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1997), 5.
35. A.M. Eckstein, "Hannibal at New Carthage: Polybius 3.15 and the Power of Irrationality," *Classical Philology* 84, no. 1 (1989):12.
36. Polybius, *Histories* 3.11.
37. Peddie, *Hannibal's War* 2-3.
38. Ibid; Livy, *The History of Rome* 21.1.
39. Polybius, *Histories* 3.15.
40. Peddie, *Hannibal's War* 66.
41. Ibid., 98.
42. Ibid., 119.
43. Ibid., 115.
44. Ibid., 118.
45. Polybius, *Histories* 3.4.
46. Ibid., 1.3.
47. Cicero, *The Nature of the Gods, Divination, Fate, The Republic, Laws, Etc* 2.1.
48. Polybius, *Histories* 6.10.
49. Donald Walter Baronowski, "Polybius on the Causes of the Third Punic War," *Classical Philology* 90, no. 1 (1995): 22.
50. Polybius, *Histories* 36.2.
51. Baronowski, "Polybius on the Causes of the Third Punic War" 29.
52. Ibid.
53. Marcel Le Glay, et al., *A History of Rome*. 4th ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009): 92.
54. William H. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327-70 BC* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 187.

55. Ibid.
56. Polybius, *Histories* 6.18.
57. Ryan Balot, "Polybius's Advice to the Imperial Republic," *Political Theory* 38, no. 4 (2010): 493.
58. Polybius, *Histories* 10.15.
59. Ibid. 10.17.
60. J. A. North, "The Development of Roman Imperialism," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 71, (1981): 2.
61. Peddie, *Hannibal's War* 2.

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The Population of Exodus in Question

Cam Rea

The Book of Exodus has intrigued churchgoers, academics, and everyday readers. The approach to its content varies. An apologetic approach includes a literal interpretation of the Bible. On the contrary, a minimalist approach suggests the stories in the Bible are not entirely factual. This study embraces the middle ground between the apologetic and minimalist approach from a secular military standpoint. The focus of this article is on the mass Hebrew exodus. The author does not dispute the fact that the Hebrew people left Egypt—the amount that fled is in question. Using an alternate interpretation of *eleph*, the Hebrew word for “thousand,” combined with the known nutrition and medical practices of the Hebrews, provides an alternative population number than what is recorded in scripture.

To determine whether the Hebrew people in Egypt were slaves that grew tired of their masters or freemen abused by their employers, the author relied upon the Bible together with the works of biblical scholars George E. Mendenhall, Abraham R. Besdin, and military historian Richard A. Gabriel. Gabriel, author of the *Military History of Ancient Israel*, made a statement that is often overlooked: “The Hebrew term used to describe the Israelites at their labors is *avadim* which in an obscure and irregular usage can connote slaves but which more commonly translates as ‘workmen’ or ‘workers’ or even ‘servants.’ The linguistic argument is interesting but is not definitive.”¹ Furthermore, the Books of Exodus and Numbers suggest something other than outright slavery. In the Book of Exodus, the Hebrews grumble at Moses after he led them out of Egypt, stating, “We wish Adonai had used his own hand to kill us off in Egypt! There we used to sit around the pots with the meat boiling, and we had as much food as we wanted. But you have taken us out into this desert to let this whole assembly starve to death!”² In the Book of Numbers, the Hebrews state, “We remember the fish we used to eat in Egypt—it cost us nothing! — and the cucumbers, the melons, the leeks, the onions, the garlic! But now we’re withering away, we have nothing to look at but this man.”³ The term *avadim* along with how the Hebrews felt after leaving Egypt speaks volumes and raises many questions concerning their true status among the Egyptians.⁴ The real issue is whether slavery was an institution in Egypt.

There are two ways to look at slavery when it comes to the inhabitants of ancient Egypt. Were the Hebrews slaves in Egypt? The Hebrews were not subservient to the Egyptians but to the state, i.e. the pharaoh. Therefore, the nature of slavery in Egypt, according to Besdin, “operated like a technological machine, with all people reduced to useful cogs.”⁵ At the time of the Exodus, Egypt possibly had a population of useful cogs between seven to nine million people. Such a population could easily staff the military and governmental jobs needed to secure the kingdom and work the pharaonic projects without hindrance. There was no shortage of manpower, and the need for a system totally dependent on slavery was for the most part unheard of. In other words, Egypt was not totally slave dependent. Moreover, with the exception of defeated armies, Egyptian religion and law forbade outright slavery.⁶ During wars of conquest and occupation, the Egyptians enslaved defeated armies along with their civilian noncombatant counterparts. However, slaves in Egypt, such as Hebrews, were not devoid of rights. They could own property, marry free women, have children, and if they reached a certain level of prosperity, they could employ their own servants. Nevertheless, their privileges did not include free movement.⁷

Historians recognize the Greeks as the first to introduce house slaves to the region when they occupied Egypt between the third and first century BCE.⁸ However, the Biblical story of Joseph being a slave of Potiphar's house suggests otherwise.⁹ During the time of the pharaohs, the institution of slavery varied. Viewed as a god, the pharaoh considered every resource and human in his kingdom his property. In this way, all those within the borders of Egypt were slaves, including the Israelites inhabiting Egyptian Goshen near the Sinai Peninsula. However, depending on his or her status, as in job occupation, the Israelites for a period each year eventually became less than freeman and a little higher in status than a slave. This characterizes them as *corvée* labor (community service tax in the form of forced labor).¹⁰ Regardless of their status, their skills in agriculture and as government employees were quite valuable to the Egyptians. The Israelites were not a tribe of nomadic Bedouins herding animals but a semi-pastoral community, having a highly skilled social complex.¹¹

The draft labor assigned to pharaoh's construction projects worked for three months, starting in September and ending in November. Agriculture at this time was impossible. With agriculture dormant, those people who worked the fields provided a large pool of additional manpower. The labor pool usually assigned to construction projects from the agricultural base stayed local. Those who were military conscripts

but no longer met the standards required of the Egyptian military were given the duty to construct great temples, government buildings, military forts, and to maintain irrigation systems. The unemployed were temporarily hired, fed, and were provided medical assistance from military doctors who were assigned to these crews to make sure that the workers were fit and healthy.¹²

The Israelites provided the Egyptian economy with additional resources. Also, Egyptians also saw their military service as a political tool to help control and expand the pharaoh's state. However, after many centuries of stability as a segment of Egyptian society, the Israelites fell out of favor with the pharaoh due to their growing numbers. The pharaoh found the Hebrew population size worrisome. "Behold, the people of the children of Israel are more and mightier than we: Come on, let us deal wisely with them; lest they multiply, and it come to pass, that, when there falleth out any war, they join also unto our enemies, and fight against us, and so get them up out of the land."¹³

The Bible, particularly Exodus 12:37-38 and Numbers 1:46, provides an idea of the Hebrew population size based on estimates of the men able to serve in the military, which was roughly 603,550.¹⁴ Given that the Israelite troops numbered approximately 603,550, it would indicate that the population including the women and children along with the elderly exiting Egypt was about two million people.¹⁵ However, this estimate is high because the term *eleph* in Hebrew means one thousand. Only later during the time of the United Kingdom of Israel did this term come to mean one thousand when units of a thousand men were called *alaphim*.¹⁶

However, the term *eleph* can mean "clan" and if so, it changes the numerical *eleph's* structure. Instead of looking at *eleph* to mean one thousand men or manpower as they did during the monarchy, consider that the term *eleph* describes one unit rather than numbers.¹⁷ To provide more clarity, George E. Mendenhall sums it up well in the chart below.



Tribe	Numbers 1		Numbers 26		I Chron 12	
	Units	Men	Units	Men	Units	Men
Reuben.....	46	500	43	750 ⁴⁷	(40) ⁴⁸	xxx
Simeon.....	59	300	22	200	7	100
Gad.....	45	650	40	500	(40)	xxx
Judah.....	74	600	76	500	6	800
Issachar.....	54	400	64	300		200 <i>rd'im</i> and their men ⁴⁹
Zebulun.....	57	400	60	500	50	xxx
Ephraim.....	40	500	32	500	20	800
Manasseh..... (Half-tribe).....	32	200	52	700	18 (40)	xxx xxx
Benjamin.....	35	400	45	600	3	xxx
Dan.....	62	700	64	400	28	600 ⁵⁰
Asher.....	41	500	53	400	40	xxx
Naphtali.....	53	400	45	400	37	1000 <i>sd'rim</i> ⁵¹
TOTALS.....	598	5550	596	5750	329	2300⁵²

Source: George E. Mendenhall, "The Census Lists of Numbers 1 and 26," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 77 (1958): 52-66.

If units rather than sequential numbers are used, then the total population may have been twenty to twenty-five thousand and the force to protect them approximately five thousand five hundred or five thousand seven hundred fifty men.¹⁸ The military was too small to penetrate Canaan and attempt settlement, which explains why Moses kept the Hebrews in the desert for thirty-eight years.

After thirty-eight years had passed, the Israelite population ranged between thirty-one thousand and forty-one thousand. Of course, these numbers depend on the mortality rate experienced by the people during their exile. However, given that Joshua led forty contingents over the Jordan River and that each contingent consisted

of two hundred men, the troop strength was likely eight thousand armed men. With an army of eight thousand or so from ages twenty years on up at Moses or Joshua's side, the Israelite population at the time was roughly thirty-five thousand.¹⁹ Comfortable with the size of his army, Moses decided it was time to set off into Canaan.

Aside from the harsh desert conditions, it is obvious from a military perspective that two million people could not have sustained themselves in the Sinai due to the lack of resources, such as sufficient food and water. What perishable items they took from Egypt, whether water, plant, or animal, could not sustain them for an extended period. Even though the Midianites did advise the Hebrews where to search for food and water, they were still living on a makeshift diet. The need to grow food and to breed new livestock to replenish the eatable commodities was important. In addition, the need to feed that very resource was important. Both man and beast in one sense or another were at war over the scraps found in the harsh wilderness. The Hebrews referenced the limited food supply in scripture. They recalled how good their diet was while living in Egypt, how they ate fish, cucumbers, melons, leeks, onions, and garlic.²⁰ They went from a steady diet in Egypt to a slow death in the wilderness.

Given that food is a crucial substance to maintain health and longevity, the combat soldier in the modern world needs three meals ready to eat (MREs) a day which have roughly 1,250 calories each, and contain 13 percent protein, 36 percent fat, and 51 percent carbohydrates. In total, the modern soldier consumes—on a daily basis—3,750 calories a day to maintain health.²¹ In the ancient world, roughly three pounds of wheat per person was the standard. However, three pounds of wheat only provided that individual 2,025 calories per day. While 2,025 calories are sufficient for a short time it is insufficient overall, and lacks the nutritional requirements needed to survive as a fully functional soldier. When it comes to the amount of water needed, the modern soldier needs five quarts of water per day but under desert conditions, the U.S. and Israeli Defense Force recommend nine quarts a day.²² However, it is apparent that the Hebrew soldiers did not have wheat to eat in the wilderness and lacked a sufficient supply of water. While certain food groups mentioned were unavailable, the Hebrews were able to eke out a diet on quail, manna, and cheese. Beef and mutton are a possibility, but given that livestock was a herder's source of income, it seems unlikely. Even with the benefit of beef and mutton, it was not enough to survive.²³ As the Bible makes it clear, after many decades in the wilderness, only a few leaders who made it out of Egypt were alive,

which indicates that starvation, thirst, diseases, exposure, and power struggles decimated the original population that left Egypt and much of their limited livestock. It is plausible that twenty thousand or so could have survived. A second reason why two million could not have made the journey is hygiene.

Keeping hygienic is important for the health and well-being of an army. However, given that the Hebrew army was living and travelling alongside the civilian population makes it more relevant. Regardless of whether the army is living among the civilian population or far away in a barracks, the need to keep clean and stay healthy is universal. For the Hebrews traveling with Moses, hygiene seems almost nonexistent. The Hebrews did not have physicians traveling with them. The Levites were spiritual physicians but nothing more. They did not have medical training but did provide the community with a series of cleanliness laws (sanitary practices) found in the Books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy. Keeping clean to stave off sickness and disease is important but of minimal benefit when compared to access to a practicing physician. This is not to say that Levitical priests ignored the ill, however, most of them likely did so for fear of losing their own life, as they were incapable of curing the illness. The Hebrews believed that if a person was found to be ill, it must have been due to his or her sins. Two verses support this notion. Exodus 15:26 states, “I am the Lord that healeth thee.” Deuteronomy 32:39 states, “I wound, and I heal: neither is there any that can deliver out of my hand.” This does not imply that an Israelite could not try to rid disease and ease the pain of the suffering. One such treatment mentioned in the Bible is hyssop, which is an antiseptic mentioned in the Book of Numbers 19:18. It states, “And a clean person shall take hyssop, and dip it in the water, and sprinkle it upon the tent, and upon all the vessels, and upon the persons that were there, and upon him that touched a bone, or one slain, or one dead, or a grave.” Even though this is just one verse mentioning one antidote, it illustrates that even without physicians on hand, the people still had some knowledge of remedies, and did their best in treating the ill—even with the belief that God curses and cures the individual. While the Israelites believed that illness comes from God as a punishment for a moral transgression, they did not believe that God caused broken limbs or nasty wounds. This means the injured did not commit a moral transgression. Such an injury, which can lead to illness, was no mystery at all. Therefore, a Levite—or anyone for that matter—could treat the injury.²⁴

It becomes evident that the Hebrews had little or no training in the knowledge of medicine like that of those they had escaped from, the Egyptians. Even

the Sumerians (4000 - 2000 BCE) long before the Hebrews, had a much greater understanding of medical procedures in treating the ill.²⁵ Because of their lack of knowledge, they decided that illness must be the will of God. This view prevailed among the Hebrews until after they returned from the Babylonian exile around 539 BCE. After the Babylonian exile, the Hebrews' knowledge of medicine grew greatly, but their religious beliefs held them back. Starvation, which led to disease and death, had nothing to do with moral transgressions. Instead, it was due to the decisions made by their leader, Moses, and the willingness of the elders to go along.

After thirty-eight years had passed, many of the Israelites who lived in Egypt had died. A multitude that had no inkling of what life was like in Egypt replaced the previous generation. This overwhelmingly young Israelite population was hungry for conquest in a literal sense. While their elders enjoyed the commodities of Egypt many decades ago, the younger generation was eager to conquer the land that was "flowing with milk and honey."²⁶ This land flowing in abundance of food was likely a tool Moses used to stoke the flames of the youth, and indicates that the Israelites had little to eat. The Israelites did not have a supply train or the ability to purchase food for some time.²⁷ Whatever rations like manna or quail that the early Israelites had, they consumed quickly.²⁸ As the Israelites ate primarily manna and quail, the Levites dined on the livestock, such as bull, lamb, goat, pigeon, or turtledoves, which they sacrificed three times a day, including holy days. Of course, the offering depended on what the common Israelite could afford to give up and provide as a sacrifice. This likely continued during the time that the next generation of Israelites were born in the wilderness.²⁹ Hence, near riots occurred over food.³⁰ With a lack of provisions and water, the Israelites were in a state of semi-starvation during their forty years in the wilderness and it is safe to say that the older generation that came forth from Egypt likely died from malnutrition and disease. While the older generation slowly passed away, their children also suffered from this semi-starvation rollercoaster, which likely caused an increase in depression, distress, disease, illness, and apathy.

In conclusion, it seems evident that the Hebrew exodus from Egypt never numbered in the millions; rather it was less than forty thousand. Even with a little over twenty thousand people, maintaining a healthy population would be hard, and surely, people would perish quickly in an area lacking provisions to sustain the necessary caloric intake and to keep hygienic. The population that left Egypt departed with a full belly and ended up like their future generations before entering Canaan, as a half-starved society seeking to do almost anything to avoid semi-

starvation. This is why the Hebrews headed for Canaan; it was the only area they knew that could provide them the freedom they desired and food they required.

Notes

1. Richard A. Gabriel, *The Military History of Ancient Israel* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 61.
2. Exodus 16:3 (King James Bible).
3. Numbers 11:5 (Complete Jewish Bible).
4. Gabriel, 61.
5. Abraham R. Besdin and Joseph Dov Soloveitchik, *Reflections of the Rav: Lessons in Jewish Thought Adapted from the Lectures of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik* (Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav Pub. House, 1989), 204.
6. Gabriel, 61.
7. Rosalie A. David, *Handbook to Life in Ancient Egypt* (New York: Facts on File, 1998), 322.
8. Gabriel, 61.
9. Genesis 39.
10. Gabriel, 62-63.
11. Gabriel, 62-63; Norman K. Gottwald, *The Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel, 1250-1050 B.C.E.* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1979), 455.
12. Gabriel, 61-62.
13. Exodus 1:8-10.
14. Exodus 12:37-38; Numbers 1:46.
15. Warren W. Wiersbe, *The Wiersbe Bible Commentary: The Complete Old Testament in One Volume* (Colorado Springs, CO: David C. Cook, 2007), 148.
16. Gabriel, 87.
17. Boyd Seevers, *Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics of Ancient Near Eastern Armies* (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Academic, 2013), 53-54.
18. Numbers 1:2-3, 17-46; 26:2; Gabriel, 88.
19. Gabriel, 113-114. According to Gabriel, “An Israelite population of 35,000 under a militia system of military recruitment accessing all males beginning at age 20 would be able to put between 8,000 and 9,000 fighting men in the field calculated at approximately 25 percent of the gross population. We might conservatively estimate the size of Joshua’s army then at least 8,000 men.”
20. Numbers 11:5; Norman K. Gottwald, *The Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel, 1250-1050 BCE* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 455.

21. "Soldier Life: Meals, Ready-to-Eat," Go Army.com, accessed August 8, 2015, <http://www.goarmy.com/soldier-life/fitness-and-nutrition/components-of-nutrition/meals-ready-to-eat.html>.

22. Gabriel, 88-89.

23. Ibid.

24. Richard Gabriel, *Man and Wound in the Ancient World: A History of Military Medicine from Sumer to the Fall of Constantinople* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2012), 104-105.

25. "Sumer," San Jose State University Department of Economics, accessed August 8, 2015, <http://www.sjsu.edu>.

26. Exodus 3:8.

27. Gabriel, *The Military History of Ancient Israel*, 89.

28. Exodus 16:13; Numbers 11:31.

29. Leviticus, 1:17.

30. Exodus 16:3, Numbers 11:4; Gabriel, *The Military History of Ancient Israel*, 89.

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From Raiders to Traders: The Viking-Arab Trade Exchange

Susanne Watts

The Viking raids across Europe brought them into contact with other cultures, including Muslim Arabs. Although there are no known Viking settlements in the Arab lands, both cultures interacted with each other through their respective exploration of Europe. Contact between Vikings and Arabs occurred mainly in the area of what would become Russia. While there is scarce evidence that Arabs visited the homelands of the Vikings, or as they called them, the “people of the North,” artifacts found across Scandinavia, and especially in Sweden, point to an extensive long-distance trade exchange between the two very different cultures. It was the promise of access to much needed and coveted silver that set off the Viking exploration into Europe, and brought Viking raiders into contact with the Arabs. In their quest for silver, the Vikings discovered and accessed valuable trade routes to Constantinople that led to an extensive trade exchange with the Arab world. Seizing upon the opportunity to enrich themselves, the Vikings came into contact with Arabic wealth and treasures through their raids, and soon realized the potential of a peaceful trade exchange.

The Vikings came into contact with Muslim Arabs during their exploration of the Iberian Peninsula. One of the first contacts occurred with Muslim Spain in 844 when a Viking fleet of fifty-four ships sailed from their base in Brittany to Spain in order to raid the Caliphate’s treasures.¹ The raiding campaign was successful, as the Vikings conquered Lisbon and Seville, destroyed numerous other towns, and even threatened the capital of al-Andalus, Córdoba. However, the Muslims were able to drive back the Viking invaders and built “an effective coastal defence against new attacks.”² Having seen the riches of the Caliphate, the Vikings were determined to return, and embarked on a second raiding campaign in 859, this time with a much bigger fleet of sixty-two ships. Again, the raiding campaign itself was a success, as their ships were “so fully laden with plunder that they sat low in the water.”³ However, on the Vikings’ journey back to their home base in Brittany, the Muslim naval fleet attacked and destroyed the majority of the Vikings’ ships. With that, Viking exploration of and interaction with Muslim Spain ended. The two raids gave both cultures a first glimpse at each other’s military capabilities and characteristics. Prior to the Vikings’ invasion of

the Caliphate, the Arabs had no interaction with the “people of the North.” To the Muslim Arabs, the Vikings appeared “as a sudden, mysterious, military threat.”⁴ The Vikings for the first time were confronted with an enemy that was well organized on land as well as on the sea, where Vikings were used to supremacy.

Viking interaction with the people of Eastern Europe, particularly those in the area around the Volga River, was markedly different from their encounters in Muslim Spain. For one, the Vikings, called Varangians by the Slavs, would establish permanent settlements there, and would later be identified as the *Rus*’, giving the name to the land that would be eventually known as Russia. It was this contact that would set the stage for future trade exchange and extensive long-distance trading with the Arabic world, as well as the Viking-*Rus*’ exploration into Byzantium. According to the *Russian Primary Chronicle*, at the same time the Vikings launched their second raiding campaign in Muslim Spain in 859, “Varangians from beyond the sea imposed tribute upon the Slavs.”⁵ However, while the Slavs successfully dispelled the Vikings, they were unable to establish a stable government, forcing them to “seek a prince who may rule over [them] and judge [them] according to the Law.”⁶ Thus, they looked to the Varangians to provide strong leadership and rule over them. However, even before they were invited back to establish law and order over the Slavs, Swedish Vikings had established a presence in the area, and established trading contacts with Arabic merchants across the Caspian Sea. The raiding campaign on Constantinople in 860 by these Swedish Vikings marked the beginning of not only a long-distance trade exchange but also an exchange of military service between the Byzantine Empire and Viking Scandinavia.⁷

The Vikings’ demand for silver was one of the most important factors that influenced their commercial contacts into Russia and Constantinople. Constantinople at the time was one of the world’s most important trading centers, and the Vikings realized the opportunities to amass personal wealth by not only engaging in trade with the empire but by also offering their military service to the Byzantine Emperors. Viking warriors were well respected, and their fighting spirit was legendary. It comes as no surprise then that “the emperors valued the Varangians above all for their loyalty and courage, their fighting qualities and ability to carry out commands efficiently and without questions.”⁸ Service in the Varangian Guard was prestigious as well as profitable. In addition to their regular salary, Varangian Guard soldiers received gifts at the coronation of a new emperor

and they shared in the booty while on military campaign for the empire.⁹

Not only were the Varangians highly regarded in their military service to the Byzantine Emperor, they also received preferential treatment in their commercial trading activities with the empire. It was in Constantinople that the Viking and Arab trade exchange flourished, as the city was regarded a major trading center, bringing together exotic goods from the East and West. The Vikings brought much sought after furs, amber, and slaves to the Byzantines and thus the Arab market. In return, the Vikings received Arab silver coins, silk textiles, and jewelry. Clearly, it appears that the merchandise traded were luxury items intended for the wealthy of both Viking and Arab society.¹⁰ It is thus not surprising that this extensive and expensive trade relationship needed to be regulated and protected. The importance of ensuring safe delivery of the exotic northern merchandise is evident in several agreements, beginning in 907. These agreements not only established the commercial trading relationship between Byzantium and the Varangians, they also aimed to create a permanent peace between the two peoples. In essence, Byzantium awarded the Varangians privileged trading status by regulating the trade, providing insurance for their goods, and awarding generous privileges for the Varangian merchants. The *Kiev Chronicle* mentions several treaties regulating Byzantine-Varangian trade:

If they [Rus'] come as merchants they shall be fed for six months; bread, wine, meat, fish and fruit. Bath shall be prepared for them as often as they wish. When they return to Rus' again, they shall be equipped by our emperor with proviant, anchors, ropes and sails and everything needed.¹¹

These treaties highlight the importance of the evolving long-distance trade relationship between the Varangians, Viking Scandinavia, Byzantium, and the Arabs. Byzantine Constantinople acted as the main trading center in facilitating this international trade relationship.

One important figure of the Varangian trade connection was Harald Sigurdson, also known as Harald Hardrada, who served in the Varangian Guard from around 1030 to 1042.¹² This future King of Norway used his service in Byzantium to amass personal wealth that would allow him to return to his native land and claim the throne in 1046. His adventures are well documented in Snorri Sturluson's *Heimskringla*, in which he devotes a Saga to the future king. During his

service, Harald travelled across the Byzantine Empire, fighting campaigns in Africa, and the Middle East, as far as Palestine, and amassed a great amount of wealth.¹³ Sturluson reports, Harald “gathered great wealth in gold, jewels, and all sorts of precious things; and all the wealth he gathered there which he did not need for his expenses, he sent with trusty men of his own north to Novgorod to King Jarisleif’s care and keeping.”¹⁴ Harald’s travels reveal a rich history of contact with cultures very different from his own. The wealth he was able to accumulate was eventually transferred to his native land, and used in the Viking practice of gift giving to ensure loyalty and support in order to secure political power. One such exotic gift was “an ingot of gold the size of a man’s head,” which Harald presented to King Magnus upon his return to Norway.¹⁵ Harald exchanged not only exotic treasures from his foreign travels but also stories, thus helping Scandinavians to imagine the world and its diverse cultures beyond their known lands.

While Viking sources are rather scarce on their trading exchange and interaction with the Arabic world, Arabic writers have left a plethora of reports about their encounters with the “people of the North.” It is evident in the written Arabic sources that they observed the Vikings and their customs with great interest. These sources reveal an extensive interaction between the two cultures. For the educated Muslim of the tenth century, only four peoples existed that possessed a civilization of culture: Arabs, Persians, Indians, and the Byzantines, and while Europe was known as a geographical entity the Arabs did not view it as a cultural concept.¹⁶ The Muslim Arabs certainly acknowledged the existence of other peoples, however “the centre of the world was the lands of Islam, stretching from Spain across North Africa to the Middle East.”¹⁷ Several writers of the ninth and tenth century however give detailed descriptions of the northern region, its people as well as its flora and fauna. Al-Bīrūnī reports that the people living in the far northern region use wooden sleds and skis for travel through the snow-covered plains.¹⁸ Prior to the expansion of Islam into Europe there was also little interaction with other ethnic groups, and even after the establishment of the al-Andalus Caliphate the Muslim Arabs were not too interested in the northern lands. According to the Arab worldview, the “people of the North” did not concern themselves with science, thus they were of little interest to the Arabs who considered themselves intellectually as well as culturally superior.¹⁹ Overall, the Varangians had little to offer to the learned Muslim Arabs.

At the time of the Viking raids in Spain, Muslim Arabs had very little

knowledge about the seafaring raiders. The Viking invasion of Spain in 844 marked one of the first contacts between the two cultures. Arabic writers recorded the Viking invasion, noting that the fire-worshipping ‘al-Majus (al-Rus) “took captives, slaughtered, burnt and plundered.”²⁰ This first interaction certainly helped to reinforce the Arabs’ perception of the uncivilized Vikings. While contact with the Vikings was limited to raids in Western Europe, Arabs had a greater opportunity in Eastern Europe to interact with the Vikings. Arabs did not seem to be interested in travelling to Scandinavia in order to conduct trade although the Spanish Arab al-Tartuschi reported that the Danish trading center of Hedeby was poor and dirty.²¹ Due to the importance of the Byzantine trade exchange Viking merchants were a common sight in Constantinople in the late ninth and tenth century, thus interacting with Arab merchants. The trade exchange benefitted both: Arabs desired Viking furs and weapons, and the Vikings were in need of silver in the form of Arabic coins and jewelry. However, Arabs also observed Vikings in their settlements. One of the better-known accounts is that of Ibn Fadlan, an Arab chronicler who was sent to the King of the Bulgars of the Middle Volga by the Caliph of Baghdad in 921.²² Ibn Fadlan’s report is remarkable in that it is a first-hand account by an Arab observing the Viking *Rus*’ in their everyday life. He admires their perfect physiques just like the Byzantine Emperors admired the physical strength of their Varangian Guards. What is of great value and helped reinforce the Arabs’ view of the culturally inferior Vikings is Ibn Fadlan’s detailed observations of the *Rus*’ life. Ibn Fadlan calls them “the filthiest of Allah’s creatures,” and is appalled by their lack of hygiene.²³ He then describes in great detail various aspects of the *Rus*’ customs, paying particular attention to their funeral and burial practices, which appear to be very foreign to the Arab chronicler. Overall, the account elucidates the differences between the two cultures. It must have been a culture shock for Ibn Fadlan to experience Viking *Rus*’ life, however his report also provides invaluable information about the interaction between the two cultures outside the commercial trade exchange. Subsequent Arab reports on the Vikings corroborate Ibn Fadlan’s observations, indicating a long lasting and extensive interaction between the two peoples.

What is missing in the Viking-Arab trade exchange discussion is evidence of written Viking sources describing the contact and interaction between the two peoples. There are no Viking accounts available similar to Ibn Fadlan’s report on the *Rus*’ that could provide insight to how the Vikings perceived the Arabs and their

customs. There is however evidence of long-distance travel and trade on memorial stones or rune stones, with the majority of them occurring in Sweden. The inscriptions tell of travels to Greece to obtain precious metals, as well as travels to the Middle East, mentioning Jerusalem and the land of the Saracens.²⁴ Equally missing from the discussion are Viking artifacts in Arab lands, which would indicate a one-sided trade exchange. However, through Arab written sources it is clear that goods such as furs and weapons were highly sought after by the Arabs. A lack of archaeological evidence does not automatically preclude the existence of trade relations. There is, however a plethora of Arabic and Islamic artifacts in Scandinavia, especially in Sweden. This in turn supports the idea that Swedish Vikings traveled eastwards, established settlements in the Volga region of Russia, and engaged in an extensive trading network with the Arabs via Byzantium. This eastward exploration was spurred by the Vikings' quest for silver. As Wladyslaw Duczko states, "For the Northmen the Islamic silver was the main object of exchange. It was in exchange of this metal that a variety of goods was delivered to the East."²⁵ In return, the Vikings acquired a rich selection of diverse goods from the East that they brought back to their respective settlements in Russia as well as Scandinavia.

The great majority of Arabic and Islamic artifacts found in Scandinavia were silver coins. Scandinavia was not a silver-producing region, thus devoid of natural occurrences of the precious metal. In Sweden alone, 80,000 dirhams have been found, with the great majority of them dating to the ninth and tenth century, indicating the intensity of the long-distance trade exchange during the *Rus'* first contact with Byzantium.²⁶ These silver coin hoards also show how important the precious metal was to Swedish society in particular. The chieftains were "in constant need of silver to maintain their societal position," which meant that "silver was very useful as an economical-political means and was a significant factor in the shaping of the emerging Swedish state."²⁷ Thus, the importance of the silver coin hoards cannot be underestimated. The coveted silver coins were used to ensure chieftains' political power and influence. Gift giving in general was an important practice in Viking society, as chieftains and men of high social standing used the custom to secure and expand their political position in exchange for loyalty and support.

The practice of gift giving was not limited to silver coins. As the Sagas report, exotic items from foreign lands were greatly desired, and used to enhance a

person's status or ensure allegiance for a leader. These exotic items are further proof of an extensive long-distance relationship with Byzantium. Snorri Sturluson mentions how "unusual splendour and foreign customs and fashions" were a regular sight at the Norwegian kings' court.²⁸ While Arabic and Islamic silver coins represent the majority of artifacts in Sweden that indicate an extensive trade relationship with the Arab world, other items point to the rich diversity of the trade exchange. Although silver was in high demand in Scandinavia, more personal Arabic objects have been found, including a bronze incense burner, an oil lamp, fine glassware, silk textiles, as well as intact pieces of oriental jewelry, such as a silver amethyst ring with the Arabic inscription *in the name of Allah*.²⁹

Evidence in written Arabic sources, Viking Sagas, as well as archeological artifacts in Scandinavia point to an extensive trade relationship between Vikings and Arabs. The Vikings' need for silver spurred their exploration eastward, and established a far-reaching trade exchange that went beyond their quest for the precious metal. The Vikings' development from raiders to traders can be traced in this long-distance trade relationship. In their quest for silver, the Vikings eventually reached the great trading center of Constantinople, bringing them in contact with diverse cultures. This in turn started a far-reaching trade exchange that impacted not only the lives of the Viking merchants but also brought the exotic world of Byzantium and Muslim Arabs to the "people of the North."

Notes

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6. *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, 7.

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8. H. R. Ellis Davidson, *The Viking Road to Byzantium* (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1976), 185.
9. Ibid., 182.
10. Elisabeth Piltz, "Varangian Companies for Long Distance Trade," in *Byzantium and Islam in Scandinavia*, ed. Elisabeth Piltz (Jonsered: Paul Åströms Förlag, 1998), 99.
11. *The Kiev Chronicle*, in Elisabeth Piltz, "Varangian Companies for Long Distance Trade," in *Byzantium and Islam in Scandinavia*, ed. Elisabeth Piltz (Jonsered: Paul Åströms Förlag, 1998), 89.
12. H. R. Ellis Davidson, *The Viking Road to Byzantium*, 211.
13. Snorri Sturluson, "Saga of Harald Hardrade," in *Heimskringla The Chronicle of the Kings of Norway*, ed. Douglas B. Killings, 1996, Project Gutenberg Etext, 11-12.
14. Ibid., 5.
15. H. R. Ellis Davidson, *The Viking Road to Byzantium*, 227.
16. Gotthard Strohmaier, "Arabische Autoren des Mittelalters über die Nordvölker," in *Byzantium and Islam in Scandinavia*, ed. Elisabeth Piltz, trans. Susanne Watts (Jonsered: Paul Åströms Förlag, 1998), 59-60.
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Susanne Watts is a native German, who moved to the United States in March 1994 to marry her then-soldier husband, Sean. As a child of the Cold War she lived through some of its hot periods. Growing up a mere ten miles from the former East-German border, her West-German hometown is located in the famous Fulda Gap, near OP Alpha. Susanne graduated from American Public University with a BA in History in November 2014 and is currently contemplating graduate school. Her historical interests include Germany from 1871 to 1933, the US Gilded Age through the 1920s, the Great War, and the history of the Cold War – particularly as it pertains to her hometown area. Susanne and Sean currently share an abode with their Rubenesque feline, Rugby. The three live in North Carolina, the Old North State.

The American Northern Plains Indian Wars: A Clash of Cultures

Jona Lunde

Introduction

In the Black Hills of South Dakota, there exists a monument in stone to four of the greatest leaders of the United States of America—Mount Rushmore. Gutzon Borglum, the sculptor, chose George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt “to communicate the founding, expansion, preservation and unification of the United States.”¹ How ironic it is that this monument to American ideals exists in a location that the Lakota Sioux have long considered sacred. Just as Jews, Christians, and Muslims have fought for control over the Holy Land for thousands of years, the Lakota and Cheyenne have fought over and revered the Black Hills country. The Lakota have often interpreted the existence of Mount Rushmore, somewhat comparable to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, as a symbol of the white man’s arrogant dominance over the Lakota people. “[Borglum] could have just as well carved this mountain into a huge cavalry boot standing on a dead Indian,” according to John (Fire) Lane Deer.² In the years 1851 to 1891, a clash of cultures existed between the white man and the Northern Plains Indians based on arrogance, deception, and greed, resulting in the near elimination of an entire culture that could easily have been avoided.

A state of peace had existed between the white man and the Northern Plains tribes when America started its westward expansion early in the nineteenth century. The Indians and early trappers had long traded peacefully for furs, glass beads, and other assorted items and sundries such as metal knives, black powder muskets, and rifles. Many of the trappers married native women and had children with them, and some of these children later became interpreters and guides for early travelers and even for the US Army. William Bent gained notoriety on the Colorado and Kansas plains working with the Cheyenne and Arapaho peoples. William Garnett, the son of a Confederate general and a Lakota woman, worked tirelessly with the Lakota until his death in 1930.³ Both men played important, yet often overlooked roles in the Great Sioux War. It was not until the conflicts began in earnest that the majority of the white population would look at such men as half-breeds and treat them with contempt.

Beginning in 1844, settlers began the long trek to the Oregon territory. Jumping off near Independence, Missouri, and following the Missouri River north to the confluence with the North Platte River near present day Omaha, Nebraska, they turned west, creating the Oregon Trail. This trail cut through the heart of the Lakota hunting grounds. While the Indians at first traded with and often guided these early settlers, it would not be long before the white settler numbers and their contempt for resources revered by the Lakota proved to be more than the Lakota could tolerate. When gold was discovered in California in 1849, the westward tide of white men through the region increased, leading to greater conflict with the indigenous tribes. A semblance of peace was needed, and the idea of a formal agreement between the Indians and the white man was decided upon by the Indian Department in Washington, D.C.⁴

The Treaty of 1851

In the autumn of 1851, at Fort Laramie in Wyoming, D. D. Mitchell, superintendent of Indian Affairs, along with Thomas Fitzpatrick, the Indian agent, issued a call for all of the tribes in his jurisdiction to meet at Fort Laramie for a peace conference. Mitchell knew the only way to achieve peace was through a treaty based on negotiations outlining specific items for the Indians and white man alike. Amazingly, most of the tribes came to Laramie, including bands from the Crow and Lakota, who were deadly enemies. Cheyenne, Arapaho, and other tribes all sent representatives as well, bringing the total to nine tribes and approximately ten thousand Indians gathered outside of the fort. A gathering of this magnitude would not be seen on the Plains for another seventeen years. This treaty set the boundaries for Indian hunting grounds, and allowed the white man to establish roads and army posts in their territory, both as protection for the Indians from the white men and to protect the white man's interests. As recompense, the Indians would receive annuities valued at \$50,000 per year for the next fifty years. However, this treaty provision was reduced to a ten-year term, without the Indians' knowledge—until it was too late—before the Senate would ratify the treaty in 1852.⁵

As the number of white immigrants to the West Coast increased, the attitude toward the Indian deteriorated. Sarah Royce wrote in her memoirs titled *A Frontier Lady*, "The country we were traveling over belonged to the United States, and . . . these red men had no right to stop us."⁶ This statement illustrates as no other statement could the attitude of whites toward the Indians at that time. While

the Treaty of 1851 allowed whites to travel through Lakota land, the level of destruction by the thousands of wagons, livestock, and hunters had not been taken into account. The Indians were horrified at the brazen disregard the white man had for natural resources, adding to already tense relations. Then men discovered gold in Montana in 1852, increasing travel along the Bozeman Trail extending from Fort Laramie to Virginia City in southwestern Montana Territory. In accordance with the 1851 Treaty, forts were built along the Bozeman Trail, ostensibly to protect the Indians from the white man; however, it was the other way around, the white man needed protection from the outraged Indians.⁷

The situation came to a head in 1854 near Fort Laramie when a Brulé Sioux brave slaughtered a lame cow that had either strayed from a wagon train, or more likely, had been abandoned. When the owner found out what had happened, he demanded the return of his cow, now dead and butchered, from the Indians through the Fort Laramie commander, Lieutenant John Grattan. Being somewhat hotheaded, Grattan set forth to arrest the Indian, indicating that he could defeat the entire Indian nation. However, the chief, Mato Oyuhi, in accordance with the 1851 Treaty, attempted to make restitution without turning the brave over to the Army. Grattan would not hear of it, and deployed his men around the camp in fighting formation along with two mountain howitzers. As the brave and a few of his friends began to load their guns, one or two soldiers fired their weapons and fighting broke out. Grattan's entire force fell. The chief, Mato Oyuhi, died days later of wounds he suffered from the fight.⁸

By deploying aggressively and firing first, the white man had indeed broken his word. The situation deteriorated from that point forward. While many of the Lakota chiefs, such as Spotted Tail and Man Afraid of His Horse, attempted to maintain the peace, the white man assumed the Indians were to blame, based on often exaggerated reports, and tensions continued to grow. In 1855, General William S. Harney was dispatched to Lakota territory and in September came up against the group of Brulés involved in the Grattan killing. Harney used the ruse of a peaceful talk to give his men time to surround the camp, and then he gave the order to attack. At least eighty-six Indians were killed, more than forty-three of them women and children.⁹

In 1862, with the North and the South locked in Civil War, the frontier state of Minnesota felt the fury of an even more fundamental internal conflict. The Santees, an Eastern branch of the Sioux Nation, having endured a decade of

traumatic change in a narrow reservation along the upper Minnesota River, launched the first great attack in the Indian Wars that would rack the West for many years to come. Starving due to lack of promised rations, they burst from the reservation killing more than 450 settlers in the region before a force that Col. Henry Sibley hastily assembled of raw recruits defeated them.¹⁰ The Episcopal Bishop of Minnesota, Henry Whipple described the killings as “the most fearful Indian massacre in history.”¹¹ After the uprising, many horrified whites adopted the precept that naked force was the only law western Indians could learn while others like Whipple argued for peace. There followed alternating periods of fighting and truce, which the US Army set out to end, once and for all, in 1876.

On August 29, 1864, Cheyenne chief Black Kettle dictated a letter proposing peace. Three months later Colonel J. M. Chivington, in command of 700 troops of the First Colorado Volunteer Cavalry, Third Colorado Cavalry and a company of First New Mexico Volunteers, massacred Black Kettle’s band of 123 Cheyenne at Sand Creek in the eastern Colorado territory. The attack came at dawn on November 29, 1864, when Chivington and his men surrounded Black Kettle’s village on Sand Creek, even though Black Kettle had hoisted an American flag and the white flag of peace above his lodge. Black Kettle was not killed; however, many of the Indians killed were mutilated horribly and exhibited in Denver City by the returning troopers. Of the Cheyenne massacred, most were women and children. Ironically, Col. A. B. Greenwood, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, had issued an assurance to Black Kettle that by flying the American flag in his village, he would never be attacked by the US Army. That same American flag flew four years later—almost to the day—when Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer and the Seventh Cavalry carried out an almost identical attack against Black Kettle on the Washita River in Oklahoma.¹²

Red Cloud’s War

In the aftermath of the Civil War, Indian policy was in utter disarray. On the frontier, troops were combating plains tribes, who fought an intermittent, but ferocious guerrilla war against white encroachment. Atrocities and massacres by both sides ignited passions and troubled consciences, splitting whites and Indians alike into war and peace factions. In 1866, tired of the increased soldier activity along the Bozeman Trail, the Lakota nation, led by a charismatic Oglala war chief named Red Cloud, began a series of attacks known as Red Cloud’s War that culminated in a battle that left Captain William J. Fetterman and all eighty of his troopers dead. Fetterman had professed little regard for the Indians’ fighting ability,

claiming that with eighty men he would ride over the entire Sioux nation. On December 21, a group of warriors supposedly led by none other than the venerated chief Crazy Horse, lured Fetterman and his men into a canyon where an ambush had been set up. None of the troopers survived. Fetterman and his assistant each apparently shot the other in the head, thereby denying the Indians the honor.¹³

General Custer, as he would forever be known, had finished up his volunteer enlistment in 1866 and had mustered out of the army after a stellar performance as a cavalry commander during the Civil War. Custer was the youngest officer to advance to Major General (Brevet, or temporary) and had earned the moniker Boy General. Custer was present and received the flag of truce when General Robert E. Lee surrendered to General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Courthouse ending the war; Grant would later give the desk used to sign the terms of surrender to the Custers. In July of 1866, Congress authorized the formation of four more cavalry units to be used in the Indian Wars on the western plains. Custer was reduced in rank to Lt. Colonel, but he had the command of the newly formed Seventh Cavalry, a command he would keep for nine of the next ten years. Custer then made a name for himself as an Indian fighter under General Winfield Hancock fighting the Comanche and Southern Cheyenne. However, the Seventh would see only one major battle prior to their demise on the Little Bighorn River; the 1868 massacre on the Washita River against Black Kettle's peaceful village. Once again, the white man broke another treaty, providing the final crack that violently ended the tottering peace.¹⁴

In 1868, General Philip Sheridan developed the idea of using the same scorched earth strategy against the Plains Indians that he had employed in the South toward the end of the Civil War, and he wanted Custer to lead the charge. However, the Army had relieved Custer of command and suspended him for one year, based on the outcome of a court martial that found him guilty of being absent without leave following an unauthorized 150-mile ride he had taken to see his wife. The charges included conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. Custer had ordered deserters shot, a practice still legal in the military, although only with a proper trial, a stipulation that Custer ignored in his fury. Sheridan convinced President Grant to commute the remaining two months of Custer's sentence and Custer again joined his beloved Seventh Cavalry just south of Fort Dodge, Kansas.¹⁵

After bringing the Seventh into fighting condition, Custer received orders from Sheridan to commence a winter campaign against the Southern Cheyenne and

Arapahoe that had been raiding white settlements in western Kansas, Oklahoma, and the Texas panhandle. Custer led the Seventh toward the Washita River in the midst of a heavy snowstorm. Sheridan's winter campaign designed to catch the Indians in their winter camps was under way. Custer found Black Kettle's village camped on the banks of the Washita just before dawn on the morning of November 28, after following the trail of a few warriors who had apparently raided a small town and taken prisoners to their camp further down the river. Custer divided his forces and attacked without warning at dawn. Black Kettle had chosen to spend the winter with his southern brethren and was still known as a peace chief. Not only had he signed the Treaty of 1851, he had also signed the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867 and the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 that saw a previously unheard of number of tribes come together for the last great treaty signing of the century. None of this mattered, as Custer had not reconnoitered to determine what village he was attacking.¹⁶

Death on the Washita River

The Indians awoke that morning to the charge of the Seventh Cavalry through their camp from every direction. Kate Bighead, only a child at the time but a young woman ten years later at Custer's demise on the Little Bighorn, remembered that morning well. She later related how the cavalry massacred women and children in the most horrific ways; that soldiers removed unborn children from their mothers' wombs after killing the mothers. Kate had hidden along the river and was one of the few that escaped the Seventh's bloody rampage through the village. Black Kettle and his wife had survived the Sand Creek massacre four years earlier but did not survive this time, even though his American flag was once again flying over his peaceful village. The irony is that further up the river hundreds of Southern Cheyenne warriors that had heard the shooting were prepared to fight Custer, who took the women and children captives and returned to Camp Supply in heroic fashion.¹⁷

While many in the nation were horrified at the idea of women and children, including babies, being massacred by the US Army, this ancient war strategy was exhibited by commanders such as Genghis Khan and as recently as Hernando Cortés in his epic conquest of the Aztecs in Mexico. Armies had long held the belief that in order to be victorious, drastic measures would need to take place. What exacerbated the situation was the attitude toward the Indian that they were little more than savages, an opinion fueled by inflamed accounts of

debauchery against the whites by the Indians. Sheridan wanted a fast and complete victory over the Indian; public sentiment had to be turned against the Indians in order for Sheridan to have their support for his scorched earth campaign. These rumors about the Indians, however, could not be farther from the truth.

Indian Culture

Indians had long fought each other to acquire new hunting lands and horses, to avenge the death of a family member, or in the defense of one's honor. The highest military honor an Indian could achieve was the role of leader, known as *Canumpa Yuha* in Lakota, or keeper of the pipe. Counting coup, or striking an enemy, was considered to be more honorable than the killing of that enemy, and, contrary to the belief of many whites, the taking of a scalp was the lowest of the honors of the battlefield. With the acquisition of the horse, the Lakota became one of the most powerful nations on the plains. The horse enabled them to hunt the buffalo, as well as move great distances with ease. With the ability to move farther and follow the great herds of buffalo, the Lakota people spread onto the plains of present-day Nebraska, the Dakotas, Wyoming, and Montana. Along the way, they displaced their longtime enemy the Crow, a fact that would play a significant role in the upcoming war with the white man. While the Lakota were fierce warriors, they were also a very spiritual people, placing family above all else and gaining knowledge of the medicinal properties of the plants in their new lands.¹⁸

The Lakota "lived in daily interaction with the seen and unseen spirit forces that comprised their universe."¹⁹ The Lakota believed that the Great Spirit was everywhere and that Mother Earth was the giver of all life. The Lakota, as did many other tribes, believed in an afterlife, and they would often mutilate their slain enemies to hinder their progress in the next world. Removing hands and eyes, cutting off extremities, removing genitals and in some cases the head, all rendered their enemies unable to meet them in battle in the afterlife, if they were even able to make the journey. Many western cultures considered these practices barbaric. Burials included weapons and often included the killing of the warrior's favorite warhorse in order that the Indian may have a horse to ride on the journey to the Great Spirit. Much of this symbolism also existed among the ancient Egyptians, and yet conversely they were not looked upon as savages.²⁰

Family was extremely important to the Indians and remains so to this day. The Lakota are matriarchal, meaning that the warrior would move in with his wife's family; marriages were as simple as moving in together while divorces were

just as simple as moving out. Men were warriors, hunters, and makers of tools, yet they would find time to play with the children and create artworks such as pictographs. Women were considered holy as they were the givers of life, much as Mother Earth. Women ran the household, fed the family, took care of the children, set up and broke down the tepee, and often were allowed to attend and sometimes speak in the councils. The various bands had their own chief, a fact that proved difficult for the white man to understand. There was not one head chief of the nation, nor was there even a central government. Councils were held among leaders within the band as well as among the different bands that would periodically join for the winter or the spring hunts. This dispersal of authority frustrated the white man, as the signature of one Indian leader was not binding beyond his band.²¹

Treaty of 1868

Confusion over who signed and who did not led to much consternation among the Indians as well since many leaders such as Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse never touched the pen, meaning they never signed a treaty with the white man. Other chiefs such as Red Cloud, Spotted Tail, and Man Afraid of His Horse had signed the 1868 Treaty. Red Cloud worked especially hard for his people, traveling often to Washington D.C. to meet with the President of the United States, referred to by the Indians as the Great Father of the white man. The reservations that had been set aside for the Indians in the 1868 Treaty and the annuities promised did not fit with the way of life the Lakota were accustomed to. Red Cloud and Spotted Tail understood that the white man could not be stopped, and that a compromise had to be reached before the Indians were exterminated. The problem seemed to lie with the inability of the white man to keep his word as promised in the various treaties. While treaties promised the Lakota unlimited access to the unceded lands of the Powder River country of southern Montana, the western half of present-day South Dakota including the Black Hills in their entirety, was ceded, or set aside, as the Great Sioux reservation. The treaties forbade white men, except those authorized, from entering a reservation, let alone settling there. This lasted until 1874 when Lt. Colonel Custer led an expedition into the Black Hills following the rumors of the presence of gold.²²

Once again, just as in 1849 in California, during 1852 in Montana, and during 1858 in Colorado, white men invaded the Indians' world, this time illegally. The Lakota and various other tribes had long held the Black Hills as sacred ground,

from the Wind Cave where life is believed to have originated, to Bear Mountain and Devil's Tower, where the Indians would often go to receive visions. The Great Spirit and Mother Earth are believed to infuse the entire area. This belief is quite similar to the manner in which Christians and Jews consider the Holy Land sacred as the origin of their people and the birthplace of God's Son. While Christianity holds the belief in angels and, in some cases saints, the Indians believe in many spirits as well, both good and evil. While Christians do not believe in maiming their enemies after death, the Indians believe in doing so to hinder their enemy's progress to the afterlife. Much of it was symbolic, such as puncturing eardrums because the victim did not listen in life, removing eyes to show that the person did not see clearly in life, and therefore he would be forever blind. Additionally, Indians would sometimes bleed out a body to weaken it in the afterlife, and, in rare cases, destroy the body to prevent that spirit from ever making the journey to the afterlife.²³

Loss of the Sacred Black Hills

In the eyes of the Indians, Custer violated the Treaty of 1868 when he led his expedition to the Black Hills. This was the worst thing the white man could have done in the interest of peace for it stirred up a hornets' nest that would take another fifteen years and hundreds of deaths to resolve. The Indians had not forgotten Custer; in fact they knew him well, calling him Long Hair or Son of the Morning Star due to his flowing blonde hair and the fact that he liked a dawn attack, appearing to come out of the sunrise. Custer, on the other hand, did not know or understand his enemy very well. Their battle tactics of strike and regroup then strike again did not follow the classic tactics and strategies taught at West Point. The Lakota did not know nor did they care who Napoleon was or what his tactics were; they only knew that to be victorious, guerilla warfare worked very well. The Plains Indians were often called the best irregular light cavalry the world had ever known and they did not stand and fight as the white man did. This frustrated Custer to no end for, being a West Point graduate, he expected an enemy that would stand up and fight.

By 1875, the Indians were divided into those who lived poorly on the reservation surviving on what the government handed out and the non-reservation Indians who continued to live the life they had long known, hunting buffalo, and fighting other tribes as well as the white man. Sheridan once again convinced the powers in Washington that the problems associated with the non-reservation

Indians needed to be solved once and for all. Therefore, an edict was issued to the non-reservation Indians to return to the reservation by January 31, 1876, or face the wrath and might of the US Army. Many Indians did not understand ultimatums, and those that did chose to ignore this one; after all, they were simply hunting on the unceded lands per the agreement of the Treaty of 1868. They did not understand that essentially the treaty was considered null and void by the United States and that the Indians no longer had any right to any lands other than the reservation land provided by the government. The US government wanted total control over the Indians and believed that confining them to reservations was the only way to achieve that control. The Indians wanted to simply abide by the agreement and live as they had always lived, free and happy. When the Indians with Sitting Bull chose not to come in, Sheridan developed a plan to gather them peacefully if possible, or through force if necessary to bring them to the reservation.

The Indians' Last Stand on the Little Bighorn

By June 1876, the country was in full celebration of its one-hundredth birthday. Many on the East Coast were not even aware of the trouble brewing in the West. The US Army implemented a three-pronged approach toward the Powder River country in central Montana where a large village under the leadership of Sitting Bull was determined to be located. Sitting Bull had become very powerful among the non-reservation Indians by this time for not believing anything the white man said, because every treaty ever signed the white man had broken. Crazy Horse, considered one of the most powerful of the war chiefs, having never so much as sustained an injury in battle, was a member of this village. It was rumored that bullets and arrows could not harm Crazy Horse, and he would often taunt the enemy, riding through a hail of bullets without a scratch. His leadership resulted in many victories, and the white man considered him along with Sitting Bull as the leaders of the Indians. The simple fact was the Indians gathered for one last great hunt before going to live on the reservation; many of the Indians would leave the great gathering on the Little Bighorn River prior to the battle on June 25 and go back to their reservations. Sitting Bull had no intention of going to the reservation. Instead, he planned to move north of the border into Canada while Crazy Horse had decided that life on a reservation was not worth living, that he would rather die free than live as a captive. June 25, 1876 would prove the pivotal point in the Great Sioux War.²⁴

The plan was for Colonel John Gibbon to leave Fort Ellis in western

Montana, Brigadier General George Crook to drive north from Fort Fetterman in Wyoming, and General Alfred Howe Terry, with Custer commanding the Seventh Cavalry, to leave Fort Abraham Lincoln in Illinois and push west. Terry had overall command of the entire action; however, Crook would act independently as he had started before Terry and Gibbon and had the least distance to travel. The plan was to flush the Indians toward one of the other columns, capture the Indians, and return them all to their reservations. Crook intended to find the Indians before the others arrived in the theater and solve the problem on his own. Crook would have his chance sooner than he thought. He traveled up the Rosebud River and on June 15 came to within twenty-five miles of Sitting Bull's great village. A war party sent for the purpose ousted Crook. Crook had not taken provisions on his excursion and, after his defeat, returned to Fetterman where he would remain for the next six weeks, waiting too long to be able to assist the other columns. Crook notified Sheridan of his setback; however, the information did not reach Terry until July 7, well after the battle that resulted in the deaths of over two hundred troopers under Custer's command.²⁵

Perhaps surprisingly, the Indians did not expect to be attacked again within days of defeating Crook on the Rosebud. The warriors returned to their camp and celebrated their victory by feasting and dancing all night. On the morning of June 25, the Indian village was unaware there were troops nearby. The women were pulling wild turnips from the ground near the Bighorn River while the children played in the water or helped the women around the camp. The men, having stayed up all night in celebration, had elected to sleep in and have a lazy morning of bathing and eating. Some of the young men and older boys were checking on the horse herds, getting ready to move them. Later that day the village intended to move as grazing was getting scarce. It had been a good spring, buffalo were plenty, and the village was in high spirits; that would soon change with the arrival of Custer and the Seventh Cavalry.²⁶

Major Marcus Reno's attack on the south side of the village was the first indication many warriors had that troops were nearby. The village had received an initial warning of troopers in the area from men sent back by the bands headed to the reservation; however, the first warriors of the village did not have time to prepare themselves fully for the upcoming battle. They rushed to meet the soldiers with their weapons and maybe a favorite shirt. Many warriors in the interior of the camp prepared themselves with paint and ceremony, gathering their horses, and then

joined the battle. The records from the Indians indicate that many of the warriors who repelled Major Reno's attack then joined in the action against Custer. He did not have a chance in this battle. The Indians far outnumbered his force, and as in previous battles, he did not have good intelligence concerning the size of the force he was facing. Custer had divided his force into three prongs, Reno to the south of the village, and Captain Frederick Benteen with his men even further south as reserves. Custer would go to the north end of the village to block the escape of the Indians. His battle philosophy of charging through the village would not work on an encampment of this magnitude. By dividing his forces he allowed many of the warriors further up the valley time to prepare themselves, and the Indians took advantage of it. Sitting Bull's vision of a sure victory a few days earlier at the Sun Dance held on the Rosebud following the Crook rout gave the warriors a sense of confidence that enabled them to go into this battle sure of a decisive victory. This victory, however, made a lifelong enemy of the entire Seventh Cavalry, which would come to fruition four and one-half years later on the Pine Ridge reservation along Wounded Knee Creek.²⁷

The Final Curtain

On June 26, following the battle on the Little Bighorn River, the village packed up and proceeded to depart the traditional hunting grounds. Sitting Bull and his followers turned north for the Canadian border while Crazy Horse and his followers turned south. Those who wished to return to the reservations did so without incident. For the next year, the US Army under Crook would hunt down those who did not want to live the life of a reservation Indian. Sitting Bull eventually returned to the United States after facing the possibility of starvation in Canada. From 1881 until 1883, Sitting Bull was kept as a prisoner of war at Fort Randall before returning to the Standing Rock Agency, also known as the Spotted Tail Agency after the peace chief Spotted Tail. In 1885, Sitting Bull joined Buffalo Bill Cody's Wild West Show and toured the United States; however, when offered the chance to go to England in 1887, Sitting Bull turned Cody down, indicating that he was needed at home due to more rumors of unrest and reduction in Sioux lands. By 1889, the Lakota were dying of malnutrition and disease; action had to be taken.

In 1889, rumors of a new Indian redemption came from Nevada in the form of the Ghost Dance. Supposedly, by performing this dance the white man would be washed from the face of the earth by a great flood and the Indian would survive. The buffalo and all the creatures of the land would be returned, and the life

of the old ways could be resumed. By this time, the Lakota people were so destitute that they were willing to believe almost anything to restore their former honor and glory. Kicking Bear brought the Ghost Dance to the Sioux after traveling to Nevada to see the mystic and receive the instructions. The Lakota added one feature to the process; a shirt called a ghost shirt that was rumored to repel bullets. This alarmed the whites, for why would the Indians need to repel bullets unless they were planning an uprising? Rumors abounded, and tribal police closely monitored the Ghost Dancers. Sitting Bull tried the dance; however, after receiving no visions he dismissed the process. During this time the authorities, fearing Sitting Bull would once again rise to power, sought to have him arrested. His own people, the tribal police, killed Sitting Bull when one of his followers fired at a policeman after Sitting Bull was reported to have said he was not going with them.²⁸

By 1890, the situation was once again uncertain as Sitting Bull's followers hurried toward the camp of Big Foot, a well-known chief. As Big Foot's band, with Sitting Bull's followers now counted among them, tried to return peacefully to their village, the Army ordered Colonel Samuel S. Sumner of the Eighth Cavalry to remove them to Camp Cheyenne. Big Foot's people then stole away under the cover of darkness toward the Pine Ridge Reservation. General Nelson A. Miles ordered Major Samuel Whiteside and the Seventh Cavalry to intercept the band, which he did. Carrying a white flag, Big Foot asked for and received permission to speak with Whiteside. Big Foot then agreed to go with Whiteside, who took them to Wounded Knee Creek and surrounded them as they set up camp. During the night Colonel James Forsyth and Custer's regiment of the Seventh Cavalry arrived and joined Whiteside's forces. The next morning, as Forsyth prepared to disarm the Indians by searching through their belongings, a rifle belonging to a deaf Indian discharged as he handed it over to a soldier. This was all it took for the troopers to open fire from their positions surrounding the peaceful band. Indians who had yet to hand over their weapons returned fire. This appeared to be the fulfillment of the final warning Sitting Bull had issued to his people before the battle on the Little Bighorn; to loot the fallen soldiers would be a curse on the Sioux nation. Custer's old regiment, the Seventh Cavalry, would, it seems, fulfill this curse as they massacred nearly 300 Indians, predominantly women and children, on the banks of Wounded Knee Creek. Once again, a peaceful village trying to comply would pay the ultimate price for hatred and scorn.²⁹

Conclusion

It took only forty years to defeat a proud and noble people and turn them into a destitute, landless nation. Dee Brown illustrated the irony very well in his book *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee* in the closing words:

The wagonloads of wounded Sioux (four men and forty-seven women and children) reached Pine Ridge after dark. Because all available barracks were filled with soldiers, they were left lying in the open wagons in the bitter cold while an inept Army officer searched for shelter. Finally, the Episcopal mission was opened, the benches taken out, and hay scattered over the rough flooring. It was the fourth day after Christmas in the Year of Our Lord 1890. When the first torn and bleeding bodies were carried into the candlelit church, those who were conscious could see Christmas greenery hanging from the open rafters. Across the chancel from above the pulpit was strung a crudely lettered banner: **PEACE ON EARTH, GOOD WILL TO MEN.**³⁰

Notes

1. National Park Service, *Mount Rushmore: National Memorial, South Dakota*, accessed May 1, 2013, <http://www.nps.gov/moru/historyculture/index.htm>.

2. John (Fire) Lane Deer, and Richard Erdoes, *Lame Deer, Seeker of Visions* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), 93.

3. Thomas Powers, *The Killing of Crazy Horse* (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), xi.

4. James Donovan, *A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn, the Last Great Battle of The American West* (New York: Back Bay Books, 2008), 18.

5. Donovan, *A Terrible Glory*, 18; Charles J. Kappler, "Treaty of Fort Laramie with Sioux, Etc., 1851." *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, Vol. II, Treaties*, (1904), accessed May 1, 2013, <http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/treaties/sio0594.htm>.

6. Jeffery Ostler, *The Lakotas and the Black Hills* (New York: Penguin Group, 2010), 37.

7. Kappler, "Treaty of Fort Laramie with Sioux, Etc., 1851."

8. Donovan, *A Terrible Glory*, 19-20.

9. Ibid.

10. Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee* (New York: Sterling Publishing, 2009),

54; Minnesota Historical Society, *The U.S. Dakota War of 1862*, accessed May 1, 2013, <http://usdakotawar.org/>.

11. Minnesota Historical Society, *The U.S. Dakota War of 1862*, accessed May 1, 2013, <http://usdakotawar.org/>.

12. Native American Legends—Chief Black Kettle, accessed May 2, 2013, <http://www.legendsofamerica.com/na-blackkettle.html>; Donovan, *A Terrible Glory*, 24-26.

13. Donovan, *A Terrible Glory*, 24-26.

14. Ibid.

15. B.W. Allred, *Great Western Indian Fights*, (Omaha, University of Nebraska Press, 1957), 175; Donovan, *A Terrible Glory*, 60.

16. James Donovan, *A Terrible Glory*, 60-62.

17. National Park Service, *Washita Battlefield*, accessed May 1, 2013, <http://www.nps.gov/waba/index.htm>; James Donovan, *A Terrible Glory*, 61.

18. Thomas Powers, *The Killing of Crazy Horse* (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 37.

19. John Neihardt, Black Elk, and Raymond Demalle, *Sixth Grandfather*. (New York: McMillan, 1951), 3.

20. Frederick Hoxie, *Encyclopedia of North American Indians* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995), 570; Thomas Powers, *The Killing of Crazy Horse* (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 40.

21. Thomas Powers, *The Killing of Crazy Horse*, 40.

22. The Avalon Project, *Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868*, accessed May 2, 2013, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/nt001.asp; James Donovan, *A Terrible Glory*, 31.

23. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, *Lakota Sioux Creation Myth-Wind Cave Story*, accessed May 1, 2013, http://www.sioux.org/index.php/main/inner/sioux/lakota_sioux_creation_myth_wind_cave_story.

24. John Gray, *Custer's Last Campaign*, (New York: Random House, 1976). 123.

25. John Gray, *Custer's Last Campaign*, 124; James Donovan, *A Terrible Glory*, 128, 150, 153.

26. Gregory F. Michno, *Lakota Noon*. (Missoula: Mountain Press, 1997), 23-24.

27. Ibid., 30-31.

28. Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee*. (New York: Sterling Publishing, 2009), 515, 506, 513.

29. Ibid., 516, 520-522.

30. Ibid., 524.

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- Allred, B.W. *Great Western Indian Fights*. Omaha: University of Nebraska Press, 1957.
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Jona Lunde was born and raised in Colorado; spending half of her life on a dry land wheat farm forty-five miles southeast of Cheyenne, WY on the Great Plains. The elder of two children, Jona grew up with a deep appreciation of history, especially of the American West. In 2012, Jona made the decision to finally pursue her Bachelor's degree in Transportation and Logistics Management; effectively combining 28 years of experience in the transportation industry as a driver and later in middle management with a degree. In conjunction with her major, Jona was influenced by Dr. Larry Fliegelman at American Public University to pursue a minor in History. Her appreciation of the events in the American West following the Civil War led her to research the cultural differences between American settlers and the native tribes of the Great Plains. Jona will graduate in June 2016, and plans to pursue her Master's in Transportation and Logistics with the intention of becoming a college professor in her field. She lives with her husband in North Texas.



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Scott Trostel. *The Lincoln Funeral Train: The Final Journey and National Funeral for Abraham Lincoln*. Ohio: Cam-Tech Publishing, 2012.

Book Review

Jennifer Thompson

This book traces the route followed by the Lincoln funeral train, with each chapter covering one day of the journey, and shows the nation's response to the loss of her sixteenth president. The city of Springfield, Illinois immediately reacted to his death, requesting to be his burial site. Mrs. Lincoln wanted him buried in Chicago and wanted him to lie in state only in state capitals along a straight path to Chicago. She did not like the idea of "an extended funeral train, extended public memorials and a Springfield burial."¹ Multiple cities requested the funeral train travel through their towns so they could pay their respects. By April 19, she finally chose a cemetery north of Springfield, but she did not escort his remains.

Trostel recorded how railroads offered special trains and cars for the journey, how they decorated the trains and cars in mourning, how each city erected memorials and held services, and how people gathered along the railroad tracks to pay their respects, even in the rain. He explained the special rules followed by the train, which included safety signals used at each switch and bridge, the speed of five miles per hour, and the tolling of the bell at each station. Telegraph officers sent telegrams to the next station to alert them that the train was coming, and security along the way ensured safe passage of the train. He described the two primary cars of the train. The funeral car, the *United States*, bore the bodies of Lincoln and his son Willie and the officers' car carried the family, high-ranking officers, and the guard escort. Lincoln had planned to view this new presidential car, the *United States*, on the day he died. At least nine cars made up the funeral train; however, the railroads changed locomotives and added and removed passenger cars along the way. The train used at least forty-two locomotives and eighty passenger cars during the journey.

Trostel recorded the weather conditions along the way, predominantly rain, and how the memorial bunting needed to be frequently changed. He recorded how each city and town along the way showed their respects with elaborate displays,

flowers, memorial services, and long lines to view the remains. He also recorded the names of those boarding and leaving the funeral train procession. He also recorded some of the problems faced along the route. Flowers thrown onto the tracks by schoolchildren became crushed by the engine wheels and “became so slippery that the train almost stalled more than once.”² Heavy rains shortened funeral processions through towns. Pickpockets stole from the crowded mourners. The train failed to stop in or skipped towns along the way. A wooden sidewalk in Chicago collapsed under the weight of mourners marching in a procession.

Trostel concluded his book with Lincoln’s final funeral and burial in Springfield. He included lists naming the guard escort, cities holding official memorials, hotels providing means and lodging, governors on board the train, railroads traveled and ferry boats used along the way, and the cars and locomotives provided for the train. This well-written book provides a great tribute to a well-loved president and will be a great asset for those planning to see the Lincoln Funeral Train following the same route for the 150th anniversary in 2015.

End Notes

1. Scott Trostel, *The Lincoln Funeral Train: The Final Journey and National Funeral for Abraham Lincoln* (Fletcher, Ohio: Cam-Tech Publishing, 2012), 16.

2. *Ibid.*, 65.

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Our reviewer: Jennifer Thompson is an adjunct professor at American Public University Systems / American Military University. She graduated from APUS in 2006 with her MA in Military Studies / Civil War. She earned her BA in General Studies from Indiana University. Since 2006, she has served as editor for the Indianapolis Civil War Round Table's newsletter, *Hardtack*. She is happily married for thirty-five years to her husband Jerry. They have two grown children, Jeremy and Rose, and four grandchildren, Crystal, James, Shyann, and Cherokee.

Desmond Seward. *The Warrior King and the Invasion of France: Henry V, Agincourt, and the Campaign that Shaped Medieval England*. New York: Pegasus Books, 2014.

Book Review

Daniel Rosko.

A person's perception of King Henry V (1387-1422 CE) can vary greatly, based upon his or her regional origins. The English hail Henry V as a hero, and revere him as one of the great monarchs of England. The French, on the other hand, view Henry V as an invader who led a ferocious army that committed unspeakable acts against the people of France. In his book, *The Warrior King and the Invasion of France*, author Desmond Seward detailed how the House of Lancaster usurped the crown of England and described the second Lancaster king, Henry V, as a brilliant and successful military leader. Henry V believed that God supported his cause and that he, Henry, earned the right to rule Normandy through his military victories. Seward also highlighted the dual nature of this deeply religious king, who brought senseless slaughter to French soldiers as well as innocent French citizens during his campaigns and subsequent occupation of France.

Seward used sources that offer accurate, contemporary insight into Henry V, including eyewitness accounts and documents from people who lived during Henry V's lifetime, reign, and his creation of the Anglo-Franco dual monarchy. He used primary sources from the accounts of people such as Bishop Thomas Basin, Jean de Montreuil, Georges Chastellain, Adam of Usk, and Robert Blondel. These sources give great insight into Henry V as a soldier and leader, both from the period when he, as a young English prince, fought against the Welsh, and later, when as king of England, he campaigned against the French in Normandy. The authors of the sources mentioned above either were either confidants to the king, or had witnessed the destruction caused by Henry V and the English army. Along with his contemporary sources, the author also used a blend of secondary sources. These sources illustrate the biases between the British view of Henry V and the French view of the warrior king, and include resources from English historians such as E.F. Jacob and K. B. McFarlane. Though the secondary sources seem to emphasize the

British perspective a bit more, Seward's historical sources used to explain the different stages of Henry V's life are, for the most part, reliable and accurate.

One of the book's great strengths is how the author used historical sources to emphasize his key points. For example, one of the author's major points described how Henry V's family came to the crown as, "Gaunt had commissioned a forged chronicle containing a fable which purported to establish his son's right to the throne." (p. 8). Gaunt—John of Gaunt, the Duke of Lancaster—was the father of Henry IV and grandfather of Henry V. Gaunt used the aforementioned chronicle to prove the legitimacy of the Lancaster claim to the throne of England, yet, if the validity of the chronicle is in question, so then is the Lancaster claim to the throne. The use of sources such as this helped strengthen the author's message to the reader. Material from Robert Blondel provided another example. When talking about Henry V's treatment of the French, Blondel stated, "There are those who have been killed by the sword, those who have fled the soil of their fathers, those who have despaired and died, ground down by the sheer weight of tyranny." (p.162). Henry V tried to portray himself as the rightful ruler of Normandy, which is in fact a false presumption, especially if a person were to rely solely on English contemporary sources. Throughout the book, the author chronologically provided accounts that emphasize how Henry V and the English army subjected the French populous to execution, unjust punishment, and forcible removal from their homes.

Historians, including Gerald Harriss and Christopher Allmand, have written countless books about Henry V, including portrayals of his life, his reign as king of England, his creation of a dual monarchy between England and France, and his military campaigns into Normandy. Desmond's book provided a detailed, chronological description of how the House of Lancaster usurped the crown of England, and put Henry V on track to become king of England, and mass an army to attack the French. Along with his focus on Henry V, the author detailed many of the king's inner circle, who were the only people that the king could trust. For a person that may not be of English heritage or may not have a strong understanding of this period of history, this book is definitely worth reading. It seems astonishing that a king who was so deeply spiritual, would not just allow, but sanction the execution of innocent men, women, and children. The reviewer recommends that others read this book because the author, Desmond Seward, removed much of the romanticism that surrounds Henry V to this day; romanticism that is due in part to perceptions created by William Shakespeare's play, *Henry V*. The author addresses a general bias of English historians who have tried to minimize the cruelty of what happened to the

French during the invasion. For a person who may know little to nothing about English history, French history, or medieval warfare, this is a very good book to read. Even for a reader looking for a different perspective on King Henry V, this book would be a great choice, especially due to the sources of information that the author used in researching this book. For someone who may know a great deal about the English invasion of Normandy, this book may completely change the reader's perspective of Henry V, the House of Lancaster, and the English invasion of France.



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Jeff Shaara. *The Fateful Lightning: A Novel of the Civil War*.
Ballantine Books: New York, June 2015.

Book Review

Robert Smith, Phd

There are those who think Jeff Shaara's books on the American Civil War are like sausage, that they are simply cranked out. As noted in *Gone with the Wind*, the response can only be “Fiddle-dee-dee!” for such an assertion shows that person has simply not read any of his works. It is easy to toss around words like masterful, but Shaara’s trilogy on the American Civil War in the West is a tour de force of an area generally—and blissfully—ignored, as it did not have Confederate General Robert E. Lee and it was not Gettysburg.

The Fateful Lightning begins with the period after Union General William T. Sherman's occupation of Atlanta. Sherman’s capture of the city ended the immediate political crisis by ensuring Lincoln's reelection. However, Sherman realized there was also a political and military crisis to be faced, particularly with his commander, General Ulysses S. Grant bogged down around Petersburg, Virginia. Sherman, with his knowledge of the South, understood that for the war to end, the level of Southerners’ pain and suffering needed to be elevated. Shaara nicely allows us to see that Sherman's decision to march to the sea and to make Georgia howl was a decision of the highest strategic order; Sherman—as we see through the author's eye—wanted the war to be over but also knew he must become more brutal. The beauty of this new work is that a reader can appreciate it as a stand-alone volume.



Figure 1 Photograph of author Jeff Shaara, used by permission.

What makes *The Fateful Lightning* even more fascinating is that there are no large pitched battles until the Battle of Bentonville, North Carolina in March 1865. Instead, the astute story telling sweeps readers along with the Army as it marches to the sea, continuously out maneuvering and perplexing the thin forces of militia and Confederate Cavalry attempting to stop the onslaught. Shaara’s Sherman

is very earthy, very real, and human. As an armor officer, this reviewer has extensively read on Sherman—and this is Sherman. However, the reviewer's most admired character was Confederate General William Hardee, who wrote the book *Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics (1853-1855)*—otherwise known as *Hardee's Tactics*—that officers on both sides of the struggle learned to master and employ. Seeing the war through his eyes invoked memories of the German officers in 1945 attempting to stem the Soviet steamroller, doing their duty, and knowing that nothing they do will produce victory.

Shaara has completed his American Civil War universe. Readers will see the war and its social implications through the life and experience of a slave freed from bondage by the Army and his promise of a new life. They will feel the depression and fatigue of the Confederate Cavalry Captain, hoping his tired mounts, troops, and himself can survive the war while continuing to do their duty for a lost cause. They will feel the sweat, the stink, the smells, and the sounds of the Union Army on the March. Shaara's small asides about the complications and political challenges of the Confederacy to find good senior leadership due to Jefferson Davis's pettiness is a cautionary tale for today's era where politics has come to the forefront seemingly as a litmus test.

A small aside—this reviewer had hoped that Shaara would delve into the punch and counterpunch of Confederate General Joseph Johnston and Sherman battling through the Atlanta Campaign. It would have been very interesting to read his handling of that Fabian campaign, which lasted until the disastrous replacement of Johnston by General John Hood. Shaara's view on the political machinations surrounding that debacle, together with Jefferson Davis's limited options and ego—and how these played into the outcome—would have been masterful. However, that is simply a wish and that story is outside the scope of Shaara's vision here. Ultimately, the success of the book, like those preceding it, is this—it feels like history. That is good enough, and coupled with it being a loving read, means it is a book to keep.




Figure 2 Cover art, used by permission.

Our reviewer: Dr. Robert G. Smith, LTC (Ret) US ARMY, graduated from Juniata College with a BS in Poli Sci cum laude. LTC Smith attended the Pennsylvania State University, receiving his MA (cum laude) in American Military History in 1982, and a Juris Doctorate in 1992 from West Virginia University. LTC Smith has served in the capacity of an armor officer, logistician, military intelligence, and engineer officer. He is a graduate of the Armor Basic Course, the Armor Advanced Course, Command and General Staff College and Army Combined Arms Staff College, the Advanced Joint Professional Military Course in Joint Warfare and Air War College. After 9/11 he was recalled to active duty, serving as the lead Army military historian at the US Army Center of Military History for the attack on the Pentagon. He has subsequently served as the Vth Corps historian for the initial invasion of Iraq and in the Deputy Directorate of Special Operation (DDSO) on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While on the DDSO he wrote a highly classified study on SOF in the Global War on Terror. He was the CoS of the Army one man GWOT record collector, tasked to collect all the lost records. In three years he collected 7 1/2 TB of records. His last duty station was serving as the Deputy Command Historian at CENTCOM before placement into the Army Wounded Warrior Program to heal. He was appointed as a Kentucky Colonel by the Governor of Kentucky in 2010. Dr. Smith is proudest of his Combat Action Badge from his tour in Iraq. Dr. Smith was honored in 2014 at AMU by being awarded of the Excellence in Teaching Award. He is married to Katie. They have two sons, one a recent graduate of the Officer Basic Signal School and the other a combat veteran of Afghanistan where he received the Combat Infantryman Badge. They happily retired from the Army near where he grew up in PA.



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Eric H. Cline. *1177 B.C.: The Year Civilization Collapsed*.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

Book Review

Stan Prager

Many scholars consider the last several centuries of the Bronze Age in the ancient Near East and Mediterranean as the first great age of internationalism that engaged dominant powers in highly complex networks of trade, treaties, relationships and alliances far more sophisticated than previously manifested. This remarkable era closed with the exclamation point of its abrupt and mysterious fall somewhat coterminous with the memory of the legendary Trojan War, a shadowy collapse that has left generations of historians scrambling to satisfactorily explain. The latest contender is *1177 B.C.: The Year Civilization Collapsed*, by Eric H. Cline.¹ Adding to the book's luster is its 2014 publication launching a new series—*Turning Points in Ancient History*—edited by noted historian Barry Strauss.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century it was Heinrich Schliemann who—after famously discovering the ruins of ancient Troy on the northwest coast of present day Turkey—later uncovered the forgotten Mycenaean civilization of Bronze Age Greece. Once among the great powers of the mid-to-late second millennium BCE engaging in international trade and swaggering with the likes of Egyptians, Hittites, Mitanni, and Kassite Babylonians, the Mycenaeans seem to have gone down in flames with the abrupt breakdown of Bronze Age civilization in the Mediterranean and Near East circa the twelfth century BCE, which spawned a dark age lasting several hundred years where the Greeks seem to have actually lost literacy.

The Bronze Age collapse has received much scholarly attention but has never found satisfactory explanation. Part of the challenge in unravelling the mystery is that not all states were affected equally: the Hittites almost entirely disappeared from history; Egypt lost its empire but otherwise endured; some states saw decline and rebirth, others extinction. Various theories have been advanced over the years—including climate change, earthquakes, plague and more—but none seems to fit all circumstances and all geographies. Perhaps the most famous focuses upon the mysterious “Sea Peoples,” unknown invaders described in various sources who brought sudden fierce attacks to the region and undermined multiple states. While

assaults by the “Sea Peoples” seem to have been an actual historical phenomenon, it is not clear whether their appearance represented a cause or effect of widespread destabilization that sparked a mass movement of populations. It is now commonly accepted, for instance, that the Biblical Philistines had their origins in Mycenaean Greeks who settled in Canaan. Upon arrival, they were no doubt “Sea Peoples,” as well.

That Cline, an archaeologist and eminent historian at George Washington University, seeks to take on such a fascinating time-honored mystery from an academic perspective only adds to the appeal of this volume. Unfortunately, the reader will be annoyed almost at once to discover that the book’s sensationalized title is wildly misleading: this work is a survey of life and trade and war and interdependence in the “globalized” world of the Bronze Age Mediterranean and Near East—not its fall, as implied. Those familiar with *From Egypt to Babylon* by Paul Collins will find little new ground broken here.² In a book comprised of 176 pages (not including end matter), Cline does not even address generalized collapse until the final chapter that begins on page 139. It turns out that even the year 1177 enshrined in his title is rather arbitrary, since there was no single year of systematic multi-state cataclysm, as Cline explains in the book’s final pages that “the eighth year of the reign of the Egyptian pharaoh Ramses III—1177 BC, to be specific . . . stands out and is representative of the entire collapse.”³ Even more disappointing is that the final chapter, entitled “A ‘Perfect Storm’ of Calamities?” is little more than a reasoned discussion of *all* of the various theories of what might have brought on a multi-regional catastrophe. Cline suggests that a concatenation of nearly simultaneous calamities might have pushed the entire civilizational structure to a kind of unrecoverable tipping point. While that may indeed have been the case, in frustration some readers may be unfortunately reminded of the denouement to Robert Mayer’s novel *I, JFK*, which concludes by whimsically trumping all conspiracy theories to reveal who was really behind Kennedy’s assassination—which turned out to be absolutely everyone: Cuba, Russia, the Mafia, the CIA, and the FBI!⁴

Cline should be credited with assembling the latest scholarship about Bronze Age civilization into a single volume with supporting citations to serve as an excellent source to a reader seeking to steep him or herself in what is known—as well as what has yet to be learned—about this fascinating period of ancient history. There is a wealth of data supplemented by solid maps, tables, and a biographical list of key figures. On the other hand, while Cline places a great deal of his emphasis on

the interdependence of the states and cultures of that era, he manages to do a rather poor job of weaving this into a coherent narrative, which instead tends to jump around from one place or theme or notion to another. Possibly a better editor was called for; Cline, after all, does not seem to be a bad writer, just a highly disorganized one. Perhaps he was put off course by being assigned to write to the book's title, rather than what he had really hoped to communicate. If one seeks to learn more about the Bronze Age and can overlook a somewhat uneven narrative, then look for the Cline book, but if seeking groundbreaking revelations of what may have led to its collapse, be sure to look elsewhere.

Notes

1. Eric H. Cline, *1177 B.C.: The Year Civilization Collapsed* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

2. Paul Collins, *From Egypt to Babylon: The International Age 1550-500 BC* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).

3. Cline, 172.

4. Robert Mayer, *I, JFK* (NY: Dutton, 1989).

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Our reviewer: Stan Prager earned a M.A. in History with honors from APU, with a concentration in Public History, and was selected by the School of Arts & Humanities as its Academic Scholar of the Year. Stan is a member of both *Pi Gamma Mu* and the newly-minted APUS History Honor Society. Stan's abiding passion is the marriage of history and technology: he is owner and president of GoGeeks Computer Rescue, a computer repair and manufacturing business, and has applied focused elements of his recent degree to a new venture focused upon digitization called Digital Archive Solutions. Stan has served on his town's Board of Library Trustees, and frequently appears as a technology expert on a local television station. An avid reader with eclectic interests, he authors his own book blog, www.regarp.com. Stan, who has two adult children, lives in East Longmeadow, MA with his wife Susan.



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Bernard Cornwell. *Waterloo: The History of Four Days, Three Armies, and Three Battles*. HarperCollins: New York, 2015.

Book Review

Robert Smith, Phd.

Americans might confuse Waterloo with Gettysburg, the critical battle of our American Civil War. However, the comparison is simply not valid at almost any level except that both battles were blood baths. Gettysburg was another one of those battles that was unable to bring closure to the American Civil War. Waterloo ended the era of Napoleon, changing the course of history. Indeed it closed the book on what was perhaps the first European Civil War until nearly one hundred years later. Bernard Cornwell, renowned for his works of historical fiction, ventures into new territory here with this nonfiction account of the eighteenth day of June 1815. Make no mistake about it; Cornwell is a military historian who has a good feel for the battlefield. Waterloo seems simply another vehicle for him to do his magic, weave tales, and bring history to life—but here Cornwell creates his take faithfully out of the whole cloth of solid scholarship, crafting perhaps the standard for future popular works on Waterloo.

Cornwell does not move much beyond the accepted limits of the standard history of the battle. There are controversies that swirl about this battle, particularly concerning the last half-hour and who should be credited with striking the decisive blow for the British. Cornwell, to his credit, side steps that issue as it would have made his work less accessible to the general public. Instead, Cornwell tells the story of the Waterloo Campaign. He spends very little time on what is called the Hundred Days Campaign. The story really begins with the grand ball in Brussels on the evening of June 15, 1815. Yet Cornwell does not solely focus on Waterloo but pays due attention to the battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras and their impact on Waterloo.




Figure 1 Cover art, used by permission.

So why another book on Waterloo? Unless Cornwell uncovered new archival material, is it not unlike a movie on the Titanic—you know the ending. This is where Cornwell's craft comes in. Through much of the book, Cornwell used present tense to build a suspenseful tale. This convention, known as the historical present, may set the teeth on edge of more traditionalist military history aficionados. Cornwell is not writing for them, however. Moreover, the chosen vignettes employed—and the book is replete with those from both sides—gives readers the feel of almost a military after action report. The tone and style makes it feel fresh and not a story from two hundred years ago. Cornwell's style imparts a sense of drama that with his pacing makes this a new story for the reader.

Throughout the book, Cornwell raises a series of interesting issues, without ever getting mired in controversy. He allows the reader to judge how much credit the Prussians deserve in the end for the Allied victory at Waterloo, and he damns with faint praise almost all the French leadership, from Napoleon to Marshal Michel Ney. Perhaps the only French leader who truly escapes censure is Marshal Emmanuel de Grouchy, who like General Lew Wallace at Shiloh, was perhaps a bit dilatory in moving to the sounds of the guns. Yet Cornwell carefully examines the historic evidence of the orders Napoleon sent to Grouchy, allowing the reader to see that Grouchy had multiple sets of conflicting orders. Cornwell though did not extend his analysis deeper, which is perhaps the one failing of sorts with this otherwise delightful book. Here was a perfect example of how ossified the French command structure had become under Napoleon that his Marshals were only tools to execute and not battlefield commanders in their own right. The Prussian story revolves around two men, specifically Marshal Gebhard von Blücher and General Augustus von Gneisenau, with a third often mentioned who left a greater intellectual impact than either—Clausewitz. The World War I German High Seas Fleet even named Battle Cruisers after the first two individuals. Cornwell indirectly places much of the credit for the ultimate victory on Blücher's shoulders, with his single-minded determination to annihilate Napoleon. Blücher was driven by the desire to avenge his homeland of Prussia's humiliations suffered through Napoleon's utter defeat of the Prussian Army and the subsequent French Army occupation of Prussia in 1806.

Yet on balance, Cornwell achieves his objective, a distinguished popular account of Waterloo. Cornwell also, one must suspect with processor in hand, tells his reader some of the more popular and apocryphal tales of Waterloo. While mounted beside Wellington at the end of the battle, a solid shot cannonball carried off Lord Uxbridge's leg. Cornwell notes the supposed exchange, which is oh, so

upper class British:

Uxbridge to Wellington upon realization he had been severely wounded:

“By God, sir, I’ve lost my leg!”

Wellington's reply was: “By God, sir, so you have!”

Cornwell also speaks to the various myths surrounding the end of Napoleons' Old Guard. Dependent upon what version suits your view of history, the Old Guard providing rear security pulled itself into a square. Popular accounts fancy that they were either all killed like the Spartans at Thermopylae after asserting, “The Guard Dies but never surrenders” or more bluntly “Merde.” For the vast majority of readers, Cornwell brings sense and context to this immense battle, the likes of which would not be seen again until the mass armies of World War One—but never again would the world see such a charnel house as was this one day in Belgium.

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Our reviewer: LTC Robert G. Smith graduated from Juniata College with a BS in Poli Sci cum laude. LTC Smith attended the Pennsylvania State University, receiving his MA(cum laude) in American Military History in 1982, and a Juris Doctorate in 1992 from West Virginia University. LTC Smith has served in the capacity of an armor officer, logistician, military intelligence and engineer officer. He is a graduate of the Armor Basic Course, the Armor Advanced Course, Command and General Staff College and Army Combined Arms Staff College and the Advanced Joint Professional Military Course in Joint Warfare. (He is currently suffering through Air War College). After 9/11 he was recalled to active duty, serving as the lead Army military historian at the US Army Center of Military History for the attack on the Pentagon. He has subsequently served as the Vth Corps historian for the initial invasion of Iraq and in the Deputy Directorate of Special Operation (DDSO) on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While on the DDSO he wrote a highly classified study on SOF in the Global War on Terror. He was the CoS of the Army one man GWOT record collector, tasked to collect all the lost records. In 3 years he collected 7 1/2 TB of records. In addition he served as the Deputy Command Historian at CENTCOM. He was appointed as a Kentucky Colonel by the Governor of Kentucky in 2010. He currently is in the Army Wounded Warrior Program.



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Steven C. Bullock. *Revolutionary Brotherhood: Freemasonry and the Transformation of the American Social Order, 1730-1840*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

Book Review

Bill Speer

National Treasure and its ilk have given the public a distorted perception of Freemasonry in early America. Professor Steven C. Bullock of Worcester Polytechnic Institute has assisted in righting this wrong with a seminal work on the transformation of Freemasonry during our nation's formative years. While Freemasonry has been central to our history in many ways, few are aware of the subtleties therein and evolution of Freemasonry in the United States. In *Revolutionary Brotherhood*, Bullock traced the history of the Masonic movement from England to the United States and demonstrated how crucial Masons were to the success of both the American Revolution and the new nation under the Constitution. He placed the roots of Freemasonry firmly in the stonemason guilds, but he failed to document this successfully and he did not address other possible origins. His prose interwove Freemasonry with the ebb and flow of social and political movements of the day.

During the Revolution, Southern planters like George Washington and Richard Henry Lee had little in common with New Englanders like Nathanael Greene, a Quaker from Connecticut, and Paul Revere, a Massachusetts engraver, even less with the likes of the Marquis de Lafayette and Baron Frederick von Steuben. Bullock extensively explored the link that bound these and many other Revolutionaries together, Freemasonry.

Bullock attempted to answer such questions as what Freemasonry stood for, what issues Freemasonry confronted, and how the public as a whole reacted to Freemasonry. He tackled confusing and difficult issues like the rise of the Anti-Masonic party (our first true third party) and in the 1820s, the William Morgan affair and its impact upon Freemasonry and the public as a whole. He relied upon both published and unpublished primary sources (including numerous Blue Lodge and Grand Lodge documents) and extensively documented his findings.

This work is not an easy read and can seem dull and listless, at times, the

kind of writing sometimes anticipated from mainstream historians writing to their peers. However, the book is overflowing with fascinating insights into Freemasonry in the period. His argument is complex with many subplots. Beginning in the eighteenth-century, British Freemasonry was a blend of esoteric ancient wisdom and mystical religious beliefs enveloped by terms and practices taken from guilds. In Colonial American cities, the Craft legitimized and justified the claims of social elites. By the mid eighteenth-century, a transformational Freemasonry came from England to the Colonies, known as the “Ancients.” This group brought new rituals and beliefs and allowed the common man into the Craft. It is interesting to note that due to a schism between the two groups, Philadelphia Masonic Lodges did not participate in the funeral of Brother Benjamin Franklin; they completely ignored the event and did not even record it, as Franklin was the wrong “sort” of Freemason. This incident underlines the institutional transformation that occurred within Franklin’s sixty-year life as a Freemason.

This work should be standard reading for anyone interested in the early years of Freemasonry in America. One final observation, a subtle theme of Bullock’s piece is the inability of Freemasonry to change with the times. This should serve as a cautionary tale for the Fraternity today, we must learn from our past mistakes.

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Our reviewer: Bill Speer is a graduate of the Pennsylvania Military College (now Widener University). A long-time instructor in history at American Military University and Georgia Military College, he has written for numerous periodicals. He is the author of the series *From Broomsticks To Battlefields: After the Battle, The Story of Henry Clay Robinett*, and the forthcoming *Harum-Scarum: The Story of David Vickers Jr.* both of whom were Freemasons. He is a member of Harlem Lodge #276, in Harlem, GA, a York Rite Knight Templar, and a 32-degree, Knights of Saint Andrew Mason.

James Madison Page in collaboration with M.J. Halley. *The True Story of Andersonville Prison: A Defense of Major Henry Wirz*. New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1908. Reprint, Scituate, MA: Digital Scanning, 1999.

Book Review

Jennifer Thompson.

James Madison Page, a Second Lieutenant in Company A, Sixth Michigan Cavalry, was a prisoner at Andersonville for seven months. Other prisoners wrote accounts of the prison, and many of them blamed Major Henry Wirz as “the sole cause of the suffering and mortality endured at Andersonville” (p. 9). Page felt their accounts served “to increase the friction between the two great sections of the country” by unjustly accusing Wirz (p. 10). He wrote this book to reduce that friction as he defended Wirz, feeling that Federal authorities should also share the blame.

Page began his book discussing his lineage “to show how thoroughly ‘Yankee’ I am in ancestry, birth, education, and environment” (p. 15). He recounted his duties as a soldier, several battles, and his capture at Liberty Mills. He spent time imprisoned at Libby Prison and Belle Island in Richmond before arriving at Andersonville.

As a child, he had learned the “biblical quotation, ‘A soft answer turneth away wrath, but grievous words stir up anger,’” which became his life motto (p. 56). Other prisoners wrote about the poor treatment they received, which he felt happened because they failed to follow that motto. During his imprisonment, no Confederate officer or soldier insulted, browbeat, robbed, or mistreated him because he tried to be polite and respectful to them.

Page discussed conflicting descriptions of Andersonville, quoting Ambrose Spencer and his book, *A Narrative of Andersonville*. He also described daily life and friendships with their Alabama guards, who General John Winder replaced with militia and home guards when he took command of the Southern prisons. He did not blame Winder for the meager rations and lack of clothing but “General Winder had an intense hatred for Union soldiers and the Federal Government and was thereby the wrong man to be in command of helpless prisoners” (p. 75).

Page felt other prisoners portrayed Wirz as a monster. Some claimed he put poison in the prisoners’ vaccines. The doctors at Andersonville worked hard to

minister to the sick prisoners, yet they faced charges of torture and neglect. Several prisoners correctly wrote “the hospital was inadequate,” but the surgeons and Wirz were not at fault because “the Confederate Government was in an impoverished condition” (pp. 82, 83). He recounts the garbled account that John McElroy wrote in *A Story of Rebel Prisons* of the shooting of Hubbard, which failed to discuss the situation with the mob charging him as a traitor. Many sick gave up and died because Secretary of War Edward Stanton stopped the prisoner exchange. Page explained how Melvin Grigsby’s account of Andersonville blamed Wirz, and referenced how John W. Urban described that the prisoners felt abandoned by the Federal Government. The soldiers held a mass meeting and created a set of resolutions requesting prisoner exchange (a fact denied by McElroy). Several prisoners failed to write fair accounts about the raiders.

When he first saw Wirz on horseback at Andersonville, Page saluted him. His comrades rebuked him for this, but “the salute was the beginning of our friendship” (p. 59). He recalled meeting with him to request better quality meal for his sick comrades and noted, “[w]ithin a day or two after this, meal of a better quality was issued to us, and a day or two later still, we received corn-meal mush, and later, bread” (p. 79). Page explained what happened when the guards erected the dead-line and ordered them to move their house which extended three feet into the deadline. Again, Page appealed to Wirz, who came to the site and ordered the soldiers “‘not to interfere with your cabin.’ . . . We had the distinction of occupying the only house, cabin, hut, quarters, or habitation within the dead-line at Andersonville” (p. 88). He also discussed how Wirz enlarged the prison and started the brewing of “corn beer” to combat scurvy. “But all that Wirz and his staff of medical men could do failed to stop the ravages of disease and death” (p. 102). Page appealed to Wirz for help against the raiders; Wirz let the prisoners take charge of the arrest and trial of these men. Page again met with Wirz seeking help for his dying comrades, but Wirz explained,

I am doing all I can, I am hampered and pressed for rations. I am even exceeding my authority in issuing supplies. I am blamed by the prisoners for all of this suffering. They do not or will not realize that I am a subordinate, governed by orders of my commanding officer. Why, sir, my own men are on short rations. The best I can do is to see that your sick comrades are removed to the hospital. God help you. I cannot (pp. 126-127).

Page recounted the arrest and trial of Wirz and questioned why Colonel E.D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General, who “figured very prominently in the prosecution,” failed to mention Wirz or the trial in his memoirs (p. 189). He also questioned why the thirteen specifications against Wirz provided specific details about each soldier’s death but none ever provided the name of the victim, even when he died several days after the mistreatment. Wirz left Andersonville on sick leave in late July, during which time he supposedly murdered several of these prisoners, but Lieutenant Davis was in command at that time. Page explained how the press portrayed Wirz “as the greatest criminal of ancient or modern times . . . a fiend, a demon, and a very monster in human shape” (p. 206). He was disappointed that he could not testify; only ten or twelve of the 160 prisoner witnesses testified. He also discussed the last days of Wirz, meeting with his attorney and a Roman Catholic priest, and his refusal to implicate Jefferson Davis in the murders to have his sentence commuted.

Page concluded his book “confident that Major Wirz was innocent of the terrible charges of which he was condemned” (p. 222). He shared an article explaining why the judge advocate failed to allow Father Whelan to testify, the final letters of Wirz accepting his fate even though innocent, an article showing the unfairness of the trial, and his attorney’s letter. Page felt that he could now tell the truth forty years later. It was time to obliterate the bitterness caused by the war, grant pensions to Confederate soldiers, and “to wipe out the so-called ‘Mason and Dixon’s line,’ and hang out the latch-string for each other” (p. 248).

Historians are fortunate that Page did not want to die with this on his conscience. He provided a very strong case in defense of Wirz. Anyone researching Andersonville should read this very well written book to learn the whole truth about Andersonville.

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Our reviewer: Jennifer Thompson is an adjunct professor at American Public University Systems / American Military University. She graduated from APUS in 2006 with her MA in Military Studies / Civil War. She earned her BA in General Studies from Indiana University. Since 2006, she has served as editor for the Indianapolis Civil War Round Table's newsletter, *Hardtack*. She is happily married for thirty-five years to her husband Jerry. They have two grown children, Jeremy and Rose, and four grandchildren, Crystal, James, Shyann, and Cherokee.



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Margaret Macmillan. *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World*.
New York: Random House, 2001. xxxi+570pp.

Book Review

Robinlynn Stewart

Margaret Macmillan's *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World*, is a detailed narrative, encapsulating six of the tensest, most politically charged months of the early twentieth century. Macmillan, the Warden of St. Anthony's College, former Provost of Trinity College, Professor of International History at Oxford, and great granddaughter of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, delves into the initial six months of fierce negotiations following the 1918 Armistice that ended the First World War.

Historians, including Ruth Henig, David Andleman, and David Muzzey, have consistently attributed the cause of the Second World War to the punitive nature of the Treaty of Versailles. In contrast, Macmillan's theory contends that the flawed treaty, created out of expediency rather than principle, is not to blame for the onset of World War II. She developed her thesis by addressing the complex political situation Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, and David Lloyd George faced in 1919, as national needs often trumped those of the international community. She has further argued that although the impetus for waging a Second World War does not lie within the constructs of the treaty, the compromises struck in 1919 laid a foundation for modern conflicts in Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. Macmillan's narrative suggests there was more to the Paris Peace Conference than merely settling peace terms; it was a chance to reshape the world. Unfortunately, the conference created more complications than it solved.

Macmillan's narrative notes the various strengths and weaknesses of each delegation, analyzing the decisions made regarding the stability of the post-war world. *Paris 1919* delves into various diplomatic diaries, letters, papers, and other primary sources to accurately uncover how the most prominent nations of the world presented the Weimar Republic with such a flawed and punitive treaty in June 1919.

While *Paris 1919* navigates its readers through the complexities of the Treaty of Versailles and attached League of Nations Covenant, Macmillan goes a step further in her analysis to evaluate the peace settlements presented to Germany's

Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Ottoman allies. Chapters discussing the creation of Yugoslavia, Iraq, Palestine, and Syria examine the struggle between new ideas of self-determination and international cooperation against established imperialist desires to divide the spoils of war. Documenting the backdoor dealings between French and British diplomats that ensured the old political system emerged triumphant; she smoothly incorporated the growing swell of nationalist sentiment in these regions led by men like Feisal I and İnönü Ismet. In doing so, Macmillan has delivered a comprehensive analysis of the failings associated with the mandate system and identified the foundations for domestic and political unrest throughout these regions in the modern era.

Although organized into thematic sections, denoting various struggles the Council of Four encountered during the pivotal first six-months of peace negotiations, Macmillan's work provides readers with a thorough understanding of the personalities and motivations of the peacemakers. However, the narrative's layout can often prove overwhelming in identifying the chronological flow of events. While isolating each issue and its consequences, the text frequently leads a reader to feel as though they have previously examined a specific period earlier in the text. During Macmillan's examination of the February 1919 struggle to establish Palestinian and Jewish states, she addressed aspects of the topic that are discussed several hundred pages before, within her chronological analysis of the Treaty of Versailles. While this mix of chronological and thematic writing can prove awkward at times, this issue is more of an inconvenience than a deterrent in reading Macmillan's narrative.

Paris 1919 analyzes many of the most disastrous decisions regarding the post war world. Macmillan masterfully weaves together the various topics into a credible account of the Paris Peace Conference. Using an abundance of primary and secondary sources, she has infused these complex negotiations with a bit of life after years of standard historical monographs, all while maintaining the customary accusations of failure attributed to the Council of Four. While this work does not remove culpability from any member of the Council, it provides a critical examination into the massive challenges world leaders encountered at the conclusion of the Great War. According to famed British economist John Maynard Keynes, although Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George were offered an opportunity to recreate the world, what emerged was "a peace that completed the economic destruction done to Europe by the war" (182). Each delegation entered Paris with their personal agendas and hope for the future. Unfortunately, most parties left

feeling they produced a fundamentally imperfect document.

While aspects of Macmillan's argument negating the culpability of the German peace settlement are sound, much of *Paris 1919's* analysis concerning the terms of the German treaty reinforces the arguments of those historians who assigned fault for the Second World War on the Treaty of Versailles. Macmillan credits the League of Nations as a "great experiment," yet she glosses over how the organization's lack of enforcement strategy failed to prevent Hitler's forces from invading those nations it was designed to protect. Furthermore, the harsh reparation issue, demilitarization of Germany, and steep territorial losses are widely considered a basis for Hitler's rise to power in the 1930s. Macmillan argues that Hitler desired to expand the German nation, regardless of the loss of land from the Treaty of Versailles.

Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World, is an important resource in modern world history. Macmillan's narrative has utilized several of the most relevant primary sources to date and develops many frequently neglected events that occurred during the Peace Conference. She conducts a critical review of the various personalities and decisions, presenting a relatable and informative narrative. *Paris 1919* reminds its audience how events transpiring almost a century ago continue to be relevant in modern world events. Macmillan's text masterfully connects the various mistakes of the Paris Peace Conference to the Cold War, rise of Communism in China, and current turmoil in the Middle East. However, her primary argument, disputing claims that the Treaty of Versailles was a significant cause for the Second World War, is best left for the reader to decide.

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Our reviewer: Robinlynn Stewart is a recent graduate from American Public University with a masters in American history. Her area of focus examines the Progressive Era and the American home front during the Great War. She lives in the Washington D.C. area and is currently working on expanding her thesis addressing the 1917 threats against the President act for professional publication.